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Abstract 
 
This research paper explores current open source practices within the Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS), with specific attention to social media use by frontline personnel for the 
purpose of intelligence gathering, investigation and safeguarding. Although, still a 
relatively new phenomenon for policing, recent advancements have been made in 
understanding the impact of open source and social media data use in police work, but 
the focus has been limited to overarching thematical analysis of systems that suggest 
institutional coordination in their use, function and purpose. This study takes a different 
approach by focusing on the practices employed by frontline policing personnel in the 
Metropolitan Police Service and evaluates the concept of ‘localised surveillance’ 
practices employed by frontline officers that risk undermining police legitimacy at a 
fundamental level. By identifying localised practices that include the use of personal 
devices, personal social media accounts and false personas to covertly extract open source 
and social media data this research considers the shifting power relationship between the 
police and public in an age where a plethora of personal information is readily available 
on the internet. At time when traditional surveillance practices are the focus of public 
enquiry, this timely and relevant research is essential for police services’ nationally and 
beyond to consider the implications of localised surveillance practices by frontline 
personnel on their respective agencies and society more widely.  
 
Keywords – social media, surveillance, Metropolitan Police Service, open source, 
intelligence, investigation, safeguarding, policing, localised social media surveillance. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Research Aims 
 
As society increases its consumption of mobile technology with round the clock access 
to social media platforms that require user generated content to survive; from 
commonplace breakfast selfies to drill videos validating gang affiliation. Law 
enforcement continues to recognise the value of open source and social media as an 
important tool to prevent crime, collect evidence and assist in identifying individuals 
associated with criminal activity (LexisNexis, 2014, p.9). With increased user driven 
content comes the exposure of personal data providing others the ability to observe, 
watch, surveil. Law enforcement survive on the identification and extraction of 
intelligence to prevent crime and disorder and their appetite to harness publicly available 
intelligence is only growing in tandem with technological advancements. It is well 
documented that law enforcement agencies around the world are investing heavily to 
harness the power and opportunities of open source technology but the focus of research 
remains largely limited to ‘outsider’ analysis of open source and social media as a law 
enforcement tactic and generally focuses on the concept of surveillance at the institutional 
level or above.  
 
This research has considered the current literature on the use of surveillance as a social 
control measure and the adaptation of surveillance power since Foucault reflected on the 
‘observation of the many by the few’(Mathiesen, 1997, p.216).  With advancements in 
communications technology, social media has changed our understanding of the power 
dynamics involved in surveillance and evolved traditional hierarchical surveillance 
models to include multi-directional and lateral surveillance behaviours. Surveillance is 
considered here in a policing context and reflects on the consequences of unchecked 
surveillance by policing personnel. An issue which has drawn significant attention in 
recent years through the inquiry into undercover policing practices and although it focuses 
primarily on traditional tactics it recognises the transition of covert practices from 
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physical to digital (Mitting, 2015, p.3). The adoption of new surveillance practices 
impacts the notion of policing legitimacy especially as these new technologies provide 
greater insights into individuals private lives that require a need for balance across the 
conflicting paradigms of security and privacy. In some respects, social media offers less 
intrusive access to intelligence compared to traditional tactics; nonetheless embracing 
these open source opportunities rightly places responsibility for proportionality and 
necessity at the feet of law enforcement as power holders in their pursuit of effective 
intelligence gathering. 
 
The governance of social media surveillance is considered here in terms of legislation, 
primarily under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, current policy and 
ethics. In addition, room to explore the legitimate use of social media as a tool for 
engagement, intelligence and investigation in policing has been provided in order to 
acknowledge the role these combined elements play in establishing a culture of accepted 
social media surveillance practices within policing. This is highlighted through the 
recognition that the key legislation is considered unfit for purpose leaving a vacuum for 
interpretation to flourish. 
 
This study recognises that little attention is given to the open source activities of policing 
personnel, who can access the same mobile devices and social media platforms as the 
public and possess the capability to conduct open source research at the swipe of a phone 
screen. A lack of internal organisational access has resulted in researchers concentrating 
on the impact of organisational scale surveillance, with academia overlooking the concept 
and impact of ‘localised social media surveillance’ practices by the police on society.  
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The combined research arena of open source, social media and their impact on Law 
Enforcement creates a substantial field in which to work and it is necessary to ensure this 
research has concise aims to remain focused. Therefore, the aims of this study are;  
 
• To establish what the current social media practices being employed by 
policing personnel across the MPS and determine whether they constitute 
a form of surveillance.  
 
• To establish whether any identified practices highlight gaps in current 
policy. 
 
• Deliver a new theoretical interpretation of surveillance in the context of 
social media and policing.   
 
This research provides value in understanding of current policing tactics in relation to the 
use of open source and social media and considers their use in a surveillance context. The 
State is represented by the activities of the police and the public are entitled in a 
democratic society to have trust in the fair application of the law. The police must 
therefore balance the proportionate needs of conducting surveillance for the purposes of 
security with the human right to individual privacy.  
 
The results and discussion have been divided into three overarching themes to assist in 
exploring the aims listed above. They are ‘Social Media and the Front Line’ which will 
evidence the demographics using the open source for intelligence and investigation 
purposes and the frequency of its use. The second theme ‘Social Media in a Policing 
Context’ will consider what MPS personnel use open source and social media in a 
policing context for and why and finally the third theme is ‘Policing Dilemmas and Social 
Media’ exploring the implications of these behaviours. However, the focus of this 
research will centre on the MPS personnel’s reliance of their own mobile devices, 
personal social media accounts and false personas for intelligence gathering and 
investigations. This will demonstrate that practices have established themselves as 
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‘normative culture’ where the distinction between public and private digital spaces has 
been blurred by practitioners who rationalise and justify access to publicly available 
information under the banner of ‘policing purpose’ and consider the internet ‘fair game.’ 
By considering the frequency of these practices and their impact on the legitimacy of 
policing this research will argue that these practices have penetrated the cognisance of 
MPS personnel at all levels of frontline policing. Fundamentally this will raise 
procedural, legislative and ethical questions around the use of social media surveillance 
activities, the role of policing in these digital spheres, MPS personnel’s understanding of 
privacy and the impact these practices have on concepts of police legitimacy and the 
power relationship between the police and the public. These are not just issues for the 
MPS but issues important to National Policing as the concepts identified here will have 
implications for all police services across the United Kingdom. 
 
Combining positivist and interpretivist methodological approaches in a mixed method 
design, this study obtained qualitative data from focus groups and quantitative and 
qualitative data from an MPS wide survey. This triangulated analysis represents the first 
internal study of operational practices by officers and staff and provides an insight into 
unchecked frontline social media surveillance. The scale of the practices concludes 
systemic challenges resulting from inadequate access and control over the use of open 
source intelligence for and by personnel. While the findings raise concerns over policing 
practices locally, they also represent a significant challenge for the management of covert 
online surveillance for policing nationally, if not globally. As an ‘insider-insider’ this 
paper provides a unique operational insight not previously captured, with the closest study 
performed by LexisNexis (2014) that looked at US Law Enforcement and the frequency 
of social media use across a range of policing duties. While previous research considers 
the implications of social media surveillance at an organisational level, usually 
referencing social media monitoring (Williams, et al, 2013, pp.461-481; Fuchs and 
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Trottier, 2015, pp.113-135; Sampson, 2017, pp.55-69; Trottier, 2015, pp.317-333). This 
original study considers social media surveillance practices by individuals at the local 
level and the implications their combined activities have on policing legitimacy. In 
evaluating the findings this research concludes by proposing a number of 
recommendations to the current approaches of acquiring open source intelligence and 
suggests a new theoretical interpretation to articulate the practices observed, namely, 
‘Localised Social Media Surveillance’ (also referred to as ‘Localised Surveillance’ in this 
research). The concept of 'Localised Surveillance' denotes the use of open source, 
specifically social media on a local level by power holders (the police) for a localised 
purpose, examples of which include the use of social media surveillance in localised 
criminal investigations, searching for a missing person and gathering local intelligence 
on a local known audience.  
 
In identifying and defining the phenomenon of ‘localised social media surveillance’ this 
research has supported the creation and implementation of practical solutions to minimise 
its occurrence. The MPS is currently seeking to deploy an alternative approach to the 
acquisition of open source and social media data that is fully auditable and transparent, 
while increasing availability of access to frontline personnel. Combined with targeted 
training and intervention based on the demographic results of this study there is an 
opportunity to reduce the current practices significantly ensuring the protection of MPS 
personnel from disciplinary action or unnecessarily exposing of their own personal data 
to those involved in criminality. Additionally, the recommendations within this research 
seek to protect the organisational reputation while increasing the public's confidence in 
the use of social media technologies by police services. The results also act as a guide to 
other police services across the country who may also be experiencing the effects of 
localised social media surveillance. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Surveillance and Social Control 
 
The observation of others to obtain information has always been a feature of human 
nature, with one of the earliest examples of surveillance coming from the Book of 
Genesis. In this biblical writing, God’s one rule to Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden 
is disobeyed yet clearly observed (Lyon, 2003b, p.1). Surveillance according to Fuchs 
(2011, p.124) is a control mechanism to, ‘oversee’ or ‘watch over’ and is carried out by 
‘watchers’, ‘overseers’ or ‘officials’ signifying a hierarchical power dynamic between 
those watching and those being watched. While Lyon (2001, p.2; 2003b, p.5) arguably 
provides a more accurate reflection of modern society defining surveillance as, ‘the 
routine collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for 
influencing, managing or controlling certain persons or population groups.’ This fits more 
accurately with societies ability to watch and collect data about each other where Fuchs 
hierarchical definition fails to consider ‘self-surveillance’ (Surette, 2016) also known as 
‘lateral surveillance’ (Ball, Haggerty and Lyon, 2012, p.344) or ‘interveillance’ (Fuchs et 
al, 2012, p.231) through one’s peers or ‘power’ equals. On the one hand this has been 
considered as a positive aspect to surveillance which empowers users to see surveillance 
as social and involves participatory acts of mutuality and sharing (Albrechtslund cited in 
Fuchs et al, 2012, p.128) and in this new era of digital ‘self-surveillance’, online 
communities can self-regulate, challenge and report inappropriate behaviour (Press 
Association, 2012) through a process of this ‘participatory surveillance’ (Trottier and 
Lyon cited in Fuchs et al, 2012, p.91). On the other hand, Fuchs et al (2012, p.127- 129) 
agrees with Kose, Han and Bakan who articulate that it is the act of watching each other 
[through social media] that is an ideal architectural example of modern disciplinary power 
that gradually creates a social pressure in the context of creating a homogenous attitude 
that discipline and control normalise peoples’ behaviours.   
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Foucault (Faubion, 2002, p.58-59) discusses these ideas as he elaborates on Bentham’s 
original panopticon design for prisons, which allowed the ‘few’ in authority to monitor 
the ‘many’ without power from a central position; with its success resting not simply in 
the architectural design but in the psychological domination of the powerless ‘watched’. 
Perceiving their actions to be under constant observation the imprisoned where obedient 
out of fear of being seen (Fuchs et al, 2012, p.127). However, Kose, Han and Bakan 
(2010, p.254) studied the power dynamic in surveillance and suggested a ‘power reversal’ 
in modern times where people such as politicians and celebrities are now monitored by 
the masses, altering Bentham’s original viewpoint to argue the ‘many now monitor the 
few.’ Lyon (1998, p.94) questioned the application of Foucault’s work to electronic 
surveillance and while a different paradigm, parallels can be drawn from the widespread 
implementation of CCTV as a social control mechanism. It was installed to foster the 
perception in society that actions were under constant observation with the intention of 
deterring crime and ensuring civil obedience (College of Policing, 2013, p.1). However, 
Walsh and Farrington (2007, p.7) argued that the presence of CCTV is only effective to 
a limited degree or when targeting specific crimes (College of Policing, 2013, p.1) 
supporting Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990, p.270) view that there is no evidence to 
suggest that an escalation of surveillance generally influences crime levels. 
 
This is important as police services begin to see social media with panopticon value, 
(Fuchs et al, 2012, p.127) where they can monitor the ‘many’, but in stark contrast to 
Bentham’s moral architectural (Lyon, 1991, p.597) approach to prisons, social media 
surveillance offers law enforcement more than just a visual audit of one’s actions or 
potentially their ‘actus reus’ (guilty act) as users document their thoughts, beliefs and 
intimacies publicly they also expose their potential ‘men’s rea’ (guilty mind) too (Surette, 
2016). McMullen (2015) goes on to consider the ‘relative intangibility that data 
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surveillance offers where there is no physical sense of exposure to authority as the 
difference between Bentham’s panopticon design.’ Stating, ‘without an explicit sense of 
exposure actions are not normalised, if anything the supposed anonymity of the internet 
means users do the opposite,’ and act without fear of the repercussions. This has created 
significant challenges for law enforcement who have recognised the need to have a covert 
surveillance presence within the digital space (ACPO, 2013, p.10). 
 
 
2.1.1. Police Surveillance 
 
Traditionally police surveillance has been concerned with direct observation (Lyon, 
2003b, p.6) fostering images of targets being followed and observed in close quarters. 
Press Association (2015) recognised that ‘only five years ago a suspect physically walked 
into a bank and carried out transactions, we could put a surveillance team on that but now, 
it’s mostly online.’ While there is still a place for these covert tactics, they have given 
way to an increased use of digital surveillance and the internet (ACPO, 2013, p.5). Which 
has enabled law enforcement to exploit social media platforms for intelligence that 
provides access to individuals and groups whom previously would have required more 
intense, covert tactics to obtain actionable information (Procter, 2013, p.420). The 2018 
guidelines on covert policing (Great Britain. Home Office, 2018, p.18) consider the use 
of open source surveillance as a less intrusive tactic compared to traditional methods of 
physical covert surveillance. This is because open source research does not generally 
interfere with individuals right to privacy under article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, 
and in most situations no authorisation is required under the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 as the information is readily available in the public domain.  
 
The focus on police surveillance in the UK have never been more prominent with media 
reports exposing sexual relationships between undercover officers and those being 
surveilled (Evans, 2018). Revelations that prompted the Metropolitan Police Service 
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(MPS) to initiate an internal review of their covert practices in 2011 (Evans, 2018b) and 
lead to the start of a formal inquiry into undercover operations reaching back to 1968. 
The inquiry launched in 2015 will primarily focus on physical undercover activities but 
its scope will include the growing need to conduct covert activities online (Mitting, 2015, 
p.3). With such emphasis placed upon traditional covert practices there is a gap in the 
literature around what covert practices are taking place on social media by law 
enforcement.  
 
While social media is a relatively new technology that can be harnessed to the benefit of 
law enforcement it is not the first instance of technology being adopted to tackle crime. 
In almost Orwellian fashion, ‘the UK delivered an extensive CCTV programme between 
1999 – 2001’ (Welsh and Farrington, 2007, p.11) and similarly its use was met with 
privacy concerns when it was adopted as a way of reducing crime and improving security 
(Wacks, 2015, p.3). A 2007 report estimated that there are 4.2 million CCTV cameras 
(Bell, Haggerty and Lyon, 2012, p.142) in Britain or 1 for every 14 citizens, recording 
individuals approximately 300 times each day (Welsh and Farrington, 2007, p.7). While 
the scale of CCTV use raised concerns, the 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade 
Centre provided a catalyst for a ‘resurgence in the value and use of criminal intelligence’ 
(ROSA, 2017, p.3) and was suggested by Lyon (2003b, p.4) as the ‘golden opportunity’ 
to implement more robust surveillance initiatives under the banner of the ‘War on Terror’ 
(Lyon, 2003b, p.15; Ball, Haggerty and Lyon, p.169) creating a ripple effect that would 
impact citizens globally. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the UK reinforced a social 
movement encouraged by law enforcement for citizens to become the eyes and ears of 
unknown future attacks, establishing an environment that normalised suspicion among 
community members and a galvanised a willingness to sacrifice liberties over security 
based on the heightened emotional response to these events (Lyon, 2003b, p.56). This 
cultural shift fostered the perception that if you have nothing to hide, then you have 
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nothing to fear and increases law enforcement’s legitimacy to exercise more intrusive 
power over citizens information. However, Solove (2011, p.21-23) details by accepting 
in this position individuals fail to safeguard a position that although they have nothing to 
hide, equally they may have nothing they wish to share. 
 
 
2.1.2. Policing Legitimacy and Power 
 
According to Homolova (2018, p.93) institutions are closer to citizens than ever, with 
former strict hierarchies of power giving way to democracy which places a high demand 
on [policing] legitimacy needing to justify the necessity of power in their maintenance of 
order. Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, p.124) consider the ‘right to rule’ from the standpoint 
on both citizens and power-holders believing the key question to ask is, ‘whether a power-
holder is justified in claiming the right to hold power over other citizens?’ With 8 in 10 
law enforcement professionals actively using social media as an investigation tool 
(LexisNexis, 2014, p.2) this is an important question as police officers are increasingly 
compelled to carry out research and investigations using the internet (MPS, 2014c, p.12). 
Ultimately spending more time collecting and processing personal [digital] information 
(Ball, Haggerty and Lyon, 2012, p.2) that can generate voluminous records of [citizens] 
activities (Brown, 2015, p.2).  
 
According to Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, p.121) police legitimacy is present when, 
‘citizens are treated fairly in decisions affecting them and that they are treated with respect 
during the process, which ultimately determines whether the decision is accepted.’ This 
definition challenges police legitimacy in the application of social media surveillance as 
citizens are unaware that they are under any form of observation or that their data is being 
used in decisions that will affect them. Consequently, their lack of awareness prohibits 
citizens the ability to ensure that their data is being used with respect and raises questions 
around historical concepts of ‘policing by consent’(Great Britain. HMIC, 2014, p.73). 
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However, as criminal trends develop and embrace new technologies it is essential law 
enforcement agencies have access, presence and capability to ensure public safety as 
considered by the Mayor of Police and Crime (MOPAC) in London Assembly (2013, 
p.33). The increased corporate use of social media as a communication tool in policing 
has legitimatised its use by officers (College of Policing, 2017), yet while the corporate 
mandate is predominantly aimed at community engagement, there is potential for 
untrained officers to use social media for observation purposes, creating unchecked 
surveillance creep amongst the front line. This is an issue considered by Cameron (2016) 
who quotes Jay Stanley from American Civil Liberty Union who states, ‘Even though 
you obviously don’t need a warrant to read stuff that’s been published for the world to 
see, that doesn’t mean as a policy matter it’s a good idea for us to give our police licence 
to engage in mass social media monitoring.’  
 
The legitimacy of police intelligence gathering raises academic friction between the fear 
of increased security v’s the impact on individual privacy with Trottier (2015a, p.537) 
suggesting there is no issue with law enforcement using of open source data, as this is 
publicly available. Which conflicts with Bartlett et al (2013, p.22) who states, ‘just 
because information is open source, does not necessarily mean the police should collect 
or analyse it’ and the standards of proportionality and necessity should still apply to open 
source acquisition. Ultimately it is the responsibility of government and law enforcement 
agencies to balance public safety with protecting the privacy rights of the innocent 
engaging in lawful activities using those same technologies (London Assembly, 2013, 
p.32; Press Association, 2015). 
 
According to Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, p. 120) ‘legitimacy is dialogic between power 
holders (e.g. government/police) and audiences’ (e.g. the public). Legitimate authorities 
must not only have the power but also the right to govern and audiences must recognise 
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that right.’ To foster public support and garner legitimacy some law enforcement agencies 
have resorted to relabelling similar technologies by creating a distinction between social 
media monitoring and social media alert systems. In a Boston Radio interview O’keefe 
and Chakrabarti (2016) discusses the distinction between the Arlington Police 
Department who received praise for the use of ‘Social Sentinel’ an alert system based on 
key word scraping of open source media against the Boston Police Department who were 
publicly criticised for their discreet implementation of a monitoring program and 
maintaining covert online profiles. As Bekker, Edwards, Kool (2013, p.335) conclude, 
social media monitoring creates tensions, it can work in the publics favour driving causes 
and bringing attention to important issues. While on the other hand, social media 
monitoring involves ordinary citizen’s communications in virtual domains that they may 
perceive as private. This poses ethical questions, especially when the monitoring agency 
is not transparent regarding its monitoring activity. It is for this reason that an appropriate 
combination of legislation, policy and ethics has to be employed to ensure the correct 
balance of power and legitimacy. 
 
 
2.1.3. Legislation, Policy and Ethics 
 
Bartlett et al (2013, p.22) recognises for law enforcement to use Social Media Intelligence 
(SOCMINT) with confidence, attention must be given to the legislation, ethics and 
regulations governing its handling. Clapham (2015, p.110) goes on to consider public 
perception and approval, stating if the police use such surveillance tactics, they need to 
be transparent, proportionate, necessary and used only to achieve a legitimate aim. 
However, navigating these challenges during routine policing duties can be daunting for 
the average beat officer, consequently UK law enforcement, including the Metropolitan 
Police have established Local Intelligence Teams (LITs) in addition to central Internet 
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Investigation and Intelligence (III) unit who specialise in open source investigations to 
support officers traversing this complex area (Bartlett, 2015, p.8; MPS, 2014b, p.8). 
 
A range of legislation is considered when looking at the use of social media for 
community engagement as highlighted in MPS (2015b, p.2; 2014, p.6), however the key 
legislation concerning surveillance is contained within the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 and is impacted by Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 covers the interception of communications, 
intrusive surveillance, directed surveillance, covert human intelligence sources and 
communications data.  
 
The key components of surveillance that render a legal authority necessary under the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 are that activity must be covert, intrusive or 
capable of obtaining private information about a person. Creating a conflict with the 
nature of open source surveillance which is publicly accessible and can be obtained 
overtly.  Charles Farr cited in Bowcott and Ball (2014) points out ‘the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act was created before social media existed’ and so pays no 
reference to social media or the legal boundaries of open source surveillance. As many 
social media companies have international bases they fall under the definition of 
‘external’ communications. This has led to practitioners having no clear legal direction 
on what is acceptable in terms of conducting social media surveillance investigations 
(Bartlett, 2013, p.9), with Bowcott and Ball (2014) documenting calls for the Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 to be urgently overhauled. 
 
Such concerns led to the proposed implementation of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
also known as the ‘snoopers’ charter’ (BBC, 2015) which compels communications firms 
to hold user’s previous communications metadata for a year, which includes the who, 
when, where and for how long the user was connected to the internet (Cobbe, 2018, p.10). 
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According to the BBC (2015) this new information includes details of services, websites 
and data sources users connect to and is called a user’s ‘Internet Connection Record’ 
(ICR). Under existing legislation authorities can ask for this data going forward but not 
retrospectively, this change has caught the concern of Liberty (2016, p.14) who state that 
this effectively modifies the presumption of innocence and brings all citizens under 
suspicion, as all digital actions are recorded.  
 
However, since the proposed legislation came to light Liberty have been challenging its 
compatibility with Articles 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998. In 2015 the European Court 
of Justice agreed that as data collection under Investigatory Powers Act 2016 was 
indiscriminate, rather than targeted, it was unlawful (Evans, 2018a). A further Court of 
Appeal ruling confirmed that the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 did not restrict the 
accessing of personal data to investigations of ‘serious crime’ and allowed police and 
other public bodies to self-authorise surveillance without adequate oversight (Travis, 
2018). Similar concerns were raised in Office of Surveillance Commissioners report cited 
in Hill (2017) where it become apparent local authorities were regularly using social 
media in investigations for a wide range of matters regardless of the seriousness, an issue 
that has yet to be fully explored within a policing context. However, the introduction of 
Investigatory Powers Commissioners Office (IPCO) to provide independent oversight of 
surveillance requests and a new Home Office definition of ‘serious crime’ (Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016, S.269(1), p.217) has assisted in progressing the legislation forward. 
 
In the absence of fitting legislation to control and manage surveillance activities across 
social media forces introduced formal policies and strategies for its use in investigations 
or as evidence (Bartlett et al, 2013, p.5). The College of Policing Code of Ethics provides 
a rudimentary stance stating, ‘standards that apply to the management of information off 
line are equally applicable to social media (College of Policing, 2014b, p.2). Yet, provides 
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little guidance to define the boundaries of conducting online investigations, an issue 
addressed in the Chief Surveillance Commissioner’s annual report 2013/2014 cited in 
MPS (2014c, p.7) where they consider a common-sense approach by looking at the issue 
of ‘repeat viewing’ stating; 
 
‘Although there remains a significant debate as to how anything made publicly 
available in this medium can be considered private, my commissioners remain 
of the view that the repeat viewing of individual ‘open source’ sites for the 
purpose of intelligence gathering and data collection should be considered 
within the context of the protection that RIPA affords such activity’ 
 
Consequently, MPS (2014c) provides practitioner guidance on ‘repeated viewing’ saying 
that research over the internet or social networking sites once in an investigatory capacity 
to establish what information exists does not fall under the definition of surveillance and, 
therefore, would not require a surveillance authority. However, the repeated viewing of a 
social networking site to monitor an individual, rather than a group, commercial or 
organisational website or social media page (for example to check for status changes or 
other activities) would fall under the definition of surveillance and would therefore 
require authorisation. In addition, College of Policing (2016, p.80) refers to the 
established ‘National Internet Investigation Model’ shown in Figure 1. and illustrates the 
five investigator levels established by the Association of Chief Police Officers in 2015. 
 
Level 1 refers to most police personnel who have received no training in online covert 
tactics and only affords them access to any police computer to conduct open source 
investigations where attribution to the police is not an investigative concern. Level two 
(2) and beyond require training and the use of a discreet or a fully covert terminal as a 
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National Internet Investigation Model 
Figure. 1 
 
minimum standard and in many cases, may require an authority under the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000. While those trained between levels two and five (2-5) 
will utilise a false persona to access certain platforms, it is only at the highest level and 
with authority that undercover online officers will engage with other users covertly, using 
their established false personas. In late 2018 this model was replaced with a three (3) tier 
model by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) streamlining the previous model to 
‘overt’, ‘covert’ and ‘Undercover Online’ (UCOL) in an attempt to reduce confusion over 
the competences at each level. It is worth noting this research was based is based on the 
five-tier model from 2015 and not the 2018 model as described by Egawhary (2019, 
pp.93-94).  
 
Although MPS (2014b, p.4-5) policy specifically distinguishes between the use of overt 
and covert police terminals for intelligence work and the restrictions on using authorised 
social media accounts for intelligence gathering, there is no auditable process or form of 
intrusive supervision to prevent officers crossing the communications/surveillance divide 
and as O’Conner (2015) identifies, when new technologies are adopted by the police they 
can have unforeseen consequences and can significantly alter police practices.  
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2.2. Social Media in Policing 
 
Communication is a fundamental social dimension of human existence (Fuchs and 
Trottier, 2013, p.3), and its effective use is necessary to uphold the Peelian principles that 
support police legitimacy (Great Britain. HMIC, 2014, p.25). Police communications 
utilise a variety of methods to engage with the public from as face to face meetings, 
organisational leaflets, newsletters, newspapers, radio (OSCAR, 2017c, p.15) to 
television (Ross, 2014). However, with improvements in health, education, technology 
and living standards the public now demand more than ever that the police communicate 
effectively (College of Policing, 2015) and as Fielding and Caddick (2017, p.4-5) state, 
‘traditional’ methods have made way in favour of social media in a ‘post truth’ era of 
rising public scrutiny, allowing police services to foster understanding and tolerance 
through open and transparent communications (OSCAR, 2017a). By providing a ‘virtual 
police’ presence (Great Britain. HMIC, 2012, p.53) social media provides an innovative 
approach to demonstrating service effectiveness and presence in a cost-efficient way to 
hundreds of thousands of users (O’Connor, 2017, p.901; Picazo-Vela, et al, 2012; 
Trottier, 2015a, p.534), especially at a time of austerity (MPS, 2017, p.7) when police 
numbers are falling nationally (Weinfass, 2017). 
 
Considered Europe’s leaders in the use of social media (Bartlett et al. 2013, p.13) every 
police service across the United Kingdom (UK) have at least a corporate Twitter account 
(Great Britain. HMIC, 2012, p.10; Ashby, 2013). However, the MPS have expanded their 
digital presence to include a Facebook and Twitter account for every Safer 
Neighbourhood Team in London, giving the MPS the largest social media presence in the 
UK (MPS, 2017, p.3). Unlike traditional methods of communication social media can be 
employed in a covert investigative capacity too, providing a unique challenge for police 
services who need to strike the balance to ensure continued public support and legitimacy 
(Bartlett et al. 2013, p.6). Although social media presents challenges for the police, retired 
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Chief Constable Scobbie of former Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) stated, 
‘the use of social media is likely to continue to grow and, on balance, the advantages of 
social media use by the police outweigh the disadvantages’ (BBC, 2012).  
 
 
2.2.1. Social Media for Engagement  
 
While OSCAR (2017c, p.16) identifies that traditional policing leaflets and newsletters 
suffered from issues of cost, distribution, frequency and had limited their geographical 
reach, Surette (2016) goes on to say, ‘the isolated acts of reading a newspaper or turning 
on the television have been replaced by the collective experience of posting, tweeting and 
going viral’. Hanson (2011) articulates this position agreeing;  
 
‘Years ago, we would send out news releases, we’d hold press conferences — 
nowadays we can bypass all that. We just put it on our website, and then reach 
out on popular social media sites like Facebook and Twitter. We believe we’re 
hitting a bigger audience.’ 
 
According to Fisher (2012); Crump (2011, p.1) and Egawhary (2019, p.89) the first links 
between the UK police and social media started in 2008 when forces started experimenting 
with Twitter mainly through unofficial accounts, and with varying degrees of official 
support (The Police Foundation, 2014). As Sweeney-Burke (2015, p.16) comments, 
‘social media has changed the way [society] communicates in the post-modern world and 
even if you are not consciously engaged, you are subconsciously being swept along in the 
largest communication shift in history.’ Citizens are increasingly using social media to 
communicate with their family, friends, colleagues, businesses and government in 
everyday situations (Kavanaugh, et al, 2012, p.480). Creating digitised, auditable 
information willingly provided and reinforced by peers (OSCAR, 2017) through ‘likes’, 
‘reposts’ and ‘shares’ that drives competition amongst users to have the most attractive 
 30 
social media presence, even if it does not altogether represent the user’s reality (Fike, 
2015).  
 
It is difficult to comprehend social media’s vast reach, as Fielding and Caddick (2017, 
p.4) conclude, ‘any recital of numbers of social media users will be obsolete before this 
report is finished.’ However, authors and academics regularly provide momentary 
glimpses which help demonstrate the sheer breadth of the internet and social media, with 
Longstreet and Brooks (2017, p.73) stating that there were 3.5 billion internet users in 
2016 and the MPS (2017, p.4) documenting that Twitter currently has 317 million active 
monthly users who send out 500 million tweets a day, while Facebook had 1.23 billion 
active monthly users in 2013 (O’Connor, 2017, p.900). With continued increases digital 
connectivity, personal data is the currency for access, which provides innovative law 
enforcement the opportunity of interrogating larger quantities of ‘intelligence data’ 
(Burgess, 2018a). 
 
In 2010, The National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) issued guidelines to UK 
services formally recognising the potential benefits of social media (Williams et al, 2013, 
p.464; Crump, 2011, p.3; Procter et al, 2014, p.418). Although, the power of social media 
would only gain recognition by senior police officers during the 2011 riots (OSCAR, 
2017c, p.11; Fisher, 2012; Crump, 2011, p.1; Egawhary, 2019, p.89), when rioter used 
‘dark social’ such as Blackberry Messenger to coordinate disorder across the UK 
(Williams et al, 2013, p.461). Public information supplied directly through police social 
media accounts was weighted as both accurate and reliable, with OSCAR (2017c, p.15) 
identifying, this was the first time the police experienced ‘fake news’ and the impact of 
‘citizen journalism’ (Williams et al, 2013, p.467; Trotter, 2010), but could dispel rumours 
quickly (Fisher, 2012) through established accounts.  
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Even with a range of guidance documents available on the professional use of social 
media (MPS, 2013; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2017), discretion and trust is placed upon 
individual officers to communicate on an unprecedented scale autonomously. While 
social media provides a platform for officers to represent the service, it creates significant 
organisational risk as detailed by Fisher (2012) with the potential for inappropriate 
tweets/posts containing sensitive information, discriminatory positions, libellous details, 
operational activities or comments, pictures and videos that may damage the reputation 
of the service (Bartlett et al, 2013, p.5; Sayre, G. and Dahling, J. 2015, p.254). Added 
concern is highlighted by Schneider (2016, p.138) who questions where the line between 
work and personal life is, with officers encouraged to continue public engagement in their 
personal time. It raises questions as considered in Association of Chief Police Officers 
(2013, p.4) around expectations, consistency and professionalism that may have 
unintended consequences that lead officers into conducting investigations via unsuitable 
means. 
 
 
2.2.2. Social Media for Intelligence and Investigations 
 
The Police Foundation (2014) considered the advent of social media a ‘game changer’, 
not only for police communications but for investigative and intelligence purposes too. 
MPS (2014b, p.2) acknowledges the internet is a necessary function of police work, 
carrying the largest amount of knowledge, information and intelligence in history. Yet 
while an integral part of everyday life, social media was identified as the ‘newest threat 
to society’ (Great Britain. HMIC, 2015a, p.7) with Press Association (2012) reporting 
crimes involving Twitter and Facebook have risen 780% since 2008 and expose users to 
increased dangers of cyberbullying, hate speech, online grooming (Clapham, 2015, 
p.111) and recruitment into extremist ideologies (Press Association, 2012; Great Britain. 
HMIC, 2015b, p.25; Hanson, 2011). Great Britain. London Assembly (2013, p.10) 
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acknowledged law enforcement is losing the fight against internet crime stating, 
‘consideration needs to be given to the basic skills required to effectively investigate 
cybercrimes.’ A position Great Britain. HMIC (2013, p.30) agreed, confirming 
production of a range of College of Policing online training packages to assist officer’s, 
but an issue they returned to again in Great Britain. HMIC (2014, p.16) and Great Britain. 
HMIC (2015b, p.25) who report, ‘the capacity and capability of agencies to address these 
issues … has not kept pace with their growth.’ Suggesting that little progress had been 
made to manage demand, but as O’Connor (2017, p.901) states, ‘the police could not have 
foreseen the impact these technologies would have on resources and crime, especially 
given the speed at which social media has been adopted.’ 
 
In many instances’ individuals can be found online in plain sight using simple, open 
source research for virtually any social actor to see, without the individuals knowing who 
is looking at them or why (Trottier, 2015a, p.531). Where data is gathered and analysed 
by the police or other investigative agency in this way it is referred to as ‘Open Source 
Intelligence’ (OSINT) (Trottier, 2015a, p.531). Where intelligence is confined 
specifically to social media platforms this is referred to as ‘Social Media Intelligence’ 
(SOCMINT) (Bartlett et al, 2013, p.5) and defined by Bartlett et al, (2013, p.9) as; 
 
‘Open source intelligence gathered from open, publicly available sources where 
no private information is collected about an individual, unless the user has no 
expectation of privacy and the methods of collection do not involve deception or 
interception.’  
Whereas the definition provided in MPS (2014c, p.3) policy is more pragmatic providing 
examples of what open source can be, but interestingly omits social media; 
 
‘Open source is defined as publicly available information (i.e. any member of 
the public could lawfully obtain the information by request or observation). It 
includes books, newspapers, journals, TV and radio broadcasts, newswires, 
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internet WWW and news groups, mapping, imagery, photographs and 
subscription databases.’ 
 
However, as considered by Hanson (2011) the use of SOCMINT as actionable 
intelligence will demand services utilise it effectively as it requires tolerance and 
acknowledgement that in many instances perceived threats may be throw away comments 
or opinions that present no risk to public safety. Particularly as services enthusiastically 
listen to ‘reports of police thwarting or solving crimes based on [social media posts]’ 
(Roufa, 2017a) there must be caution to ‘the sheer volume of social data streams that 
generates substantial noise which must be filtered to detect meaningful patterns and 
trends’ (Kavanaugh, et al, 2012, p.480). Especially as the growth of SOCMINT continues 
to aid investigations, prevent crimes, identify offenders and generates intelligence 
(LexisNexis, 2014, p.2-9) that can assist in spotting emerging events, piece together 
criminal networks, discern public attitudes and improve situational awareness (Bartlett et 
al, 2013, p.6). Yet while social media can be used for investigations and intelligence a 
distinction needs to be identified as to when this becomes a surveillance activity. 
 
 
2.2.3. Social Media Surveillance 
 
According to Bekkers et al (2013, p.335) social media monitoring is ‘the continuous 
systematic observation and analysis of social networks and communities,’ this increased 
collection of personal information in the digital sphere swells to produce ‘Big Data’, a 
term that refers to all forms of data, including transactional data, video data and waste 
information generated as we search the internet and surf the world-wide-web (Mayer-
Schonberger and Cukier, 2017, p.52). A significant element of Big Data is social media 
monitoring or surveillance, with its origins in the private sector focusing on strategic 
marketing through research, trend scouting and consumer feedback (Bekkers et al, 2013, 
p.336). The repurposing of data by companies such as Cambridge Analytica (Greenfield, 
2018; Tan, 2018) and the state according to Fuchs and Trottier (2013, p.21-22) creates a 
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society that is totalitarian in the double-sense of being a dictatorship of the market 
capitalist logic as well as a state dictatorship and believes that the interlocking of state 
and commercial surveillance poses considerable threats for society. ‘Passive consent’ has 
provided this surveillance gateway by becoming the norm with law enforcement 
surveillance systems such as licence plate readers, facial recognition (O’Connor, 2017, 
p.890), and social media scrapping assuming the right to capture data for commercial 
advantage or lawful investigations (Surette, 2016).  
 
As Brandom (2016) reports, it is one thing when data is used for marketing purposes but 
when it results in people being arrested there is an obvious chilling effect; an issue 
London Assembly (2013, p.33) say the Metropolitan Police understands, stating 
excessive surveillance might stretch public confidence and raise ethical questions. As 
Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier (2017, p.150-157) details there have been many instances 
throughout history where data has been used for ‘social sorting’ of the population into 
groups and social media is significant to policing, as surveillance today according to Lyon 
(2003a, p.1) uses data to sort people into categories and could facilitate mass social 
sorting into general categories of ‘criminal’ and ‘non-criminal’ based on their social 
media profiles and posts. These are issues not only of importance to the MPS but policing 
nationally and through an analysis of MPS social media surveillance practices make 
recommendations to improve national police practice and policy. 
 
In summary the literature agrees that there is increasing use of social media surveillance 
tactics by law enforcement agencies around the world. However, discussions are limited 
to external observers and academics who have had little or no opportunities to research 
the internal practices of police services in their use of social media as a surveillance tool. 
As a consequence, discussions as to the impact surveillance has are concentrated around 
theoretical perspectives and are inclined to focus on the macro scale relationships between 
 35 
the police and public in the context of surveillance measures. This is reflected in the 
hierarchical terminology used in discussions such as, policing, government, national and 
global contexts and is echoed in theoretical discussions that focus on the impact of 
societal surveillance. Generally, literature attributes social media surveillance techniques 
as high-level skill sets that are only accessible to trained specialist teams such as the 
Internet Investigation and Intelligence (i3) Unit within the MPS who are equipped to carry 
out a range of online surveillance activities. What the literature fails to consider in any 
depth is the micro scale, the working practices of officers on the front line and how their 
practices influence the theoretical landscape.  
 
Having regard for the available literature in this study the following three aims have been 
established:  
 
1. To establish what the current social media practices being employed by 
policing personnel across the MPS and determine whether they 
constitute a form of surveillance.  
 
2. To establish whether any identified practices highlight gaps in current 
policy. 
 
3. Deliver a new theoretical interpretation of surveillance in the context of 
social media and policing.   
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the methodological approach taken in this study. The research 
design employs a mixed methods strategy to data collection through the use of focus 
groups with operational police personnel (Police officers and Police Staff) who have 
experience and knowledge of social media practices. These focus groups provided 
qualitative data and a representative sample to pilot the survey in order to evaluate 
structure and question modification (Ruel, Wagner and Gillespie, 2016, p.101) before its 
full Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) wide distribution. The survey quantified what 
social media surveillance practices were being employed across the MPS and used 
qualitative questions to explore the underlying factors that legitimise police personnel’s 
use of social media in this context.  
 
The chapter begins by considering the role of the researcher as a policing practitioner 
before exploring the philosophical foundations that this study is built upon. The research 
design follows with details of the methods employed, specifically focus groups and 
survey with consideration given to their deployment, data collection, analysis, participant 
selection and ethical considerations. The chapter will then conclude with personal 
reflections of this research. 
 
 
3.2. Police Research 
 
 
It should be noted that the research is being conducted by a serving police officer of the 
MPS. As such various approaches have been considered by academics to characterise 
police and public sector research with Brown (1996, cited in Davies, 2016, p.158) 
distinguishing four types of researcher based on their affiliation with the police. These 
categories are defined as ‘insider-insider’, research that is conducted ‘by’ serving police 
officers. ‘Outsider-insider’ research where police officers conduct research ‘on’ the 
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service but from outside, perhaps as former officers moving into academia. ‘Insider-
outsider’ researchers who have been hired to work ‘with’ the police and ‘outsider-
outsider’ researchers with no affiliation to the police but whom are studying the police or 
policing. Alternatively, Fox, Martin and Green (2007, p.2) consider the position of the 
‘practitioner researcher’, a practitioner working in the public sector and in their 
professional capacity undertakes research with a focus on the real problems that 
individuals or organisations face.  
 
This research falls into the category of both ‘insider-insider’ and ‘practitioner’ research 
as it is being conducted in house ‘by’ a serving police officer of sixteen (16) years’ 
service. While both ‘insider-insider’ and ‘practitioner’ research have been criticised over 
concerns that narrow management can evade recognised academic research techniques 
and is merely considered ‘professional development’ (Tripp, 2005, p.446). There is 
growing recognition that police research has reached a pivotal point, as inside 
practitioners under the auspices of evidence-based policing become increasingly 
equipped at conducting scientifically-grounded research (Davies, 2016, p.156).   
 
During the course of this study the data collection was achieved in collaboration with Met 
Intelligence and the Horizons Team as they were considering similar research questions. 
This added another dynamic to the ‘insider researcher’ paradigm and as considered by 
Campbell (2013, p.2) not having any direct affiliation with the Horizons Team 
represented a partnership between practitioner and external researcher that embraced the 
idea that a ‘stranger might be better placed to see the kind of things which, to the insider, 
are too mundane, too obvious, to register as an important factor’ (Denscombe, 2014, 
p.128). Holding this position assisted in addressing issues of reflexivity raised in 
practitioner research, however as a research practitioner insight into front line policing 
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practices had a benefit in the overall research design (Fox, Martin and Green, 2007, pp.80-
81). 
 
 
3.3. Philosophical Perspective 
 
 
Research paradigms address the philosophical dimensions of social science (Wahyuni, 
2012, p. 69), they refer to theoretical frameworks of thought that act as a template or 
example to be followed (Miller and Brewer, 2003, p.220). As basic belief systems or 
worldviews they guide the investigator and impact how the research is shaped (O’Rielly, 
Ronzoni and Dogra, 2013, p.161), not only in choice of method but in ontologically and 
epistemologically fundamental ways (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, cited in Tang and Joiner, 
2006, p.61). The two paradigms that underpin social science research are ‘positivism’ and 
‘interpretivism’, where ‘positivism’ is the application of the empiricist model of natural 
science to the study of society and usually characterised by quantitative approaches that 
test hypotheses (O’Rielly, 2009, p.163). While in contrast ‘interpretivism’ uses 
qualitative research methods and believes in a fundamental difference between natural 
and social sciences (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010, p.90). However, in modern academic 
practices, researchers have become more flexible and can combine various methodologies 
to conduct their research (Plano Clark and Ivankova, 2016, p.3), leaning towards social 
constructionist approaches that maintain there is no ‘right answer’ waiting to be 
identified, instead arguing that the researcher and researched are actively engaged in 
constructing the world being studied (Laws, Harper and Marcus, 2003, p.273).  
 
Plano Clark and Ivankova (2016, p.81) recognise that given the variety of research 
approaches available it is important to justify the chosen methods in any particular 
research situation and that whether a positivist, interpretive or a mixed methods approach 
is utilised depends upon the nature of the question(s) being investigated (Kincheloe and 
Berry, 2004, cited in Jackson 2013, p.57). Thomas (2003, p.2) describes quantitative 
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research as tending to be based on numerical measurements that generate general 
descriptions and quantitative research as seeking explanations for human behaviour that 
can be generalized to other persons and places. Both approaches add value to the 
examination of current social media surveillance practices within the MPS, calling for a 
mixed methods approach that can quantify the existence of the phenomenon while 
exploring the reasons that underpin the human behaviour behind it. Wahyuni (2012, p.69) 
emphasises the importance of questioning the research paradigm to be applied, as their 
ontological perspective and epistemological position frame the decisions around the 
intended research design. As advocated by Given (2008, p.578) research must consider 
the social ontology; it is not enough to focus solely on quantifying a phenomenon, even 
though it will uncover important data about social dynamics and patterns of behaviour. 
To avoid naïve empiricism, the researcher must ask how the social reality came to be 
constructed as it appears. In this study the question of what constitutes surveillance 
practices requires a deeper understanding through the behaviours’ and cogitative 
processes involved, not only on an individual basis but as a collective representation of 
the MPS.  Through the use of a mixed methods research design the use of quantitative 
methods will generate objective and measurable data, while qualitative methods will 
embrace a subjective and interpretive understanding of the ontology of social media 
surveillance within the MPS.   
 
Jackson (2013, p.53) states that researchers’ ontological stance is linked to their 
epistemological perspective which pertains to the knowledge of the world being 
researched and that an ontological view of knowledge as ‘subject to interpretation’ means, 
epistemologically, that knowledge is arrived at through sense-making and meaning, 
rather than through objective observation. Having considered the ontological perspective 
of this study with MPS personnel representing a distinct group with shared experiences, 
understandings, interactions and cultural interpretations that create meaningful properties 
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in their social world, and that as an ‘insider-insider’ researcher of the MPS I share and 
impact the nature of that reality. My epistemological position is that a legitimate way to 
collect data for this research is to utilise a mixed methods approach which will produce a 
complete picture of the social media surveillance phenomena being studied. This is more 
meaningful than utilising the individual components of the separate methodological 
approaches (Bickman and Rog, 2009, p.287). This research supports Sherman (2013, 
p.14) view that the finest evidence is a blend of individual experiences with the best 
quantitative and qualitative evidence available. 
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3.4. Research Design 
 
3.4.1. Research Method 
 
Having decided upon a mixed method approach, combining the use of quantitative and 
qualitative methods, consideration was given to the different approaches suitable for 
obtaining the primary research in this study (Greener, 2011, p.2). Morgan and Hoffman 
(2018, p.5) describe qualitative research as intending to understand, describe and explain 
phenomena ‘from the inside’ through everyday practices experienced by individuals or 
groups. Focus groups according to Liamputtong (2011, pp.4-5) provide the opportunity 
to appreciate the way people see their own reality and explore what they think, how they 
think and why they think the way they do about the issues of importance to them. They 
allow the researcher to capture shared lived experiences and uncover aspects of 
understanding that remain hidden through more conventional in-depth interviewing 
methods. Willis (2016, p.360) also states that focus groups are a good conceptual 
development method for survey questionnaires with Morgan and Hoffman (2018, p.251) 
agreeing that the success of the quantitative portion of the research depends on having 
materials that work well for the participants with focus groups commonly assembled to 
pre-test surveys prior to full dissemination. This pre-testing phase can serve to improve 
research validity by ensuring the questions asked truly measure what they intend to. 
Equally the process offers as an opportunity to measure consistency of answers across the 
survey questions in order to improve reliability (Ruel, Wagner and Gillespie, 2016, 
p.118).  
 
Surveys according to Ruel, Wagner and Gillespie (2016, p.2) are a highly effective 
method of measurement in social science research with web-based surveys becoming the 
primary vehicle for distribution and data collection. Although more commonly used for 
quantitative research to generate numerical data for statistical testing and drawing 
inferences from a sample to be applied to general populations; surveys are also used in 
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qualitative research to obtain profound understanding of particular demographics 
(Toepoel, 2016, p.3). However, they have begun to embody an approach that can facilitate 
the simultaneous collection of both quantitative and qualitative data within in a single 
research study (Hewson, Vogel and Laurent, 2016, p.47). A concurrent design that 
collects qualitative and quantitative data at the same time was favoured in this study over 
a sequential approach as it represented a less time intensive method of data collection in 
a single phase (DeCuir-Gunby and Schutz, 2017, p.89-93) that suited the demands of the 
research questions and the sample population being surveyed.   
 
Interviews according to Gubrium and Holstein, (2001, p.85) drive interpretation and 
allow for ‘cultural inferences’ and themes to be drawn from the thick descriptions 
obtained. In this study, ‘key informant’ interviews (Given, 2008, p.524) were considered 
to provide understanding and interpretation of social media surveillance at the 
organisational level. The use of semi-structured interviews was determined the most 
suitable approach to obtain descriptions of interviewee’s world with respect to 
interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena (Kvale, 2007, p.8). However, 
Morris (2015, p.7) identifies the limitation of interviews which include accessing 
interviewees who can subsequently present inaccurate information and data that cannot 
be generalised across a population. In turn dealing with participants’ recollections that 
appear contradictory, inaccurate or not truthful will impact on the reliability of the method 
as considered by Roulston and Choi (2018, p.240). In addition, they are time consuming 
to arrange, conduct, transcribe and analyse which can be costly (Morris, 2015, p.121). 
For these reasons’ interviews were considered unfeasible within the times scales and 
beyond the scope of this study. Observational methods were also considered but 
discounted, as Guest, Namey and Mitchell (2013, pp.83-84) identify they have limitations 
in terms of event unpredictability, time constraints and practitioner sensitivities around 
openly discussing and justifying practices. This type of ethnographic approach would also 
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fail to provide an insight into the scale of the phenomena (Greener, 2011, p.74) across the 
MPS. 
 
The use of mixed methods research ‘offers a solid methodological foundation that creates 
an integrated approach to address complex problems of a practical nature’ (Ivankova, 
2015, cited in Ivankova and Wingo, 2018, p.979). Morgan (1993, p.119) confirms the 
research strategy in this study stating, ‘incorporating a qualitative approach, represented 
by the focus group method, into an integrated research design with a sample survey 
component can enhance the quality of the resulting analysis and the confidence that can 
be placed in it.’ Employing a mixed methods design will provide qualitative data through 
focus groups that explore the wider cultural context of the research; while surveys 
employing a combination of quantitative and qualitative questions will detail whether 
practitioners are using social media for surveillance purposes along with the how and why 
they are doing it. 
 
3.4.2. Reliability and Validity 
The importance of conducting research in a way that allows the reader to have confidence 
in the soundness of the methodological approach should not be underestimated and the 
researcher should have regard for the impact of ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’ throughout the 
research. It is widely supported that reliability relates to the probability that repeating the 
research procedure or method would produce identical or similar results. It provides a 
degree of confidence that replicating the process would ensure consistency. Whereas the 
concept of validity is used to judge whether the research accurately describes the 
phenomenon that it intended to describe with Bush (2012, p.81) concluding that, ‘research 
design, methodology and conclusion all need to have regard to the validity of the process.’  
As this research employees a mixed methods approach with a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative methodologies, a process of triangulation will be employed in the 
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discussion and conclusion to enhance the validity of the research findings as identified by 
Mathison (1988, p.3) cited in Flick (2018, p.527); 
 
‘Good research practice obligates the researcher to triangulate, that is, to 
use multiple methods and data sources to enhance the validity of the research 
findings … it is necessary to use multiple methods and sources of data in the 
execution of the study in order to withstand critique by colleagues.’  
 
Denzin (1979, p.304) describes two alternative types of methodological triangulation as 
within-methods and between methods triangulation. In this study the use of surveys will 
employ both qualitative and quantitative responses representing a form of within-methods 
triangulation. While the survey method will also be triangulated against the qualitative 
research collected through focus groups and represent a between methods approach. 
Denzin argued that by ‘playing off methods against each other’ would improve the 
validity of the research and though the implementation of several methods the research 
increased reliability as ‘several methods were more reliable than one.’ Flick (2018, p.531) 
challenges this interpretation of triangulation stating that triangulation aims to critically 
question data produced by a specific method and concludes an alternative version of 
triangulation that refrains from testing the validity and reliability of the data and findings. 
Rather it examines the way that something in the social world is turned into data by a 
specific approach. This will be of importance later when discussing the implications of 
the survey distribution and the decisions around the methodology undertaken. Ultimately 
triangulation aims to extend insights into a subject but has deeper links to the theoretical 
perspectives underpinning methodical approaches which impact the reliability and 
validity of the research.  
 
Through the analysis process this research seeks to draw internal consistency and 
demonstrate reliability using the split-half test. While there are a number of approaches 
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to test reliability in survey questions as considered by Litwin (1995, pp.5-32) the split-
test is the most appropriate for the methodological design of survey distribution 
implemented in this research. Other options discounted included the Test-retest and 
Intraobserver methods which were unsuitable as the survey was distributed anonymously 
on a self-selection basis making it impossible to retest the same respondents at a later 
date. Alternate-form reliability was also dismissed due to time restrictions and 
complications it presented around distribution and length of survey. The split-half test is 
a suitable test for reliability given the number of respondents to the survey (n=785) and 
supports the methodological design employed for its distribution. They are also useful 
when the researcher has a theory on which the outcome should be preferred (Lavakas, 
2011, p.834).  
 
The use of focus groups over interviews was not only a conscious decision based on time 
constraints. As Morgan (2019, p.22) challenges the belief that individual interviews 
provide some sort of ‘gold standard’ for accuracy and validity, calling it questionable and 
arguing that they fail to consider the potentially heightened influence a researcher has on 
an individual interviewee compared to the ‘strength in numbers’ that comes from 
interacting with peers in a focus group. Additionally, while it is suggested that caution 
should be given to attitudes expressed in the group context, the researcher should treat 
those attitudes as relatively flexible constructs that are situation dependent, a feature that 
will be discussed in the coming chapters to interpret some of the focus group content.  
 
3.4.3. Phase One - Focus Groups 
 
For the first phase of this study focus groups were conducted with police personnel from 
across the MPS to provide an insight through qualitative content into what social media 
practices are taking place organisationally and whether those practices can be considered 
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surveillance. Participant selection was based on suitability for the issue being investigated 
and who would provide the best information (Liamputtong, 2011, p.51). A sampling 
strategy utilising inclusion and exclusion criteria drove participant selection (Given, 
2008, p.743) which favoured police personnel with operational access, experience in the 
use of social media and those specifically authorised to only use social media for 
communication purposes rather than investigation or undercover activities. Consideration 
was given to the inclusion of officers with covert open source experience, but they 
represented a demographic with authority to conduct covert investigations. As the study 
focuses on the practices of front-line personnel who are not trained to use social media 
for covert activities this group was excluded from participant selection. 
 
Within the MPS each borough has a dedicated social media officer, they are front line 
personnel and have direct contact with officers utilising Twitter and Facebook across their 
geographical area of responsibility. The sample represents experienced practitioners in 
the field of social media and policing who are afforded a unique position with insight to 
both positive and negative practices across the organisation. As the single point of contact 
(SPOC) for training and content creation, they advise colleagues on the appropriate use 
of social media and represent the target demographic capable of providing the ontological 
perspective required. The selection of these participants supports the use of focus groups 
as a purposive sampling method that uses information-rich cases to generate the best data 
(Borkan, et al, 1995, p.578). 
 
Utilising a list of the social media SPOCs obtained from the Department of Media and 
Communications (DMC) provided quick and inexpensive access to the target 
demographic (Mariampolski, 2001, p.125) and represented an existing group from which 
to recruit from (Curtis and Curtis, 2011, p.110). As part of the ‘recruitment plan’ 
(Liamputtong, 2011, p.57) consideration to venue, location and timing was given to 
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maximise participant attendance prior to the circulation of a standardised invitation to 
each of the thirty-two SPOCs. As suggested by Given (2008, p.3) focus group invitations 
outlined purpose, participant suitability and the extent of participation required. They 
included location, session duration, itinerary summary, an endorsement of confidentiality, 
and that identities would be anonymised prior to research publication. As participants 
were serving police officers and staff the provision of a monetary incentive to attend 
would be inappropriate but money isn’t everything and so participants, as social media 
and policing experts were incentivised using a subject matter of interest to them and the 
prospect of meeting fellow practitioners in their field (Tuckel, Leppo and Kaplan, 1992, 
p.17).  
 
Each of the three focus groups lasted approximately an hour and thirty minutes, attracting 
seven to eight participants; with small groups favoured as the participants were highly 
involved with the topic of a potentially controversial nature. As stranger’s, data pollution 
was avoided and groups represented a controllable size that captured a good range of 
responses (Guest, Namey and Mitchell, 2013, p.176). Alderson and Morrow (2011, 
pp.100-101) hold consent as central to the act of ethical research and link it to the 
provision of information so that participants can ask questions prior to the commencement 
of the research. Frey (2018, p.822) formalises consent as ‘an agreement made with 
individuals to participate in research, having been fully advised of the potential benefits, 
risks, and procedures or activities of research participation’. In this study participants 
were provided with an information sheet (See Appendix B) at the beginning of each 
session which was read aloud to ensure understanding. It detailed the research being 
undertaken and key facts participants needed to know that ensured they provided genuine 
informed voluntary consent and allowed an opportunity for questions to be raised and 
addressed in the open forum. Consent forms documented participants understood the 
information sheet, agreed to the recording of sessions and that their participation was 
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voluntary and confidential. However, while the researcher can protect confidentiality and 
anonymity within the methodological approach and appropriate management of data, it 
was highlighted to participants via the information sheet that no such guarantee could be 
afforded to the potential of other participants disclosing information obtained during the 
focus group (Morgan,1993, p.12). Upon acceptance of the information, consent forms 
were signed by the researcher and participant, duplicated and provided to both for record 
keeping (See Appendix C).  
 
To ensure continuity across focus groups a ‘Focus Group Plan’ was adhered to, (See 
Appendix A) dividing sessions in two parts with the first employing the focus groups to 
pilot the intended research survey. This provided the target population the opportunity to 
highlight wrongly formulated research questions (Sieber and Tolich, 2013, p.125) 
resulting in a number of changes identified through a group debrief (Ruel, Wagner and 
Gillespie, 2016, p.107). These included structural amendments to questions and a 
requirement to improve terminology explanations around the use of ‘Open Source and 
‘Online Investigation’ throughout the survey. Modifications were tested in subsequent 
focus groups to ensure participant compatibility. While Kara (2012, loc 2529) suggests 
sending participants questions prior to the focus group to allow preparation; this study 
took an approach closer to Barbour (2007, p.85) by supplying participants a copy of the 
survey questions at the beginning of the session. Completing the survey at the outset 
meant it was seen by all at the same time, allowing the average completion time to be 
monitored and safeguarding against concerns of survey fatigue (Sue and Ritter, 2012, 
p.22). Hugick and Best (2008, p.660) consider questionnaire length and identify it a major 
factor it if exceeds twenty (20) minutes. In this study respondents were time and took no 
longer than twenty (20) minutes to complete the survey. The pre-test survey was paper 
based, and suggested that the final survey, being internet based and containing elements 
of automation to direct respondents seamlessly and logically through the survey would 
 49 
therefore reduce the questionnaire length further. In addition, the provision of stimulus 
material (Barbour, 2007, p.85) provided participants the opportunity to became 
cognitively attuned to the issues surrounding social media in a policing context and 
consider their own ontology before engaging in group discussion. Although the second 
session intended to provide a separate dialogue around the use of social media for 
surveillance; group communication meant as moderator it was necessary to balance 
enforcing the intended plan against the qualitative benefits of allowing participants to 
freely interact and express themselves (Gubrium and Holstein, 2001, p.146). Adopting 
Barbour’s (2007, p.99) flexible approach to the application of loosely structured topic 
guides allowed for the acquisition of rich qualitative data that picked up new topics as 
they emerged and harnessed participants’ insights into the subject.  
 
Audio recordings obtained during the three focus groups were initially transcribed 
utilising an automated service through Trint.com which mitigated issues such as rate of 
speech, volume and overlapping speech (Paulus, Lester and Dempster, 2014, p.96) during 
the transcription. Liamputtong (2011, p.165) raises concerns however over paying for 
transcription and the subsequent accuracy of the transcription. Although the initial 
automated transcription removed the burden of manually typing the entire text it was 
subsequently compared against the original audio for accuracy and represented an initial 
data analysis. Verbatim and Jeffersonian types of transcription were considered but 
deemed unnecessary to achieve the aims of the research. Instead a condensed version of 
‘gisted transcription’ was favoured as ‘it removed unnecessary words and phrases, 
leaving a simplified version with the exact words’ (Paulus, Lester and Dempster, 2014, 
p.98). The completed transcripts were then analysed using a list of basic questions 
suggested by Flick (2006, p.300 cited in Liamputtong, 2011, p.174) that qualitative 
researchers use as a coding strategy (See fig.2) to assist in the identification of themes 
across the focus groups.  
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Figure 2. List of questions for thematic coding strategy 
What What are the phenomena of concern/being mentioned?  
Who Who are the persons involved? What roles do they have? 
How do they interact? 
How Which aspects of the phenomena are mentioned/Omitted? 
When Referring to time, course and location. When does it 
happen? How long does it take? Where did the incident 
occur? 
Why Which reason(s) are provided or can be constructed? 
How Much/How 
Strong 
Referring to intensity. How often is this issue emphasised? 
What For What is the intention of the phenomena? What is the 
purpose? 
By Which Referring to means, tactics and strategies for achieving the 
aim. What is the main tactic and how is it accomplished?  
 
Thematic analysis is one of the most common approaches to qualitative data analysis and 
generates key patterns identified in the data that may be important features to the 
phenomena in question.  
 
 
3.4.4. Phase Two - Survey 
 
The distribution of an MPS wide survey signalled the second phase of this study. Survey 
research is considered a highly effective method of measurement in social and 
behavioural science research (Ruel, Wagner and Gillespie, p.2). In this study the 
methodological design incorporated a singular cross-sectional survey that captures data 
from the target sample at a particular point in time; before forming a basis by which to 
infer characteristics against the population from which the sample was obtained (Jupp, 
2006, p.53).  
 
Questions were designed to maximise inclusion across the range of ontologies that exist 
within the MPS and the subject matter arena. As detailed by Ruel, Wagner and Gillespie 
(2016, p.44) the type of measures developed within the survey instrument should ideally 
produce, unbiased, error-free data. Therefore, setting concrete research goals was 
paramount to ensuring the survey answered the research questions. In this study the 
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survey generated an understanding of what practices are taking place across the MPS and 
why they were taking place in order to understand the ontology of social media 
surveillance within the policing context.  
 
Modern web questionnaires offer a range of different features that cannot be achieved 
through traditional pen and paper designs (Fricker and Schonlau, 2012, p.1). With 
N=29,289 Police Officers (Inc. PC/DC N= 23,707, PS/DS N=4391and Insp/DI N=1191), 
N=8,868 Police Staff and N=1228 Police Community Support Officers totalling 
N=39,385 police personnel as of February 2019 (MOPAC, 2019) across the 32 London 
Boroughs; an online non-list-based survey contained within a URL was published on the 
MPS Intranet page to engage the target population. Response rates to internet surveys 
generally receive lower returns which can impact the validity of the data (Feusch, 2012, 
p.380) and to address this Vehovar and Manfreda, (2017, pp.148-150) recommend a 
strategy of multiple contacts with the target sample to increase engagement. In this study, 
after the survey was placed on the intranet a communication was sent to each of the 32 
Staff Officers across the MPS requesting the survey URL be sent directly on e-mail with 
a communication outlining the purpose of the survey to all personnel in their geographical 
area. In addition, a private direct message was sent through Twitter to all of the 649 safer 
neighbourhood ward accounts as well as the 32 borough accounts which trained front-
line personnel have access to. Running the survey for 12 weeks and spreading the 
communications described across that period resulted in n=785 responses to the survey. 
Demographically the survey was intended for frontline personnel who use open source 
and social media resources and with PC/DCs representing 71% of respondents and Police 
Sergeants, Inspectors and Police Staff from bands E, D and C representing 26% the survey 
was received by the target sample. Only three percent (3%) ‘preferred not to say’ or 
selected ‘other’ as an option.  
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While the survey produced n=785 responses which would represent a confidence level of 
95% against the population size, consideration needs to be given to the sample selection 
process. In order to effectively maintain respondent anonymity a systematic sampling 
structure across the MPS was not viable as this would have required specific targeting 
and monitoring of replies from each of the selected respondents. In addition, it would 
have required access to every employee’s pay/warrant number in order identify the 
regular intervals in the sampling frame; information that would have been very difficult 
to gain access to when considering privacy and security of personnel details. As a result, 
the survey was distributed on a self-selection basis to ensure respondent’s anonymity. 
However, as identified by Sterba and Foster (2008, pp.807-808) this causes underlaying 
statistical problems when the sample data is inferred against the population data and 
should be used as a guide rather than an exact statistical inference. Utilising the split-test 
reliability coefficient the responses were divided into two groups. The questions of 
relevance to the research where included in the test which provided a reliability 
coefficient of r - 0.94.   
 
With this in mind it is worth noting that the key demographic in this research was frontline 
constables with n=560 represented in this survey. While caution should be taken when 
inferring the data statistically, the questions being asked placed the respondents in a 
professional quandary as the survey in parts asked them whether they were doing 
something wrong. Given the frequency of positive responses to these sensitive questions 
it can be suggested that the response rates act as a base line. As Lavrakas (2011, p.834) 
articulates, ‘any mode of data collection that increases the number of sensitive behaviours 
is considered better under the assumption that respondents will underreport those 
behaviours.’ Generally, respondents are considered likely to answer in line with accepted 
practices, culture and social norms of the associated group they represent. However, 
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Lavrakas’ position adds weight that these practices are likely to be underrepresented 
creating a juxtaposition that the external reliability should be treated with caution even 
though the findings support the alternative hypothesis as they may be higher in reality.    
 
Survey questions are measurement tools, and this study utilised a multidimensional 
concept to question formulation (See Appendix D) in order to achieve the research aims 
(Ruel, Wagner and Gillespie, 2016, p.46). Asking respondents, single concept questions 
such as, ‘do you use social media for surveillance purposes?’ would unlikely yield truthful 
results given its provocative stance or provide sufficient detail to understand the ‘why’. 
Instead the first section considered levels of training, uses of social media and awareness 
of different ways to conduct investigations across social media which once interpreted 
answer the fundamental research question. As considered by Holyk (2008, pp.657-658) 
open-ended questions that test respondent’s knowledge base were used sparingly and 
chiefly towards the end of the survey as they are cognitively demanding on the 
respondent. While closed-ended questions with predetermined response categories were 
used to enable the comparison of respondents and focused towards the beginning of the 
survey to ease participants into the survey and encourage survey progression. As 
considered by Ruel, Wagner and Gillespie (2016, pp.56-61) a combination of fixed-
choice question types were used within the survey depending on the nature of information 
being sought from the respondent. These included multiple choice questions where clear 
and unambiguous options were provided to the respondent, for examples; 
1. To what level are you trained in Online Investigation (Open Source)?  
 
 Level 1 (Not specifically trained)       
 Level 2 (Core Open Source Investigation/Research)    
 Level 3 (Advanced Open Source Investigation/Research)   
 Level 4 (Network Investigations)      
 Level 5 (Undercover Officer online, Covert Internet Investigator)   
    
          
Rating scale questions that used responses to represent a continuum from which 
respondents choose the single best answer, for example; 
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4. Approximately how often do you use Online Investigation (Open Source) research 
in your work? 
 
Very frequently (several times a day)    
Frequently (1-2 times a day)     
Occasionally (2-3 times a week)     
Rarely (2-3 times a month)     
Very rarely (once a month or less)    
Other (please explain):      
 
Finally, checklist questions were used when it was important to allow the respondent the 
opportunity to select multiple responses, for example;  
7. How have you conducted Online Investigation (Open Source) research?  Please 
tick all that apply. 
 
Request submitted to Open Source Unit       
Request submitted to LIT        
Request submitted via CRIMINT       
Used an Aware terminal (MPS desktop computer / tablet device etc.)    
 Used a Covert terminal (standalone, not overtly linked to the MPS)   
Used my personal, non-work-related device (your own phone/tablet etc.)     
 Other (please explain):        
   
          
Where appropriate in ‘rating scale’ and ‘check list’ questions comprehensive lists were 
drawn up of potential answers followed by the option of ‘other – please specify’ to capture 
answers not thought of by the researcher in survey design. Litwin (1995, pp.1-4) discusses 
psychometrics in survey design questions and raises the need to ensure that surveys ask 
questions in a way that demonstrate reliability by eliciting the same kind of information 
each time they are asked. Therefore, consideration was given to ‘rank order scales’ where 
respondents put choices in order themselves and ‘Likert scales’ where participants are 
asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with a statement but were discounted 
as they would not provide the necessary reliability sought through the survey questions.  
  
Demographic questions provide a clear picture of who participated in the survey and 
assist in making arguments around generalisability of the sample to larger populations. 
Consideration was given as to their placement within the survey as they can invoke 
sensitivities that impact survey completion (Allen, 2017, pp.2702-1704). In this study the 
three demographic measures considered relevant were age, length of service and rank; 
these demographics provided a base for correlation against practices that aids in 
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presenting generalisations around social media surveillance practices within the MPS. 
Some of the established demographics in survey research such as gender (Ruel, Wagner 
and Gillespie, 2016, p.45) and ethnicity were excluded from the survey on the basis of 
relevance to the research questions and to further prompt the notion of anonymity. While 
Givens (2008, p.847) suggests sequencing demographic questions towards the end of the 
survey to maximise respondent engagement, they were placed prior to the final four (4) 
questions in a strategic decision based on the value of demographics data verses the 
benefit of the data obtainable in the final knowledge section. Questions 1-4 in the final 
section evaluated respondent’s knowledge of legislation, policy and ethics in relation to 
open source investigations, and combined fixed-choice typology with an open-ended 
option, for example;  
 
1. Does the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA 2000) impact the way in 
which police obtain Online Investigation (Open Source) intelligence? 
 
Yes   (pop up) Please briefly explain why (TEXT – Max 1000 words?) 
No    (pop up) Please briefly explain why (TEXT – Max 1000 words?) 
Don’t know   
 
This was used so encourage participants to commit to an answer and then explain their 
understanding if they could, generating a detailed picture of participant knowledge within 
the sample. By placing these cognitively complex group of questions at the end of the 
survey eighty-three percent (83%) of respondents completed the entire survey. Caution 
should be taken in relation to the validity of these questions as they do represent complex 
topics that require further analysis and research in their own right.  
 
Focus group participants (see phase one) were used to test and discuss the survey 
questions prior to full dissemination across the MPS (Holyk, 2008, p.659). Consequently, 
changes were made to the wording of questions including question 1. which asked; ‘To 
what level are you trained in online investigation (Open Source)?’ While officially the 
levels are one-to-five (1-5), with one (1) formally recognised as ‘overt open source 
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investigation/research’ this caused respondents confusion as it suggested a minimum 
basic level of training that most had not attained.  
 Participant: ‘The first question, is that level one (1)?  
 Facilitator: ‘Yes level one (1) is the basic level with no training.’ – Focus Group 2 
Participant: ‘That took a little bit of reading to figure out.’ 
 [Group agrees with member that the first question needs clarification] – Focus Group 2 
 
As a consequence of the feedback the option was changed to, ‘not specifically trained.’ 
In subsequent trails respondents no longer raised the question as problematic. Focus 
group participants also raised concern at the use of the term ‘Open Source’ highlighting 
that they felt it was too restrictive and unclear;  
 Participant: ‘The fact that the words ‘open source’ is there. It’s a bit restrictive, 
a lot of people will step back from that.’ – Focus Group 1 
 
 Participant: ‘I think a lot of people will read that, ‘have you conducted open 
source research?’ and they would think no. Open source research doesn’t cover what I 
have done, so then you wouldn’t get the answers to the next questions.’ – Focus Group 1 
 
As a result, the terminology throughout the survey was changed to say, ‘Online 
Investigation (Open Source)’ resulting in support from the focus group that raised it; 
  
Participant: ‘People will relate to “online research” more than they can relate 
to “open source.” – Focus Group 1 
 
In later focus groups trials the use of ‘online research throughout the survey received no 
further criticism. Making these changes further ensured the reliability of the survey by 
ensuring participants understood question wording and were able to respond consistently 
as a sample to what was being asked.  
 
Utilising ‘London Voice’, an online survey tool supplied to the MPS as part of the Mayor 
of Police and Crime (MOPAC) contract with Open Research Services (ORS) afforded 
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breadth of coverage to the target demographic (Denscombe, 2014, p.29). London Voice 
offered a cost and time efficient survey distribution method while reducing potential 
errors arising from the transcription of paper questionnaires (Vehovar and Manfred, 2017, 
p.143). In addition, it safeguarded participant anonymity externally of the MPS due to the 
Data Sharing Agreement (DSA) which ensured all data uploaded was only shared as 
agreed with the MPS, not disclosed to third parties and secured any ‘paradata’ obtained 
during the respondent’s completion of the survey (Toepoel, 2017, pp.184-186). Due to 
the sensitive nature of some of the questions addressing anonymity internally of the MPS 
was equally important and was raised during the focus group sessions; 
 
 Participant: ‘Anything that says anonymous; there will always be officer 
cynicism.’ – Focus Group 1 
 
Participant: ‘Unless the DPS (Department of Professional Standards) send 
out an e-mail themselves saying its completely anonymous, we are a cynical 
bunch [Police Officers] and it doesn’t matter what you say, we will always 
think that someone is looking’ – Focus Group 2 
 
Highlighted by Allen (2017, p.228) that reassuring participants of their anonymity is 
essential to building trust between the researcher and voluntary participant so they can 
feel comfortable completing the survey. Researchers have a responsibility to keep 
participants safe from harm, embarrassment or repercussions from employers and in this 
study serving police personnel were being asked about their involvement in practices that 
could raise ethical and professional questions. As a consequence, anonymity was 
addressed at the outset in the survey through the information sheet and at key points 
during the survey the word ‘anonymous’ was written in bold and highlighted in red to 
cognitively remind participants of their anonymity, especially around questions that may 
be considered sensitive.  
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In addition, the information sheet as considered by (Ruel, Wagner and Gillespie, 2016, 
p.25) contained details of who the survey was for, the purpose of the survey, key 
definitions to help participants, the authority to conduct the research, rationale for 
collecting participant demographics, how participant information and responses will be 
used and finally ow to contact the researcher directly if questions arise. Providing this 
information increases participant confidence in the survey legitimacy and serves to 
further reassure respondents that their identity remains anonymous, whilst ensuring 
informed voluntary consent. 
 
The quantitative survey results were then analysed through SPSS, while the qualitative 
results from both the survey and focus groups were analysed through NVIVO with the 
triangulated analysis (Given, 2008, p.527) identifying social media surveillance practices 
within the MPS, a gap in current MPS policy and providing characteristics to establish a 
new theoretical interpretation of social media surveillance.  
 
 
3.4.5. Ethical Considerations 
 
There were a number of influences that required reconciling prior this studies 
commencement to guarantee it met CCCU’s ethical standards. As Fox, Martin and Green 
(2008, p.103) identify practitioner research may highlight inappropriate practices or 
organisational failures and inadequate participant anonymity at the outset could create a 
research environment where ‘organisational influence’ informs participant contribution 
or hinders involvement altogether. As a policing practitioner conducting insider research, 
it was identified at the outset that researching social media surveillance with police 
personnel may plausibly uncover inappropriate practices. This then produced an ethical 
conflict with the ‘Police Code of Ethics’ that governs policing (College of Policing, 
2014b). Firstly, the codes dictate that police officers should act confidentially, ‘treating 
information with respect, accessing or disclosing it only in the proper course of their 
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duties’. Creating a dilemma for both the researcher and participants in their ability to 
openly share information about policing practices for research purposes. Secondly 
officers are bound by the codes to ‘report, challenge or take action against the conduct of 
colleagues which falls below the standards of professional behaviour’, creating an 
expectation that identified wrongdoing is challenged or reported. These issues were raised 
with MPS HQ Strategy and Governance Unit and the College of Policing who recognised 
the challenges of social research within policing contexts and support the research being 
conducted as recorded on the ‘Information Sheet’ for the information of participants. 
Brunger, Tong and Martin (2016, p.198) consider the ethical challenges of policing 
research in detail and articulate that a number of factors need to be considered when 
weighing up a particular ethical dilemma. These include established agreements of 
confidentiality and anonymity with participants, practitioner codes of ethics, 
organisational powers and policies, as well as university and research governance which 
will affect the researcher’s instincts of right and wrong. Of equal importance is the 
organisational risk that conducting this research generates and whether proceeding 
outweighs the potential exposure of inappropriate practices. In this sense any results 
would lead to greater awareness of the cultural practices surrounding the use of social 
media surveillance in a policing context, allowing for informed policy and practice 
development to safeguard police services, officers and the public from the potential 
dangers of social media surveillance in the future. 
 
According to Dingwall and McDonnell (2015, pp.153-154) human participants should 
not be exposed to unnecessary risks of harm and it is the responsibility of the research 
team to assess and manage potential risks within their study. In this study the focus group 
sessions and the survey were subject to a risk assessment in accordance with CCCU health 
and safety practices (See Appendix E). The risk assessment considered the following;  
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1. Physical risk. 
2. Psychological risk resulting from discussing potentially 
 inappropriate practices of social media surveillance.  
3. Genuine voluntary consent.  
4. Confidentiality and Anonymity. 
5. Breaches of Professional Standards. 
6. Reputational Damage to the MPS. 
 
A risk matrix incorporated within the CCCU health and safety procedures evaluated the 
severity of risk against likelihood which concluded a low probability of their occurrence 
in this study and that if they did occur the impact would be minor. Risks four (4) to six 
(6) received a slightly elevated likelihood score due to the nature of the phenomena being 
researched and potential impact on individual participants and/or organisational 
reputation. However, the risk assessment for each phase of the study remained within the 
low/acceptable range and therefore necessitated no further action or mitigation but 
required continued observation to ensure no increase in the risk throughout the duration 
of the study. Completed risk assessments were subsequently included as part of CCCU’s 
Ethics Review Checklist (See Appendix E) for consideration by CCCU Ethics Review 
Panel. This study involved, ‘the discussion of, or collection of information on, or topics 
of a sensitive nature’ such as police practices and culture in the use of social media as a 
surveillance tactic and therefore required a full ethical review. The Ethics Committee 
evaluated the study and found that it met CCCU’s ethical compliance standards (See 
Appendix F).   
 
 
3.4.6. Personal Reflections 
 
As my first experience in academic research this has challenged me on more than one 
occasion. Over the last three years there have been a number of obstacles to overcome 
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professionally, academically and personally to ensure this research was completed as 
detailed in my research timetable (See Appendix F). 
 
From the beginning I was aware that conducting this study would be time consuming and 
endeavoured to have a proactive attitude towards conducting the research within the two-
year timeframe. Around the same time as undertaking the ‘Masters by Research’ 
programme I began a new role as the Social Media Engagement lead for Ealing Police; it 
was a result of accepting this role that I began to establish the initial research questions 
for this study. Shortly after beginning the programme the opportunity to apply for a 
bursary through the College of Policing arose and participating in the application process 
led me to a chance communication with a colleague from Met Intelligence who had also 
been awarded an academic grant. This provided an opportunity to develop my research 
proposal further and ascertain that a unit within Met Intelligence, the Horizons Team were 
about to engage on a piece of work looking at the same subject matter.  
 
While this provided a valuable opportunity to work in collaboration with the Horizons 
Team, it quickly became a necessity so that similar research wasn’t being undertaken by 
two different entities at the same time. By working in partnership, it prevented duplication 
of effort and reliability concerns over attempts to obtain similar data sets from the same 
target sample. While there were clear advantages to data acquisition by working together 
it was a challenge in the beginning to ensure that expectations were laid out from both 
sides to ensure a cohesive working relationship. This included making a stipulation at the 
beginning that all data collection methods had to comply with CCCU research ethics 
criteria to ensure that the study met the necessary standards. However, while these 
negotiations were relatively straightforward, the Horizons Team had stringent timeframes 
for the data collection which caused challenges around my original research schedule. In 
order to manage the tight timeframes, I brought forward the focus groups and survey 
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deployment which increased the pressure on me to complete the literature review within 
the proposed schedule.   
 
However, these challenges were met by rearranging the original schedule and taking time 
away from work to ensure research tasks remained on track. At an early stage of research 
design, it became clear that there was an ethical issue that needed considering. To ask 
operational police personnel if they have been working outside of approved police 
practice would create a number of issues for me both professionally and academically. In 
order to overcome these concerns dialogue was established with both MPS HQ Strategy 
and Governance Unit and the College of Policing who respectively permitted the research 
to proceed and supported it through the bursary scheme. In order to further satisfy any 
ethical concerns, the research was submitted for a full ethical review through CCCU.  
 
The focus groups were straight foreword to organise but with little experience in 
moderating a focus group, the first resulted in me talking too much to fill gaps of silence. 
By the second and third focus groups, I had established a rhythm to keep topics and 
conversations more focused and allowed silences to be filled by the focus group members, 
making for a smoother flow in the conversation. In relation to the survey I had concerns 
around the number of questions and the ability of this research to manage the volumes of 
data they would generate. Some of the questions were specifically necessary to the 
Horizons Team but in pretesting none of the participants raised the number of questions 
as an issue and so the survey was left unaltered in this regard. Originally the survey was 
only going to be accessible for six (6) weeks but this time frame ran across the Christmas 
and New Year period of 2017/2018. In retrospect the delivery timeframe was not ideal 
but internal pressures to push the survey out meant this was a compromise that had to be 
made. However, a review of the number of completed surveys in January 2018 lead to 
further discussions with the Horizons Team and an extension until March 2018 with 
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additional direct engagement to encourage participation in the survey. Had time allowed 
and in hindsight I would have altered the methodological approach to sample selection 
and considered ways to make the sample process more systematic rather than self-
selection. This would had allowed for a more precise inference of the final results against 
the research population, reduced the effects of sample bias and improved the external 
validity of the research (Lavrakas, 2011, p. 347).  
 
Once the data was acquired it was shared with the Horizons Team who benefitted from 
the academic rigor provided by working in partnership with a postgraduate student. In 
addition, working with the Horizons Team allowed me the opportunity to engage with 
open source practitioners, and develop a greater understanding of how open source and 
social media are used within a policing context. In April 2018 a Sergeants position on the 
Horizons Team became available and given my close working relationship with the team 
it felt like the right opportunity. I applied and detailing the research work that I had 
completed to date with the team and was successfully appointed in the role. While this 
was a fantastic opportunity, starting a new job added another dimension of stress on top 
of selling our family home and welcoming the birth of my son Aidan in August 2018. 
These personal milestones created delays of approximately four months in the data 
processing of the focus groups and survey resulting in a (6) six-month extension to 
complete the research.  
 
To conclude this reflection, I have recognised the benefit of having internal access to the 
sample set and while there were benefits to an internal collaboration including delegation 
of tasks, support in the facilitation of focus groups and deployment of survey. There were 
also significant challenges and compromises that have to be made such as altering 
schedules and managing conflicting demands that wouldn’t have arisen if I were 
conducting the research fully independently.
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Chapter 4. Results and Discussion  
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The results and discussion represent the triangulation of research generated through 
qualitative data obtained during three (3) focus group sessions (Full Focus Groups Coding 
- see Appendix G) and quantitative and qualitative survey sample data collated from 
n=785 survey respondents (Full Survey Results, including referenced tables and figures 
– See Appendix H). It is worth noting that there is no similar internally produced research 
at this time that can be compared against the results found here. However, research 
produced by LexisNexis (2012; 2014) offers the most suitable comparison in some areas 
as it focuses on aspects of social media use in US law enforcement and where appropriate 
comparisons have been considered against their published data. However, it is important 
to note the LexisNexis research is generated for corporate benefit and their methodology 
impacts the data by actively implementing sample bias by only targeting respondents who 
use social media on the job(policing). Therefore, the data naturally reflects a high number 
of police personnel who use social media for intelligence, investigative or communicative 
purposes and discounts those who don’t use social media for such reasons. This is 
important as the data suggests 81% of police personnel in the US are actively using social 
media for investigations, when in fact it is 81% of the sample and cannot be inferred as 
an accurate population proportion.  
 
In this analysis it is important to recall the key definitions relating to ‘open source 
intelligence’ and ‘social media intelligence’ as the quantitative survey results utilise a 
combination of the two terms to ensure respondents understood the context of the 
questions and to improve reliability. Where data is gathered and analysed by the police 
or other investigative agencies from open, publicly available sources, where no private 
information is collected, it is referred to as ‘Open Source Intelligence’ (OSINT) (Bartlett 
et al, 2013, p.9; Trottier, 2015a, p.531). Where data and intelligence are confined 
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specifically to social media platforms this is referred to as ‘Social Media Intelligence’ 
(SOCMINT) this can be public and private information.  
 
While the expressed and measured demographics in the survey were, age, length of 
service and position, questions one (1) and two (2) also represented a demographic means 
by which to sort the sample as respondents were asked their level of training in open 
source and social media. The five (5) demographics represented independent variables 
against which to test the dependent variables collated across the survey results which 
included;  
 
Q.4. Respondents frequency of online investigations. 
Q.6. Respondents awareness of the open source unit. 
Q.7. How respondents conducted online investigations. 
Q.7.1. How respondents used their personal devices to conduct online 
 investigations. 
Q.8. Why respondents didn’t use the services of the Open Source Unit. 
Q.9. Respondents use of their personal social media accounts for online 
 investigation. 
Q.10. Respondents use of false personas to conduct online investigation  
Knowledge Q.1-3. Respondents knowledge around RIPA/Policy/Ethics. 
Knowledge Q.4. Respondents beliefs around privacy. 
 
In considering these variables this research is founded on a null hypothesis that MPS 
personnel are generating OSINT and specifically SOCMINT within the remit of their 
training (or lack of training, at level one) without using their personal social media 
accounts, a false persona or their personal devices. The alternative hypothesis is therefore 
that, with no training or authority MPS personnel are utilising SOCMINT for policing 
activities, exploiting access through personal mobile devices, personal social media 
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accounts or by creating false personas to remain covert. These activities constitute a form 
of social media surveillance that are presented ontologically as for a ‘policing purpose’ 
by those engaging in the described practices. 
 
The quantitative results represent a combination of descriptive statistics to evidence what 
practices are taking place within the sample data and inferential statistics to estimate the 
parameters for the MPS population. Utilising the confidence interval for population 
proportions formula the results can be inferred to a confidence level of 95%, while 
statistically asserting that there is only a 5% chance that the true population results will 
fall outside the confidence interval ranges.  
   
A number of topics were identified through the data analyse that have been grouped 
together under three (3) overarching thematical heading; ‘Social Media and the Front 
Line’ which evidences who within the MPS is utilising open source for intelligence and 
investigative purposes, examines the frequency of its use and evaluates what practices are 
appearing in the data. The second theme, ‘Social Media in a Policing Context’ evidences 
what MPS personnel are looking for when using open source and social media in a 
policing context and explores why they engage in these practices. With the final theme, 
‘Policing dilemmas and Social Media’ evidencing the challenges presenting the police in 
the use of open source and social media and discusses the legal, ethical and organisational 
implications by looking at the knowledge levels of MPS personnel, before finally 
considering how MPS personnel view the public’s online data and privacy to justify their 
use of it for a ‘policing purpose.’  
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4.2. Open Source and the Frontline. 
 
The analysis of respondents to the survey results begins with Table 13. (see appendix) 
showing the frequency of respondents defined by their grade/rank within the MPS, while 
Figure 20. (see appendix) represents the percentage of respondents by rank/grade it 
identifies the modal response as PC/DC with n=560 responding the to the survey. This 
group represents a significant category in this research as frontline police officers are 
engaged in investigations and matters of safeguarding on a regular basis and are most 
likely to use open source to support that work demand. In the LexisNexis (2012) report 
into social media use in law enforcement the demographics also represented a higher 
proportion of frontline personnel engaging in the research with 55% of respondents 
representing ‘rank and file.’ Table 14. (see appendix) shows the frequency of respondents 
by ‘length of service’ while Figure 21. (see appendix) represents the percentage values 
of those frequencies and identifies the modal length of service as 10-15 years with 26% 
of respondents in this category. Those with service between 2 years and 20 years had the 
greatest representation making up 80.5% of the survey sample, while those with 0-2 
years’ service and 20-35 years made up 19.5%. The frequency is not surprising and 
represents the recruitment drive at the beginning of the millennium to meet the then target 
of 35,000 (MPS, 2003, p.9) officers. With recent austerity the numbers of new recruits is 
significantly lower than previous years (HMIC, 2012, p.26), while those later in service 
tend to be harder to reach and engage with. In the LexisNexis (2014) report respondents’ 
length of service was only divided into four categories compared to the eight (8) 
categories in this research. However, there were similar trends with the LexisNexis report 
identifying greater responses from those with 11-15 years’ service and those with 15+ 
years but as their categories are broader it is difficult to draw direct correlations in this 
demographic. Table 15. (see appendix) showed the frequency of ‘age’ groupings for 
survey respondents, with Figure 22. (see appendix) representing the percentages and 
identifies the modal response as 35-44, with a M=38.5 years, overall those aged between 
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25-54 represented 90% of the respondents in the survey, while those in the 18-24 
category, 55 and over or preferred not to say represented the remaining 10%. Similarly to 
the length of service demographic the frequency here arguably represents the recruitment 
drive at the beginning of the millennium; with a reduction in recruiting in recent years 
highlighted by the lower representation of 18-24 year olds and naturally as personnel 
come to end of their 30 years’ service and retire there is a drop in the frequency of those 
aged 55 and over. While the LexisNexis (2014) report captured age demographics using 
broader categories, with everyone £35 in one category and only four (4) categories in 
total. Interestingly they had the same modal age range as this research of between 35-44 
in both their 2012 and 2014 studies. Generally, both LexisNexis 2012 and 2014’s 
demographics are similar to those of this research and offer a good comparison in those 
areas of research where there is overlap.  
 
Table 1. (see appendix) shows the frequency of personnel that are open source trained 
with Level One (1) respondents who have had no training in the use of open source 
representing the modal response n=685 or 87%. Figure 5. (see appendix) shows the 
percentage of personnel trained at each of the five (5) levels with reducing representation 
as the levels increases due to the specialism of the roles and training cost implications. 
However, those trained at level two (2) and beyond are authorised to utilise open source 
for intelligence and investigation purposes via approved discreet or covert computer 
terminals across the MPS estate. As with Level One (1) personnel, they are not authorised 
to use their personal social media accounts or their personal mobile devices to conduct 
any police related research. While they are permitted to utilise false personas to facilitate 
access onto social media platforms, it is only personnel at Level Five (5) who are 
authorised to covertly engage with other users online. As the complexity of the 
investigation or intelligence requirement increases so does the necessity for personnel to 
be trained beyond level two (2) and the likelihood that a Directed Surveillance Authority 
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(DSA) will be required, especially where there is ongoing monitoring, a likelihood of 
personal information being obtained or the plausibility of collateral intrusion occurring.  
 
As highlighted in the introduction of ‘Real lives, real crimes’ (HMIC, 2015, p.5) those 
who commit digital crimes create victims. Those victims demand and deserve the support 
of the police as much as any other victim of crime, with the report identifying a mixed 
picture when considering the extent to which police officers and staff know of and are 
trained in digital crimes and modern technology. Yet even HMIC’s understanding of 
digital crime appears to stop short of considering the benefits and implications of OSINT 
in everyday policing activities, from gathering intelligence on gangs, safeguarding the 
vulnerable, investigating crimes to identifying and locating offenders. The MPS was 
unable to provide a concrete statistic for the number of open source trained personnel, 
however, organisational estimates gathered in consultation with the Horizons Team 
suggest between 750 – 1000 personnel are trained between levels two (2) and five (5). 
This creates a concern with the validity of question one (1) which identifies 87% (Table 
1.) of the sample have had no open source training and currently sit at Level One (1). 
According to the survey 13% of respondents are trained between levels two (2) and five 
(5) which is not representative of the training within the population.  
 
However, what can be stated with certainty is that 87% of survey respondents have had 
no open source training and demonstrates a vacuum of skills within the service and missed 
opportunity in harnessing the value that open source intelligence and investigation 
presents to police personnel. This issue that is reflected internationally (Sampson, 2016, 
p.55; LexisNexis 2012; 2014) and equally fails to embrace the HMIC (2015, p.74) 
recommendation; 
 
‘To provide appropriate and continuing training and guidance for all those 
within his or her force who are likely to deal with digital crime and its victims.’  
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In comparison Table 2. (see appendix) evidences how many respondents state they have 
been trained in social media for the purposes of community engagement through the 
official MPS social media presence. There are two (2) avenues for personnel to receive 
this training, either officially through the Department of Media and Communication 
(DMC) who manage communications with the press, branding and the MPS social media 
presence used to engage with the public. Alternatively, the second avenue is via 
designated personnel across the MPS who have been trained by the DMC and authorised 
to deliver training locally to officers and staff wishing to use social media (Twitter and 
Facebook) for engagement purposes. Figure 6. (see appendix) shows the percentage of 
respondents and the various methods of social media training with the modal response 
for social media training being ‘No Training’, with n=359 respondents, while the second 
highest answer is ‘Self-Taught’, n=247, combined they equate to n=606 (n=359+247) or 
77% of survey respondents who have received no official training in the use of social 
media. As with official open source training, the absence of record keeping means there 
is no immediate process of identifying how many MPS personnel have received social 
media training. Those survey respondents trained in social media totalled 23% (DMC 
Trained + Borough Trained) and would represent an estimated N=9,000 personnel across 
the service. This figure is considered high as a population parameter based on official 
suggestions by the Department of Media and Communications (DMC) there are only 
approximately 2000 trained MPS personnel and suggests a failing the methodological 
approach used to engage survey respondents using official MPS Twitter accounts. This 
approach potentially increased the number of personnel participating who had training in 
social media. However, it still shows that the combination of ‘Self Taught’ and ‘No 
Training’ respondents equals 77% which represents approximately N=29,000 personnel. 
This data reveals the lack of training amongst MPS personnel and is comparable to the 
LexisNexis (2014) report, however their report only focuses on social media training and 
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not open source training, it does perform a deeper analysis yet identifies that 75% of 
personnel are 'self-taught'. While the LexisNexis research excluded those not using social 
media 'on the job', comparisons can be drawn from this research that identified 31% of 
respondents were also 'self-taught'. 'Self-taught' represented the second highest response 
to survey question two (2) but when combined with 'No Training' as the two (2) answers 
are intrinsically entwined, the overall response rate of 77% supports the international 
trend that police personnel are predominantly self-teaching and generally left without 
support and guidance from their respective police agencies. It also highlights a correlation 
in the LexisNexis report that, if 75% of respondents are self-taught, yet 81% of the same 
sample are using social media for investigations, then plausibly they are using unofficial 
practices such as the creation of uncontrolled false personas to conduct these enquiries, 
suggesting similar activities and practices found in this research are taking place in the 
US. Finally, while the results considered herein primarily focus on personnel without 
open source training or social media training, the research captured personnel who have 
received training in either or both capacity which offers an opportunity to compare 
practices and knowledge between the two demographics of trained and untrained (See 
chapter 4.4) which the LexisNexis research could not offer.  
 
Having considered the above population parameters in relation to training, the primary 
consideration is to evaluate the qualitative commentary from the focus groups together 
with the qualitative and quantitative survey results to either reject or accept the null-
hypothesis. In doing so focus group participants from all three (3) sessions acknowledged 
anecdotal evidence that open source investigation and intelligence specifically through 
the use of social media is being conducted by police officers without appropriate training. 
In each of the focus group sessions participants were asked ‘Do police officers use social 
media for intelligence gathering?’ to which replies included;  
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Participant: ‘We see it all the time, it’s very common.’ – Focus Group 1 
 
Participant: ‘I know for a fact it happens. You just don’t talk about it.’  
– Focus Group 2 
 
While these anecdotal reports suggest the phenomena is taking place, participants were 
unable to say what, if any training those engaging in these practices had, whether it 
involved the use of personal social media accounts or false personas or provide 
confirmation they had witnessed these practices first hand limiting the reliability and 
validity of the answers elicited. However, focus groups one (1) and three (3) went further 
by commenting on the practices of their peers and highlighting the impact supervisors 
played in junior personnel conducting open source research outside of legitimate 
practices. In those focus groups sessions participants stated; 
 
Facilitator: ‘Do you think the organisation understands social media at the 
higher level … or do you think they just let people get on with it?’ 
Participant: ‘I think they let people get on with it.’ – Focus Group 1 
 
Participant: ‘I get quite a lot [of requests]. A duty Inspector asked me to hack 
into a person’s Facebook… I don’t think they understand. Do they! That’s 
them not understanding. It’s been several times; can you check this Facebook 
account, or can you check this person?’ – Focus Group 3 
 
This issue was also picked up in the qualitative data obtained from the survey results with 
MPS personnel not only reflecting on requests from their supervisors, but supervisors 
documenting how they actively request their teams to conduct open source intelligence at 
level one (1); 
 
 Respondent: ‘I was asked by a supervisor to look for a suspect on Instagram. 
As this is an App that one must have a log in to use – I obliged.’- Survey Question 9 
 
 Respondent: ‘As a supervisor, I suggest others use it [open source]’- Survey Question 4 
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 Respondent: ‘I direct my team to use it often – Probably around 2/3 times a 
month.’- Survey Question 4 
 
 
The comments made by supervisors demonstrate the issue is not simply one of junior 
ranks deciding to go against policy and legislation, but an issue of supervisors actively 
encouraging personnel to engage in such practices. This was also highlighted in 
LexisNexis (2012, p.3) where their executive summary stated;  
 
‘Those in supervisory positions are significantly more likely to use social 
media for investigations.’ 
 
This thematical section considering open source and the front line has shown the key 
demographics involved are officers of PC/DC rank, aged 35-44, with service of between 
10-15 years who have had no training either in the use of open source for investigations 
and intelligence or social media for the purposes of community engagement. Although 
unique research, this theme has been compared to the closest available US study which 
has shown similarities in the key demographics. In addition, it has raised the impact of 
those in supervisory positions contributing to the phenomenon either by conducting the 
same practices or directing others to do so. With 78% of personnel without any form of 
open source training and 77% without any formal social media training the concern should 
be that this leaves a vacuum for discretional operational practices to thrive. Discretion 
becomes pertinent to this theme when there is limited training, operational access and 
direction for personnel to formulate informed decisions. Cockcroft (2012, p.47) reviews 
previous work in this area and considers that police culture has tended to highlight the 
importance of discretion at the lower end of the police ranks. He cites Davis’ (1969) 
definition that ‘a police officer may be said to exercise discretion whenever effective 
limits on their power leave them free to make choices among possible courses of action.’ 
Furthermore, Cockcroft considers Reiss (1974) who believes, ‘discretion pertains not only 
 74 
to the power holder making the decision, but also to the fact that that decision is not subject 
to review.’ In this instance police personnel will continue using unrestricted access to 
social media platforms because there is no official oversight to review their actions. 
However, this issue will not be resolved solely by successful training or an effective 
infrastructure to facilitate official access to social media platforms, it requires a process 
that has less systematic friction than taking your personal mobile device out of your pocket 
and tapping into an application without trace or justification. This would require a cultural 
shift at all levels of the policing hierarchy and a recognition of the challenges open source 
presents to policing organisationally. However, the implementation of a new system or 
process can only be justified with an understanding of what practices are taking place and 
how frequently they occur in order to determine the benefits of implementation.  
 
 
4.2.1. Frequency of Open Source Use. 
 
Survey question 4. provides an insight into how often personnel are using open source for 
investigations by asking, ‘Approximately how often do you use Online Investigation (Open 
source) research in your work?' with Table 4. (see appendix) showing the frequency of 
use against the number of respondents for each category, with Figure 8. (see appendix) 
showing respondents usage in percentages. This represented the lowest reliability 
coefficient with a split-half reliability result of r-0.81 and represents an area of complexity 
that would benefit from future research to extract the data with more precision than this 
survey allowed. However, it does corroborate the comments made in the focus groups 
where participates stated the existence of surveillance practices. Table 20. is filtered to 
show only level one (1) untrained respondents (n=685) together with the frequency each 
demographic (Grade/Rank) uses online investigation (open source) research in their work 
(obtained from Table 4.). Separated by respondent’s grade/rank the table highlights 
PC/DCs as the modal category within the demographic utilising open source for 
investigation purposes either ‘Rarely’, 2-3 times a month (n=181) or ‘Occasionally’, 2-3 
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times a week (n=121). Both categories represent 44% of the responses while PC/DCs 
represent higher use in all frequencies compared to the other grades and ranks in this 
demographic. 
 
Table 20. Level 1 Frequency of Open Source Investigation by Grade/Rank 
 
n=685, modal response – PC/DC-Rarely,  
 
The estimated confidence interval for the population proportion is calculated using the 
frequency of PC/DCs who indicated they use open source intelligence either ‘Rarely’ and 
‘Occasional.’ Therefore, the confidence interval for ‘Rarely’ estimates that the population 
parameter ranges between N=9,000 and N=11,000 MPS personnel utilising open source 
two (2) – three (3) times a month. While for ‘Occasionally’ estimates that between 
N=6,000 and N=8,000 MPS personnel are using open source for investigative reasons 
between two (2) and three (3) times a week. Although the parameters relate to Level One 
(1) personnel this in itself does not confirm that they are conducting the open source work 
themselves. However, it provides an estimate to the number of personnel using open 
source for investigations in each category. Given that the number of central requests for 
open source in 2018 was 3,605 (Data obtained from the Central Open Source Unit), the 
data in Table 20 suggests that personnel are fulfilling their need for open source elsewhere 
adding weight to the alternative hypothesis that individuals are conducting the research 
other than through official channels. Table 20. also identifies the phenomenon is not 
confined to PC/DCs and demonstrates that supervisors, (Band D, PS/DS and Insp/DI’s) 
also engage in open source investigations, albeit at a lesser frequency.  
 
Frequency of use was considered by LexisNexis (2014, p.4) but was only broken down 
into four (4) categories of daily (25%), 2-3 times a week (31%), 2-3 times a month (30%) 
n Band E Band D Band C PC/DC PS/DS Insp/DI PNTS
Total n= 685 V. Frequently (Several Times a day) 49 2 0 0 31 11 2 3
64 4 1 1 46 8 1 3
157 5 0 1 121 22 7 1
214 3 1 0 181 22 4 3
138 10 3 0 80 30 10 5
63 9 0 0 44 9 0 1
Rarely (2-3 Times a month)
V. Rarely (Once a month or less)
Never
Grade/RankFrequency of Use by Level 1 
Level 1 - No OS Training Frequency 
Frequently (1-2 Times a day)
Occasionally (2-3 Times a week)
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and less often(12%). While the target audience was only those who use social media on 
the job comparisons can still be drawn with this research data recording 21% using online 
investigations daily, 23% used it 2-3 times a week, 16% used it 2-3 times a month, while 
31% used it very rarely. However, 9% of this research stated they never used open source 
for investigations, but it demonstrates the high levels of use internationally and 
demonstrates that 91% of survey respondents are using social media to some degree for 
online investigation and research in their work compared to 81% in the LexisNexis study. 
 
4.2.2. Personal Social Media Accounts 
 
The following data sets consider the specific elements of the phenomenon that were 
articulated by focus group participants and identified in the survey analysis as taking place 
contrary to MPS policy. The existence of these elements confirms the alternative 
hypothesis that, social media surveillance is taking place across the service through the 
use of personal social media accounts and false personas that are accessed primarily via 
personal devices. Figure 16. Shows the breakdown of respondent answers to survey 
question 9. with n=101 respondents from the sample population stating that they use their 
personal social media accounts, such as Facebook to conduct online investigations (open 
source) research. With a sample size of n=785, those using their own accounts represents 
13% of participants (101/785 = 13%).  
 
 
13%
87%
Figure 16. Have you ever used your personal social media account 
(Facebook, etc) to conduct Online Investigations (Open Source) 
research?  
Yes No
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The estimated population proportion uses the percentage of respondent’s answers to 
question 9. to calculate the estimated population parameter for MPS personnel using their 
personal social media accounts to conduct online investigations. The estimated population 
parameter for MPS staff using their own social media accounts ranges between 4,000 and 
6,000 personnel. The use of any personal social media account for the purposes of 
intelligence gathering or investigation is not specifically against MPS policy, but it could 
be argued inappropriate under the current guidance ‘using social media for professional 
reasons’ (MPS, 2013, p.5). Here the guidance discusses compromising operational 
effectiveness but doesn’t unambiguously prohibit the use of personal social media 
accounts for a policing purpose; 
 
‘It is expected that you will conduct yourself in such a way as to avoid bringing 
the MPS into disrepute or compromising its effectiveness or the security or its 
operations or assets’ 
 
The data set contained in figure 16. supports the alternative hypothesis that MPS 
personnel do in fact use personal social media accounts to conduct intelligence research 
and provides an organisational estimate of the practice. Table 21. below takes the analysis 
of the practice one step further by analysing the distribution of personal social media use 
across the demographics of age, length of service and band/rank. In doing so it 
demonstrates the practice occurs across the demographic with modal responses identified 
for personnel aged between 34-44 years (however, the age range of 25-34 differs by only 
one (1) respondent) with 10-15 years of service and observes those of PC/DC rank 
predominantly using their personal social media account for online investigation work.  
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Table 21. Use of Personal Social Media Account across Age/Service/Rank 
Demographics 
 
While none of the focus group participants openly admitted using their personal social 
media accounts, survey respondents commented across several survey questions to 
explain why they used their personal social media accounts. Similar themes resonated 
through their answers with examples of, Safeguarding, Investigation and Intelligence 
Gathering being presented as the principal reasons (See Appendix H for full analysis);  
 
 Respondent: ‘I cannot remember specifically but I have used my private 
social media accounts to see if mispers have social media accounts and 
whether there is any useful information.’ – Survey Question 9. 
 
 Respondent: ‘Tracked a Romanian burglar who created a number of profiles. 
Male had not been arrested before and we could not locate him. Used 
Facebook to try and discover friend groups the he was associated with and 
locations of pictures he was uploading’ - Survey Question 7.1. 
 
The data for this element of the phenomenon evidences that MPS personnel are using 
personal social media accounts, an activity considered high-risk as the use of a personal 
account may leave a footprint or trace of the employee’s (officer/staff) search. Not only 
could this undermine the ‘policing purpose’ for which the search was being conducted but 
may pose as a potential risk to the individual through the exposure of their personal 
identity and information. In some respects, the risk is less about accidental ‘liking’ or 
‘following’ a potential criminal, and more about the unknown algorithms working in the 
background. The purpose of social media is to connect people and algorithms in part 
facilitate those connections by making recommendations based upon who has visited a 
Yes Total n= 101 18-24 3 0-2 6 Band E 3
25-34 33 2-5 18 PC/DC 67
35-44 34 5-10 18 PS/DS 22
45-54 23 10-15 24 Insp/DI 5
55+ 2 15-20 17 PNTS 4
PNTS 6 20-25 8
25-30 7
30+ 3
Personal Social Media Account ServiceAge Range Rank
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profile, page or put a mobile number into their phone. This concern was captured by a 
survey respondent when asked if they had used their personal account; 
 
 Respondent: ‘No as there can be a trace which would link my personal 
account to having searched for the suspect and Facebook may then use that 
data to link me to the subject. He would then be able to find me despite the use 
of high security settings.’ – Survey Question 9.   
 
While Trottier (2014, p.82-83) is correct when he states, ‘we may think of police 
surveillance on social media as one single process, yet there are several categories’ with 
the first category detailing manual searches by investigators and identifying that these 
practices are taking place by ground-level personnel. However, it assumes that those 
practices are being conducted through appropriate, authorised channels by trained 
individuals with a top-down mandate providing effective oversight to safeguard against 
inappropriate practices. While Trottier’s first category is correct and those individual 
appropriate enquiries do take place, this research suggests a seventh category below his 
current six, where unofficial police use of social media creates surveillance practices that 
are rationalised by practitioners as ‘for a policing purpose.’ 
 
 
4.2.3. False Personas  
 
A false persona is a fake social media profile and is strictly governed within the MPS with 
only trained open source personnel of level two (2) – five (5) allowed to create and 
maintain them. They are recognised by ACPO (2013, p.7) as necessary to gather online 
information from platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Accessing these platforms 
covertly requires an account in order to carry out observations of another user or group. 
The only purpose in using a false persona is to act covertly in those observations.  While 
the creation of a false persona does not require authorisation under RIPA, all false 
personas must be authorised, and a record maintained by a Detective Inspector in 
Intelligence or Covert Policing. The use of false personas was discussed during each focus 
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group session and while none of the participants detailed any instances of either 
themselves or others using them it was evident that there was confusion over what a false 
persona was or how they could be used; 
 
 Facilitator: ‘How do you feel about false personas? 
 Participant: ‘I think you would need some authority to do that.’ – Focus Group 1                                                                                                                  
 
Facilitator: ‘Level 2 and above allows you to adopt a false persona, at level 3  
you can befriend and eventually at level 5 you can engage in conversation.’ 
Participant: ‘Does that mean if you are using Met Twitter and you follow  
@plumstead? People talk on there … would that be?’ 
Facilitator: ‘Not quite, you are using a Met account and are completely Overt.’ 
 – Focus Group 2 
 
In focus group three (3) participants intuitively raised the issue of false personas and 
discussed how their use may impact public trust;  
 
Participant: ‘I think we are going to lose a lot of trust by being able to  
interrogate anyone’s social media account. We need to have some boundaries …  
to keep public confidence.’ – Focus Group 3 
 
Although survey question 10. asked respondents if they had used a false persona to 
conduct online investigations, it did not provide the opportunity to add comments. 
However, respondents provided valuable commentary throughout the survey in relation 
to their use of fake accounts and false persona;  
 
 Respondent: ‘I have a fake account that I use for work just like many other 
investigators have.’ – Survey Question 9. 
  
Respondent: ‘Normally around locating high risk mispers or high-risk suspects. 
I work on response team and this is when no one is available with an approved 
Facebook account. This is when the research is time critical. I know I should not 
but for the sake of expediency I have created a Facebook account solely for this 
purpose.’ – Survey Question 5 
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Respondent: ‘I maintain a simple dummy account to use for research. I am aware 
that I cannot interact with other account users.’ – Survey Question 9. 
 
The qualitative data demonstrates the ease with which a false persona can be created and 
remain covert not just from the public but from internal monitoring, auditing and 
authorisation. As the society increases its use of these platforms so will the need and desire 
for the police to access the data and with the relative intangibility that data surveillance 
brings, there will be no physical exposure to authority (McMullen, 2015) meaning that the 
public will be unaware of any surveillance activity they become observed in.  
 
Figure 18. represents the percentage of respondents for survey question 10. who stated 
they had created a false persona for online investigations, with 11% or n=90 respondents 
across the sample and filtered to include only personnel at Level One (1). This provided 
an accurate statistic for those using false personas against policy and without 
authorisation.  
 
The validity of this question raised consideration around knowledge levels of what a false 
persona meant. However, this was not considered an issue in survey pre-testing, the term 
‘false persona’ is widely used throughout the MPS and the survey targeted professionals 
within the policing environment. The use of ‘false personas’ filtered by Level One (1) 
personnel represents n=24 or 3.5% of respondents (24/685) within the survey data. 
11%
89%
Figure 18. Have you used a false persona to conduct Online 
Investigation (Open Source) searches/reaserch?
Yes No
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Calculating the estimated population proportion produces a range of between 800 and 
2,000 personnel who are utilising false personas to conduct online investigation (open 
source), research. Again, this supports the alternative hypothesis that social media is being 
used for surveillance purposes and rejects the null hypothesis. Table 22. Takes the 
analysis further to represent the respondents (n=24) by their age, length of service and 
rank highlighting the modal responses for respondents as aged between 34-44, with 10-
15 years’ service and of PC/DC rank. 
 
Table 22. Level 1 use of a False Persona across Age/ Service/Rank Demographics 
 
While there is no comparative research to compare this analysis against the use of a false 
or fake accounts was raised by Mateescu, et al (2015, p.5) who has concerns over the 
violation that these accounts represent to public rights arguing that they represent a cheap 
and disproportionate method of conducting surveillance on the public. In contrast they 
articulate how the creation of these accounts, whether authorised or not is a violation of 
the terms of service for many social media platforms who ban law enforcement creating 
fake identities. Although a relatively low statistic this finding has the worrying potential 
of becoming more prevalent in time, with LexisNexis (2014, p.4) recording that 43% of 
respondents stated they believed a significant increase in the use of social media for 
investigations was likely. The embedding of these practices as ‘accepted’ arguably 
represents a bottom-up manifestation of state power in the form of law and order politics 
that includes profiling, discrimination (Trottier, 2012, p.75) and directed targeting through 
localised surveillance. The key issue with the use of technology for these purposes is that 
unchecked surveillance creep can have a significant impact on police legitimacy and how 
the public view their personal data being used fairly, appropriately and transparently. The 
Level 1 n= 24 25-34 4 2-5 1 PC/DC 17
35-44 13 5-10 4 PS/DS 4
45-55 7 10-15 10 Insp/DI 2
15-20 2 PNTS 1
20-25 6
25-30 0
30+ 1
Age Range Service RankOS Level 1 using a False Persona
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use of unauthorised false personas offers no reassurances against abuse of power, and goes 
against the principles of legitimacy, especially without the oversight to ensure consistent 
proportionality and necessity in their application. Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, p.124) 
recognise the power dynamic intrinsic to policing and raise the question of legitimacy in 
terms of, ‘whether the power-holder is justified in claiming the right to hold power over 
citizens.’ The purpose of policies and legislation is to ensure that the exercise of power is 
appropriate for the purposes in which it is being applied but this cannot happen if the 
activities taking place within the organisation are covert and unauthorised. Consideration 
must be given to the methods by which police personnel are actively engaging these 
platforms in the course of their duties.  
 
 
4.2.4. Personal Devices 
 
The last element to the phenomenon that is central to its occurrence is the presence and 
accessibility of personal mobile devices with access to the internet which all focus groups 
raised and discussed during their sessions;  
 
Participant: ‘I think a lot of us are aware that we are not supposed to use our  
phones for this kind of research no matter how good our intentions are.’  – Focus 
Group 1 
 
Participant: ‘The problem is that people are doing it on their mobile phones, 
there  
is no record of what they we’re doing? People certainly aren’t putting on any  
crime reports or criminal intelligence reports to say they are doing checks.’ 
– Focus Group 1 
 
In survey question 7. respondents were asked, ‘How have you conducted online 
investigation (open source) research?’ with Table 6. showing the frequency of the various 
methods available to MPS personnel. The question allowed respondents to select more 
than one option giving a total response of n=1670 with the modal response being, ‘Used 
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an aware terminal’ (n=445) but of particular interest is the frequency of respondents who 
used their own personal, non-work-related device (n=279) to conduct online investigation 
(open source) research. This represents 36% (279/785) of respondents who have used their 
personal devices. The horizontal bar chart in Figure 11. provides a clearer representation 
of the various methods used by respondents and articulates that the phenomenon is not an 
‘either/or’ scenario with respondents using official channels in addition to their own 
mobile devices interchangeably to conduct open source work. 
 
Table 6. Frequency of methods used to conduct open source research. 
How was Research Conducted? Frequency 
Used my own personal, non-work-related device 279 
Used a Covert Terminal 186 
Used an AWARE Terminal  445 
Request submitted via CRIMINT 171 
Request to Local Intelligence Team (LIT) 289 
Request to Open Source Unit (OSU) 253 
Other (Never used open source) 47 
n=785 Respondents, n=1670(no. of answers), modal response Used an AWARE 
Terminal (445). 
 
 
 
 
 
The population proportion estimates a range of between 13,000 and 15,000 MPS 
personnel are using their personal devices for the purposes of open source investigations. 
This is not particularly surprising as it was identified by the London Assembly in ‘Smart 
Policing’ (2013, p.10) and while they were addressing the use of ICT generally rather than 
the use of open source their comments are still pertinent. They stated; 
 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Never used Open source
Request to Open Source Unit (OSU)
Requet to Local Intelligence Team (LIT)
Request submitted via CRIMINT
Used an AWARE Terminal
Used a Covert Terminal
Used my own personal, non work related device
Figure 11. How have you conducted Online Investigation (Open Source) 
research? 
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‘1.12 The Met also faces challenges in regaining operational advantage over 
criminals. Criminals using commonly available smartphones may have better 
technology than officers, as demonstrated by the 2011 riots. Currently, a 
parallel ICT infrastructure is in place at the Met: police officers use their 
personal smartphones since these can be more effective at helping them do their 
jobs than the kit provided to them.’ 
 
Although they do not make a direct connection between the use of personal smart phones 
and the surveillance tactics the statement goes some way to demonstrating the systemic 
complacency of the capability of these devices by policing practitioners.  However, 
accessing open source intelligence via a personal device, such as a mobile phone is a clear 
violation of MPS policy (2014c, p.2) which states, 
 
‘Investigation or research over the internet must not be carried out on personal 
devices. This activity can pose a risk to the personal safety of the individual 
and/or that of their family and may also compromise operational activity.’  
 
As stated, using a personal device for the purposes open source investigation applies to 
all MPS personnel regardless to the level of open source training, therefore Table 23. 
Correlates the results to the survey question, ‘How have you conducted online 
investigation (open source) research ’ and specifically the option, ‘Used my personal, 
non-work-related device (your own phone/tablet etc)’ against the demographics of level 
of open source training, age, length of service and grade/rank.  
 
Table 23. Use of personal device to conduct online investigation (open source) 
research across Open Source Training/Age/Service/Rank Demographics 
 
Level 1 257 18-24 6 0-2 16 Band E 11
Level 2 19 25-34 91 2-5 52 Band D 1
Level 3 3 35-44 101 5-10 54 Dand C 2
Level 4 0 45-55 60 10-15 74 PC/DC 198
Level 5 0 55+ 6 15-20 51 PS/DS 50
PNTS 15 20-25 16 Insp/DI 11
25-30 13 PNTS 6
30+ 3
Service Rank
Yes' to using personal device n=279
Age RangeOS Training
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The results show that while the modal response is level one (1) trained personnel (n=257), 
the phenomena also takes please by those trained at level two (2) and three (3) indicating 
that the use of personal devices is not completely removed by training, particularly at level 
(2). The modal responses across the survey sample are those aged 34-44 (n=101), with 
10-15 years’ service (n=74) and of PC/DC (n=198) rank. Several risks arise from the use 
of a personal device for official intelligence gathering and investigational work, firstly the 
prospect of releasing personal data, including the devices IP address to those the 
practitioner is conducting surveillance work on exposing themselves and any operational 
activity they are conducting. Secondly, as detailed by Sampson, (2017, p.65) there is a 
core issue with the admissibility of OSINT material obtained by the police that relates to 
the means by which it was obtained with the definition and parameters of what amounts 
to ‘unlawfully’ obtained material often in legal dispute. Issues have arisen many times in 
relation to potential breaches of Article 8 of the ECHR which allows for the materials 
admissibility to be challenged in court. As Sampson articulates the key element is the fair 
administration of justice which in the view of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘holds 
so prominent place in a democratic society … it cannot be sacrificed for the sake of 
expedience.’ 
 
In summary the survey data in this theme supports the alternative hypothesis and describes 
how MPS personnel are conducting open source intelligence and investigations using 
social media and while it is predominantly PC/DC’s engaging in these practices, there is 
representation across the demographic of police officers and staff, only to a lesser extent. 
The survey data observes respondents aged 25-44, with 10-15 years’ service of the rank 
of PC/DC use their personal social media accounts, false personas and personal devices 
to carry out intelligence work across social media platforms which suggests key 
demographics to target in order to have the most significant reductions in these practices.  
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The inference of the survey results has been estimated against the true MPS population 
proportion and while based on statistical survey data, it is recognised that because the 
number of untrained personnel at level one (1) is likely to be higher than represented in 
the survey there will be an impact on those inferences. It is argued that because the number 
of personnel at level one (1) represented in the survey (n=87%) is lower than the estimated 
population proportion of N=98% the analysis can infer that the parameters observed in the 
sample represent at best, the lower range of expected values in the population. Table 24. 
summarises the statistical findings of this chapter and helps to summarise the concerns 
raised throughout this chapter in relation to the use of localised surveillance tactics by 
policing personnel. As concluded in Sampson (2017, p.66) while there is a responsibility 
to consider the provenance and reliability of social media intelligence, there is also a need 
for law enforcement agencies to consider how they came by the material and what 
processes they used to obtain it and that failure to consider these issues at an early stage 
may prove fatal to a prosecution or related proceeding. 
 
Table 24. Ch. 4.2 Summary of key findings and inferences against MPS Population. 
Theme Survey Response (n) Percentage (%) Estimated Population 
Proportion (N) 
No Open Source Training 685/785 87% 30,000 to 39,000 
No Social Media Training 606/785 77% 29,000 to 31,000 
Level 1. Use of Personal 
Social Media Account 
101/785 13% 4,000 to 6,000 
Level 1. Use of False 
Persona 
24/785 3.1% 800 to 2,000 
Use of Personal Device 279/785 35.5% 13,000 to 15,000 
 
4.3. Open Source in a Policing Context 
 
Having established the occurrence of the alternative hypothesis, the null hypothesis can 
be rejected opening the next phase of analysis which considers what police personnel are 
using OSINT and SOCMINT for and why they are going against policy and legislation to 
access these data streams for policing purposes. A number of themes were established 
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from the data including the dichotomy between justifying the use of using open source for 
matters of safeguarding opposed to investigations and intelligence gathering. However, at 
a fundamental and practical level, justification was articulated in terms of basic policing 
needs; the need for real time information at the scene while still relevant; the need for 
technology to enable personnel to conduct open source research quickly, safely and 
efficiently and finally a need to feel empowered to conduct investigations using capable 
technology fit for purpose and representative of  modern policing. 
 
4.3.1. Safeguarding Vs Investigation & Intelligence 
Throughout the three (3) focus group sessions participants attempted to explain why ‘their 
peers’ were using social media under the principle of ‘for a policing purpose.’ On the hand 
they could understand and justify its use in terms of protecting the vulnerable, mitigating 
risk and the belief that necessity outweighed any breach of policy. This was often framed 
in examples by participants referring to locating and safeguarding of high-risk missing 
persons;  
 
Facilitator: ‘Do you feel that if it’s a vulnerability issue [rather than an 
investigation] the means justify the ends in terms of looking at open source?’ 
Participant: ‘Yeah, you would often go to your Local Intelligence Team (LIT) 
team for this, but if it’s Sunday night and no one is in, what else are you going 
to do. If you don’t know there is 24/7 support, you are going to look it up 
yourself.’ – Focus Group 2 
 
In contrast participants articulated the use of social media to trace suspects or follow 
individuals of police interest in less favourable terms;  
 
Participant: It’s about risk, its immediacy and proportionality. Is it worth 
checking [social media] to see where you checked in over the last two (2) 
weeks because you are a shoplifter? No, however, you are a regular missing 
person, you’re a child and you constantly go missing at the weekend and I can 
see that you are at the same nightclub for the past five weekends… 99% of the 
public would support that.’ – Focus Group 3 
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The propensity for participants to justify policing practices in terms of safeguarding and 
risk management while being less empathetic towards its use for monitoring, investigation 
and suspect identification/location suggests the presence of evaluation apprehension 
(Fern, 2001, pp.106-107). Where participants felt more comfortable presenting the use of 
social media as a surveillance tool in a positive, altruistic light rather than constructing the 
phenomena in terms of ‘Big Brother’ watching the public. In doing so participants were 
able to find a common ground that presented themselves in a favourable light to each 
other. However, while the focus groups articulated the acceptability of social media in the 
use of safeguarding, survey respondents answering the questions independently were 
more receptive to the idea of using platforms for intelligence and investigations. In survey 
question five (5), respondents were asked to, ‘Briefly describe how you use/have used 
online investigation (open source) research?’ Filtering the results of question five (5) by 
Level One (1) trained personnel (Full analysis in Appendix H) produced Table 25. which 
represents a word frequency query performed through NVIVO and identifies three (3) 
themes from the survey respondent’s descriptions of how they used open source research 
in their work: 
 
Table 25. Word Frequency for Question 5.  
 Briefly describe how you use/have used online Investigation  
 
Key Words Searched Themes Frequency 
Intelligence, intel, intels, research, researching, 
researched, search, searched, searching, 
researchers, searches, information, inform, 
informant 
 
Intelligence Gathering 
 
237 
Suspect, suspected, suspects, investigate, 
investigation(s), investigating, investigative 
Investigation and Suspect 
Identification/Location 
 
200 
Missing, missed, misper(s) Safeguarding 71 
 
In contrast with the focus groups, safeguarding ranked third on the reasons why personnel 
used online investigations, with intelligence gathering and investigations scoring higher 
in the word frequency count. Intelligence gathering represented the most common theme 
in the analysis with variations including ‘intelligence’, ‘research’ and ‘information’ all 
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referring to the collection and use of data for a policing purpose. The theme was referenced 
237 times and represented a weighting of 5.11% across the analysis. In London Assembly 
(2013, p.27) it was recognised that social media was a useful source of intelligence and 
stated that the Met was starting to use tools to monitor protests and events planned on the 
internet. However, the examples presented by respondents demonstrate that intelligence 
gathering while diverse is taking place on a more localised scale than that suggested by 
the London Assembly with a variety of examples being provided; 
 
Respondent 1: ‘Open source on social media provides valuable intelligence 
on subjects under investigation so at every opportunity social media is 
checked for latest photos, personal information on whereabouts both past 
and current. This can be used obtain information which can then allow 
police to apply for further [court] applications.’ – Survey Question 5. 
 
Respondent 2: ‘I regularly search the internet and social media for Intel and 
Info purposes to help and assist with events planning.  Although we have a 
Local Intelligence Team, they are often busy with other requests and mainly 
deal with crimes rather than public order.’ – Survey Question 5. 
 
The key word ‘suspect’ and its derivatives represented the most frequently used term 
within the analysis, referred to n=133 times and was closely linked to the term 
‘investigation’ and its associated derivatives. There is a logical connection as 
investigations tend to seek a suspect responsible for the allegation being investigated. 
Together the two (2) terms had a combined weighting of 4.76% over the entire text and 
supported the initial findings from the focus groups that open source and social media are 
utilised for investigative purposes for example; 
Respondent: ‘Used in investigations, to trace suspects, to establish if victims 
had contact with the suspect.’ – Survey Question 5. 
 
The final theme, safeguarding was chiefly contextualised in the data by respondents using 
social media to locate or find information on missing persons as in the focus groups. The 
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key words identified were ‘missing’ and ‘misper’ (a term used within the MPS to refer to 
‘Missing Persons’) that resulted in the inclusion of this theme with 71 references being 
made within question five (5) and a weighting of 1.21%. A search of associated words 
such as, safe, safeguard and vulnerable yielded no additional results. Comparing the 
weightings of the three (3) themes shows statistically that safeguarding was not as 
important to the survey respondents as it was to the participants of the focus group but 
still featured. 
 
 Respondent: ‘Whilst working on the misper unit - open source research, for 
example Facebook was a great tool for monitoring some of the mispers who 
were out of 'contact' but would post on social media so we could establish that 
there were alive and seemingly well.’ – Survey Question 5.  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly the analysis recognised the overlap between the three (3) themes 
where intelligence gathering can relate to either an investigation and/or a matter of 
safeguarding but warranted its own theme due to the variety of functions that the police 
are employed to carry out within society and require the development of intelligence to 
make effective decisions on (e.g. public order events). The qualitative analysis of question 
five (5) does, however, demonstrate the breadth of uses open source data and social media 
has in a policing context and is visually represented in the below word cloud. Figure 29. 
shows the top 60 words identified in the NVIVO frequency analysis of survey question 
five (5) and provides a context around the key words that drove the development of the 
above themes.  
The saturation of social media is a result of its domestication, that is the degree to which 
it has been embedded in everyday life (Trottier, 2012, p.78) and so it is not surprising it 
has migrated from personal use to police use at the localised level. Police personnel use 
these platforms personally and identify with the benefits professionally. However, as 
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stated in Sweeney-Burke (2015, p.134), ‘Police officers hold a distinguished place in 
society, and we expect higher standards off them than we might for others. Therefore, 
 
Figure 29. Word Cloud Representing How Level One (1) Trained Personnel use 
Online Investigation (Open Source) research in their work. 
 
 
 
 
their digital activities must be above reproach.’ Figure 29. Shows the vast array of reasons 
policing practitioners are engaging in online investigations and while the word cloud 
doesn’t provide the context the key word some of the prominent words, ‘suspects’, 
‘investigation’, ‘locations’, ‘identifying’, ‘research’, ‘search’ initiate suggestions that 
open source access is being used for activities that should be carried out by qualified 
personnel.   
 
 
4.3.2. Personal Device Uses 
 
This subsection considers ‘what’ MPS personnel are using personal devices for through a 
combination of commentary from focus group participants and survey respondents to add 
further weight to the alternative hypothesis evidencing the use of personal devices to 
access open source and social media for policing purposes. While chapter 4.2.4. confirmed 
the existence of the phenomenon with 35.5% of the MPS population using their personal 
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devices to access open source for the purposes of investigation and intelligence the 
qualitative commentary explored the reasons for use of personal devices, with one (1) 
focus group participant stating;  
 
Participant: ‘[using your personal device for intelligence gathering] It does 
happen regularly. We see it all the time, it’s very common and whether on 
YouTube or Facebook you seek the suspect. I mean it’s very common.’ 
- Focus Group 1. 
 
These comments are supported by the qualitative commentary obtained from question 7.1. 
which highlights the key types of work being carried on personal devices as investigative, 
safeguarding and intelligence based;  
 
Respondent: ‘Trawling social media quickly reacting to information from a 
victim to determine if the information was accurate and would lead to a 
potential suspect being identified. Once confirmed that the information was 
accurate, I then submitted an official request to have the social media account 
evidentially captured.’ – Survey Question 7.1. 
 
Respondent: ‘I have used my personal mobile and tablet to see Facebook 
profiles and gain info from the press. It is the quickest way of seeing the 
information that is in the public domain.’ – Survey Question 7.1. 
 
The majority of comments detail research being carried out for the purposes of conducting 
investigations, with safeguarding second and intelligence gathering rarely mentioned, 
suggesting that personnel are using mobile devices predominantly to access information 
immediately to assist with ongoing police matters, rather than for protracted monitoring 
of intelligence.  
 
Survey question 7.1. takes the responses to question 7. of those who stated that they use 
their personal mobile devices to conduct open source research (n=279) and asks them to 
detail what they use their personal devices for. Table 7. shows the breakdown of responses 
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across this multiple selection question, with n=1084 representing the total number of 
answers by the n=279 respondents. The bar chart in Figure 12.  shows the frequency of 
those responses and identifies the modal response as being the provision of directions to 
the public which is considered an appropriate use of the technology. However, 
respondents also use their personal device for safeguarding with n=110 conducting 
missing person enquiries, and while criminal investigation represented n=131 responses, 
as a theme criminal investigation could include the categories, Domestic Incident, Civil 
Dispute, Road Traffic Collision and Critical Incident as they are types of investigations. 
To avoid double counting only independent responses across each theme have been 
included to establish an estimated confidence interval for thematical analysis. (Note: If a 
respondent ticked yes to more than one answer within the theme it has only been counted 
once within the thematical context). Therefore, the combined categories that represent the 
theme of investigation total n=167 (n=131+3+8+20+5). Responses involving intelligence 
gathering either by accessing information about persons/suspected/wanted offenders or 
monitoring a suspect’s social media account equal n=66 (n=33+33).  
 
Table 7. Reasons for using your Personal Device 
Reason for Using Personal Device Frequency Thematical Value 
Missing person enquiries 110 110 (Safeguarding) 
Criminal investigation 131 131 (Investigation) 
Domestic Incident 26 3 (investigation) 
Civil Dispute 31 8 (Investigation) 
Road Traffic Collision 46 20 (Investigation) 
Critical Incident 37 5 (Investigation) 
Finding information for member of the public 161 161 
Giving directions to members of the public 189 189 
Accessing information about a person/suspect/wanted offender 74 33 (Intelligence) 
Access Information blocked by AWARE 184 184 
To update an MPS social media platform 48 48 
Monitoring of a suspected offender’s social media account 44 33 (Intelligence) 
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n=279 Respondents, n=1084(no. of answers), modal response – Giving Directions 
(189). 
 
It was previously established in chapter 4.2.4 that the number of personnel using a 
personal device for open source research was n=279 and represented an estimated 
N=13,000 and 15,000 across the population size. Utilising the three key themes identified 
it is estimated that the population proportion of MPS personnel using personal devices for 
purpose of investigations is between 8,000 and 9,000. The number of personnel across the 
MPS using their personal mobile devices for the purpose of intelligence gathering is 
between 3,000 and 4,000. Finally, the number of personnel across the MPS using their 
personal mobile devices for the purpose of safeguarding is between 5,000 and 6,000.  
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Figure 12. Reasons for using a personal device to conduct Online (Open 
Source) research.  
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Based on the above data it suggests personnel are utilising their mobile devices 
predominantly for the purpose of investigations, then safeguarding and finally intelligence 
gathering. It is recognised that the question simplifies the complex nature of police 
activities and that validity of the thematical analysis may be impacted on the loose 
inclusion of answers into themes that were not specified at the time of asking the survey 
question. This represents another area for further research but provides a loose 
interpretation of the data to compare against the word frequency analysis in chapter 4.3.1. 
There the data suggested the order of significance for MPS personnel carrying out online 
research was intelligence gathering, investigation and then safeguarding. As such the 
quantitative data could suggest personnel are conducting real time open source research 
during potentially live investigations and matters of safeguarding, while intelligence 
checks may be a less time sensitive and therefore not requiring the use of a personal device 
as often. If this were the case the qualitative responses don’t support the quantitative 
reasons provided.  
 
While there are no comparative studies to compare these finding, Table 7. Confirms 
surveillance activities as a minimum are taking place with the n=44 respondents using 
social media to monitor suspected offenders accounts which represents a total of 5.6% of 
the overall survey (n=44/785) results and suggests an estimated population proportion of 
between 2,000 and 3,000 MPS personnel. These respondents also stated they were level 
one (1) untrained personnel. This activity contradicts the guidance on ‘repeated viewing’ 
of personal information and constitutes directed surveillance under the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Without the correct authority it is highly likely that it 
constitutes breaches under the Human Rights Act 1998, article 8, the right to a private and 
family life and contravenes MPS policy and codes of conduct. As highlighted earlier in 
these findings, practices that fail to be conducted with proportionality or necessity 
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severely impact public perception and approval (Clapham, 2015, p.110) and ultimately 
undermine the confidence the public hold in the police. If the police are to use these tactics 
they must do so with proportionality, necessity and transparency and only employ them 
for a legitimate aim. In the case of localised surveillance these important concepts 
distinguish the police and the rule of law from the rest of society are absent and serve only 
to diminish the evolving dialogue between the power holders (police/state) and audiences 
(the public) that maintains the legitimacy of the police as rightful power holders (Bottoms 
and Tankebe, 2012, p.120). 
 
 
4.3.3. Why Personnel don’t use the Open Source Unit 
 
In the previous chapters it was identified that MPS personnel are using their own devices 
to conduct investigations, manage matters of safeguarding and obtain intelligence with 
these themes being represented through the paradigm of a ‘policing purpose’ to justify the 
means by which information is obtained. To facilitate these enquiries, personnel are using 
false personas and personal social media accounts in contradiction to MPS policy and 
guidance specifically around the ‘repeated viewing’ and the use of personal devices, while 
at the same time potentially breaching legislation. This chapter will explore ‘why’ 
personnel are putting themselves in this position by utilising the quantitative data obtained 
from survey questions six (6) and eight (8) and the qualitative data obtained not only 
through the focus group sessions but throughout the survey. Survey question 6. asked 
respondents whether they are aware of the Internet Intelligence and Investigation (i3) 
Team (Open Source Unit) who can support them with open source research. Table 5. (See 
appendix) shows the frequency of respondents who are aware of the i3 Team with Figure 
10. (See appendix) representing the percentage of respondents aware of the i3 Team and 
exhibits that 52% of respondents stated they are unaware of the support available to them 
in conducting open source research through the central team.  
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This suggests an estimated population proportion between 19,000 and 22,000 MPS 
personnel are unaware of the i3 (Open Source) Team or that they can assist with open 
source research on their behalf. While 52% of the sample didn’t know the i3 (Open 
Source) Team existed there are other reasons that resonated throughout the research as to 
why MPS personnel chose to conduct open source research independently of the support 
offered by both their Local Intelligence Teams (LITs) and the i3 (Open Source) Team. 
The qualitative data from focus group sessions and the survey identified the following 
themes to explain why MPS personnel used their own personal devices;  
 
Efficiency     Its Open Source  
 
Self-Service     Restrictive IT Systems 
   
In support of these themes survey question 8. asked respondents, ‘Are there any specific 
occasions/reasons for why you have not used the services of the Open Source Unit?’ with 
Table 8. representing all n=1768 answers from the n=785 respondents and the modal 
response stating that respondents didn’t know the remit of the open source unit.   
 
Table 8. Reasons why the Open Source Unit (OSU) were not used 
Reasons why Open Source Unit (OSU) were not used Frequency 
My request to the OSU was rejected 33 
Too time consuming to request research through the OSU 226 
Research could be carried out via own personal device 166 
Research could be carried out via AWARE 260 
Research could be carried out via a standalone (Inc. LIT or colleague) 184 
Didn’t or don’t know the remit for the OSU 293 
Didn’t or don’t know how to contact the OSU 263 
Didn’t or don’t know that the OSU is open 24/7 216 
Not Applicable 127 
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n=785 (no. of Respondents) n=1768 (no. of answers), modal response – Didn’t know 
remit of OSU (239). 
 
 
 
4.3.3.1 Efficiency: 
 
With the advent of mobile phone technology and social media applications everyone has 
ready access to the internet through their phone or variety of mobile digital devices. This 
creates a situation where MPS personnel have an efficient means to access information in 
the palm of their hands. It is therefore difficult to establish organisational practises that 
are faster or less system friction.  This was articulated across all focus group sessions with 
respondents stating the benefits of using their own devices;  
 
Participant: [Referring to social media engagement] ‘I’ve tried using the work  
phone, it’s pointless!’ 
 Facilitator: ‘And so you revert back to your own phones?’ 
 Participant 1: ‘Oh god yeah. We just revert back to whatever is easy generally  
with all things.’  
Participant 2: ‘It’s easier just to use your own phone, you own minutes.  
I mean we all get free minutes now anyway, so it doesn’t cost me anything to  
use my own phone.’ Focus Group 2 
 
It was also identified in the survey data that respondents felt placing a request for open 
source work to be conducted was an inefficient process when they needed the information 
immediately and adds weight to previous conclusions around the need for investigational 
and safeguarding information quickly; 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Not Applicable
Research could be carried out via own personal…
Research could be carried out via AWARE
Research could be carried out via a standalone…
Didn't or don't know the remit for the OSU
Didn't or don't know how to contact the OSU
Didn't or don't know the OSU is open 24/7
Too time consuming to request research through…
My request to the OSU was rejected
Figure 14. Reasons why the Open Source Unit were not used 
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Respondent: ‘Not operationally effective to continually make requests, 
information required at that point.’ – Survey Question 8. 
 
Respondent: ‘It’s easier than having to go through the Open Source Unit – 
Fast time intelligence is required and do not have to fill in a form.’– Survey Question9. 
 
Respondent: ‘It is the 21st century. Why would I waste time making a request 
when I can do it on my phone which is in my pocket. Unless I needed it in an 
evidential format and for a paper trail for legal reasons there is no way I 
would bother making an official request. Unless I had been given the training 
to do it myself.’ – Survey Question 7.1. 
 
Figure 13. (See appendix) confirms these qualitative comments exhibiting that n=226 
respondents stated that ‘It was too time consuming to request research through the Open 
Source Unit’ and n=166 respondents stated that ‘The research could be carried out via 
their personal device’ representing 29% and 21% of the sample size respectively. The 
confidence interval for respondents who stated using i3 (Open Source) Team was too time 
consuming is: 
 
The true range for the population proportion of the MPS is therefore between 10,000 and 
13,000 who believe that it is too time consuming to use the i3 (Open Source) Team. In 
relation to the respondents who stated that they could use their own device to carry open 
source research the confidence interval is: 
 
The true range for the population proportion of the MPS is therefore between 5,000 and 
7,000 who state they can do the research via their personal device. If the MPS is to reduce 
practices of localised surveillance it needs to ensure that its staff are aware of the support 
available to them and constantly work towards streamlining processes to make official 
routes to accessing OSINT and SOCMINT more attractive to personnel.  
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4.3.3.2 Restrictive IT Systems: 
 
In correlation with the fact that MPS personnel felt it easier to use their personal devices 
to conduct official investigative and intelligence research; is the issue of restrictive access 
to the internet through the MPS IT system AWARE. However, in slight contradiction 
n=260 respondents to question 8. stated that using the internal MPS AWARE system was 
a reason not to need the support of open source research through the i3 (Open Source) 
Team, yet the restrictiveness of MPS IT also featured heavily in respondent answers to 
question 7.1. as the main reason (n=34 comments) why they use their personal devices 
with focus groups making similar comments;  
 
Participant: ‘You could argue that the MPS is trying to say, “You can’t do 
this” because they block sites like YouTube and certain aspects of Twitter. But 
it is not clear for u, we are investigators and if one avenue is blocked, we will 
find another one [Group Agrees]. I can’t access it on Firefox, my phone will 
do it.’ 
 Facilitator: ‘Do you think this is something that happens regularly?’ 
 Participant: ‘Oh yeah’ [Multiple participants make agreeing sounds] 
 – Focus Group 2 
 
Participant: [Using social media for intelligence purposes] ‘It happens all 
the times and is always done on their own phones because their access to 
AWARE is restricted.’ – Focus Group 1 
 
While survey respondents agreed declaring;  
 
Respondent: ‘It’s happens multiple times as the aware terminals are quite 
restricted, the stand-alone terminals are few and far between (or hidden in a 
proactive team office), it is usually the quickest and easiest way to carry out 
the task at hand.’ – Survey Question 7.1. 
 
Respondent: ‘Websites frequently blocked on Aware, most recent example 
being a YouTube video linked to a gang-related murder that could not be 
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viewed on Aware. Everyone on the MIT team had to view the video on their 
personal phone. Google Maps is unusable on Aware via Firefox.’ 
 – Survey Question 7.1. 
 
 
4.3.3.3 It’s Open Source 
 
Throughout the focus groups an underlying assumption began to develop about the 
information personnel were trying to obtain from the internet. Specifically, that because 
it was considered ‘open source’ it was ‘fair game’ for any policing purposes. In one focus 
group a participant articulated this as;  
Participant: ‘It should be down to the fact that it is in a public profile, that it’s 
an open public profile. Then I can see any major issue because it’s out there 
anyway. I can see any issue of going to someone’s Facebook account because 
we have done it before. It’s an open profile, there is nothing stopping anybody 
looking at it.’ – Focus Group 1. 
 
While qualitative comments from survey respondents were used to contextualise and 
justify why they used their personal devices; 
 
 Respondent: ‘I have used my personal mobile and tablet to see Facebook 
profiles and gain info from the press. It is the quickest way of seeing 
information that is in the public domain.’ – Survey Question 7.1. 
 
Respondent: ‘The fact that it’s open source means it is easily accessible.’ 
– Survey Question 8. 
 
 
4.3.3.4 Self Service 
 
In many instances police personnel are left to get on with the job at hand and while there 
is support available, personnel tend to be self-reliant and self-driven with the desire to 
move each job along. In a policing context the next investigation or job is just around the 
corner which only breeds frustration when the task at hand can be self-fulfilled. In this 
respect the belief in MPS personnel that they can complete open source research 
themselves without the need to involve the Local Intelligence Teams (LITs) or the i3 
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(Open Source) Team ran through the qualitative analysis. While ‘necessity’ formed part 
of this rhetoric the underlying belief was, ‘I can do this myself’ as evidenced by the focus 
groups; 
 
 Participant: ‘You know we are all adults! If we can’t do something one way, 
we’ll find another. We won’t go back to mommy and say this isn’t working, 
give me access. It’s time consuming, I wouldn’t even know who to get in touch 
with for the whole Web-Marshall thing. I’d just ignore it, when I see that page, 
I close it and just go to the phone because it’s there.’ – Focus Group 2 
  
 Respondent: ‘As OIC I would rather do the work myself and be assured it’s 
to a high standard.’ – Survey Question 8. 
 
 Respondent: ‘Every person (nearly) has access to a smart device with internet 
access. It is ridiculous to not use a tool that has access to a wealth of all 
human knowledge that sits in the palm of your hand. It would be preferable 
not to use my own device (due to personal costs to have it and access services) 
but it is foolish not to use something that would aid in your day to day 
work/life. – Survey Question 7.1. 
 
 Respondent: ‘I have a fake account that I use as it is the only way to get the 
job done without filling in a load of forms’ – Survey Question 9. 
 
Table 26. summarises the key quantitative finds from this chapter which has shown a 
combination of reasons presented by MPS personnel to justify why they resort to the use 
of their personal devices and accessing sites either through their personal social media 
accounts or through false personas. With respondents qualifying the identified practices 
by describing the desire to support victims and investigate crimes at one end of the 
spectrum, while at the other to support the vulnerable, find missing people and ensure 
safety. These reasons suggest an underlying desire to make the job work and emanate 
from a belief that as police personnel, they are engaging in these practices for altruistic 
purposes, therefore justifying the means. However, the presence of this rhetoric 
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demonstrates in some respects the failures of recent reports to make technology and access 
to it the priority promised (London Assembly; 2013; HMIC, 2015) and illustrates a lack 
of understanding on the part of the agencies and departments generating these reports, as 
not one mentions access to open source research for frontline policing practitioners. In the 
reviews and recommendations that this research identified over the two years of research, 
all highlighted the importance of social media, but it was identified as either an 
intelligence tool suitable from an organisational point of view to collect masses of data, 
or as an important engagement tool to be used for intelligence gathering through the open 
engagement and communication with online communities. The provision of skills and 
training in this area have been siloed into centralised specialist roles within the MPS 
making official access to open source data sets time consuming and bureaucratic and 
resulting in the unofficial practices described. The MPS needs to consider how it can 
decentralise some of the basic OSINT and SOCMINT enquiries and support frontline staff 
perform the research they need to effectively and efficiently perform their roles. However, 
what begins to emanate from the commentary is the lack of awareness that MPS personnel 
have in relation to their representation of the state, of policing and that they are bound by 
policy guidance and legislation that not only protects them but protects the public from 
intrusions into their privacy too. 
 
Table 26. Ch. 4.3 Summary of key findings and estimated inferences against MPS 
Population. 
Theme Survey Response (n) Percentage (%) Estimated Population 
Proportion (N) 
Use of mobile device for 
the purpose of 
Investigation 
167/279 59.8% 8,000 to 9,000 
Use of mobile device for 
the purpose of Intel 
Gathering 
66/279 23.6% 3,000 to 4,000 
Use of mobile device for 
the purpose of 
Safeguarding 
110/279 39.4% 5,000 to 6,000 
Using mobile devices to 
monitor suspect SM Acc. 
33/785 4.2% 1,000 to 2,000 
Respondents not aware of 
i3 (Open Source Team) 
410/785 52% 19,000 to 22,000 
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Not using i3 (Open Source 
Team) Too Consuming 
226/785 28.8% 10,000 to 13,000 
Not using i3 (Open Source 
Team) Own device 
166/785 14.8% 5,000 to 7,000 
 
 
4.4. Policing Dilemmas and Social Media 
 
The previous chapters explored the existence of the alternative hypothesis which stated 
that police personnel are using personal devices and either personal social media accounts 
or false personas to access online data that they are using for either investigations, 
safeguarding, intelligence gathering or a combination of all three (3). In evidencing that 
these practices are taking place this research also looked at the evidence of why they are 
occurring and investigated the justifications presented by focus group participants and 
survey respondents.  
 
This chapter will consider the policing dilemmas open source and social media create by 
evaluating MPS personnel’s understanding of their legal, ethical and organisational 
responsibilities to investigate crime while protecting the public’s rights to privacy. The 
chapter will then end with a summary of the research findings across the four (4) 
knowledge questions from the survey.  
 
4.4.1. Legislation: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
 
The last four knowledge questions in the survey were designed to evaluate focus group 
participants and survey respondent’s knowledge around legislation, MPS policy and the 
Code of Ethics. While the final question sought to understand how MPS personnel view 
public data and whether they valued the role security represented by the police and State 
over the public’s privacy. Across the focus groups it was clear that participants had a 
limited knowledge of the key legislation contained within the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act, 2000 and how it applied to the use of open source, with one participant saying; 
  
Participant: ‘When I first read the question about RIPA, I thought I should 
know the answer to this.’ – Focus Group 2 
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This was echoed in the statistical data obtained in knowledge-based question 1 (Table 17.) 
which asked respondents, ‘Does RIPA impact the way in which police obtain Online 
Intelligence?’, while Figure 23. shows the percentage of answers with the modal response 
being, ‘Don’t know’ represented by n=304 responses, while n=49 respondents said, ‘No’ 
it does not impact the way in which the police obtain online intelligence.  
 
n=624, modal response – Don’t Know. 
 
Although the modal response was ‘Don’t know’, 43% of respondents answered ‘Yes’ that 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 does apply. The limited respondent 
commentary centred on ‘repeated viewing’ with some awareness of collateral intrusion; 
 
Respondent: ‘Some material that can be obtained from the internet 
(especially social networking profiles) can be considered private 
information and will be directed surveillance if repeatedly/frequently 
viewed.’ – Survey Knowledge Question 1. 
 
Respondent: ‘If you are regularly checking someone’s Facebook account or 
other social media account, you’re likely to be obtaining private/personal 
information and experiencing collateral intrusion with regards to the others 
commenting on the items being posted and potentially breaching RIPA.’ – 
Survey Knowledge Question 1. 
 
43%
8%
49%
Figure 23. Does the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
(2000) impact the way in which police obtain Internet 
Investigation and Research (Open Source) intelligence? 
Yes No Don't Know
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As the knowledge questions were at the end of the survey responses declined with n=624 
respondents answering the following questions. This reduction impacts the margin of 
error, reducing it to 3.9% but remaining within satisfactory parameters. The confidence 
interval for the population proportion is: 
 
 
The range for the true population proportion estimates that between N=18,000 and 
N=21,000 MPS personnel do not know how RIPA impacts the use of open source and 
social media as a tool for intelligence gathering and investigation. While the limited 
comments articulated the need to consider ‘repeated viewing’ and ‘collateral intrusion’ 
there was a lack of understanding about the notions of public and private space with some 
believing information available on Facebook was all public. In many examples it was clear 
that the respondents hadn’t recognised that in order to enter many social media sites the 
user required an account and by entering they were no longer entering an exclusively 
public domain, but a private one in which the public maintain a certain right to privacy 
from the state even in a such a public sphere as Facebook as considered by one respondent; 
 
Participant: ‘Just because this material is out in the open, does not render 
it fair game. The Surveillance Commissioners have provided guidance that 
certain activities will require authority under RIPA, and this includes 
repeated viewing of what are deemed to be ‘open source’ sites for the 
purpose of intelligence gathering or data collection.’ – Knowledge Question 1 
 
As articulated by Brandon (2016) it is one thing for your personal data to be used for 
marketing purposes, but when the data is being used as intelligence by a representation of 
the State it is something entirely different. However, the key terminology that needs to be 
addressed in the legislation is the ambiguity around ‘repeated viewing’ as identified in 
this research there are a variety of beliefs and understandings in existence as to what 
constitutes repeated and over what time period. While the guidelines state that the repeated 
viewing of an individual’s website or social media, which singularly may be considered 
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as open source material but for the fact that it is being looked at for the purposes of 
intelligence gathering and data collection, consideration should be given to obtaining the 
protection of RIPA directed surveillance authority (MPS, 2014c). It is with certainty that 
those engaging in practices of social media surveillance through the use of personal 
devices, personal social media accounts and unauthorised false personas will be in breach 
of RIPA, especially as they are acting covertly. While policy has developed around the 
concept of repeated viewing, this was never in the original legislation and from a true 
surveillance point of view is irrelevant; for Fuchs (2011, p.124) surveillance is a control 
mechanism to oversee and is carried out by watchers or officials signifying a hierarchical 
power dynamic between those watching and those being watched, but he never mentions 
the need to watch on more than one occasion. This is a policy measure by the Association 
of Police Chiefs (ACPO) and designed to mesh the legislation with the needs of the 
activities being conducted as highlighted by in the Chief Surveillance Commissioner’s 
report 2014-2015, 
 
‘Certain activities will require authorisation under RIPA…and this 
includes repetitive viewing of what are deemed to be ‘open source’ sites 
for the purpose of intelligence gathering and data collection.’ 
 
 
4.4.2 MPS Policy 
 
Knowledge question 2. asked, ‘How does MPS policy on the covert use of social media 
and online investigation impact you and the use of these platforms?’ In the focus groups 
participants were again unsure of what the policies said they could and could not do and 
although most had received training on the use of social media from the DMC, they felt 
there was little support to fill the knowledge gap around using social media platforms for 
more than just engagement saying; 
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 Facilitator: ‘So we have said that these practices (intelligence gathering, etc.) 
are taking place but are individuals intentionally going against policy?’ 
Participants: ‘I don’t think they know (police personnel) they are doing 
anything against the procedures, they think they are allowed to do it.’ 
 – Focus Group 1 
 
Figure 25. represents the percentage of respondent answers to knowledge question 2. in 
Table 18. with the modal answer being ‘Don’t know’ (n=405). 
 
 
n=624, modal response – Don’t Know (405). 
 
While n=70 respondents answered, ‘No’ MPS policy on the covert use of open source and 
social media does not impact their use of those platforms. Those respondents who left 
comments predominantly stated that the policy did not affect their current role and 
although n=149 said ‘Yes’ the policy did affect their use of these platforms there was little 
similarity in any of the commentary provided. The confidence interval for the population 
proportion is based on the modal response of ‘Don’t know’: 
 
 
The range for the true population proportion estimates that between N=24,000 and 
N=27,000 MPS personnel do not know how the MPS policy on covert use of social media 
and online investigation and intelligence impacts their use of these platforms. The lack of 
24%
11%
65%
Figure 25.  Does MPS policy on the covert use of social 
media and Open Source Intelligence impact your use of 
these platforms? 
Yes No Don't Know
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awareness around MPS policy in relation to the use of open source and social media 
should be of concern to the MPS with the increased use of social media through the 
practices identified in this research. This lack of understanding supports Bartlett’s (2013, 
p.9) findings that practitioners have no clear legal direction on what is acceptable in terms 
of conducting social media surveillance investigations and that the interpretation of 
inadequate legislation has been left to law enforcement to interpret.  
 
4.4.3 College of Policing - Code of Ethics 
 
In knowledge question 3. respondents were asked, ‘Does the College of Policing ‘Code of 
Ethics’ apply to the use of open source engagement and research?’ Table 19. shows the 
frequency of answers with the modal answer being, ‘Don’t Know’ (n=368), while n=6 
said ‘No’ and n=250 said, Yes. Figure 26. shows the percentages for the survey responses.  
 
 
n=624 modal response – Don’t Know (368). 
 
Focus groups were asked if they knew what the Code of Ethics said about the use of open 
source with the following response; 
Participant: ‘I wouldn’t read that (question 3.) and think I have read the 
College Policing Code of Ethics.’ - Focus Group 2. 
 
40%
1%
59%
Figure 26. Does the College of Policing 'Code of Ethics' 
apply to the use of open source engagement and research? 
Yes No Don’t Know
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Similarly, to knowledge question 2. there were not a significant number of qualitative 
answers to analyse in the categories of ‘Don’t know’ and ‘No’ and in the category of ‘Yes’ 
most respondents made sweeping statements about ethics applying to everything. While 
this may be true few articulated the rudimentary stance stating held by the College of 
Policing which states, ‘standards that apply to the management of information off line are 
equally applicable to social media’ (College of Policing, 2014b, p.2). The confidence 
interval for the population proportion of knowledge question 3. is based on the modal 
response of ‘Don’t Know’: 
 
 
The range for the true population proportion estimates that between N=24,000 and 
N=25,000 MPS personnel do not know what the College of Policing’s Code of Ethics says 
about the use of social media. While the London Assembly (2013, p.33) says the 
Metropolitan Police understands that excessive surveillance might stretch public 
confidence and raise ethical questions, the data in this research suggests that the MPS still 
have a long way to go demonstrate they truly do understand the potential consequences 
and will need to positive action to address the current practices identified in this study.  
 
 
4.4.4 Policing Attitudes towards Privacy/Security  
 
The final question in the survey asks respondents whether they think the police should 
automatically have the right to view open source information, regardless how personal, 
for a policing purpose? The question was included to understand how police practitioners 
viewed the public’s information on the internet. whether personnel constructed a 
justification for access by articulating a ‘policing purpose?’ The focus group sessions 
discussed this point; 
 
Participant: ‘If someone’s happy to put their world out on social media … 
that’s effectively what they are doing, so is it our job to be responsible for 
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those people and responsible for Facebook, Twitter and the like. They have 
privacy settings. We are fighting with both hands behind out backs because 
we are not confident to use [social media].’ – Focus Group 2. 
 
Table 19. (See appendices) shows the responses to knowledge question 4. with the 
modal response being ‘Yes’ (n=355 or 57%) who think the police have the right to 
automatically view open source information regardless of how personal, for a 
policing purpose while Figure 27. presents the percentage of respondents in each 
category.  
 
 
n=624, modal response – Yes (355). 
 
The commentary for knowledge question 4 was the most detailed out of all the qualitative 
data sets and represented an opportunity for personnel to give their opinion. There were 
three (3) broad themes that the categories fell into as detailed in Figure 28. (See 
appendices). Those respondents who felt that access should be automatic with n=177 
comments being made, those who felt that access shouldn’t be automatic represented by 
n=41 comments. The final group who presented their comments with a balanced approach 
considering the need to respect privacy but recognised the need to access information in 
the appropriate way who were represented with n=128 comments.  
57%
19%
24%
Figure 27. The privacy/security debate is an important one for 
society and the legitimacy of the police. Do you think the police 
should automatically have the right to view open source 
information regardless of how personal, for policing purpuses? 
Yes No Don’t Know
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While the commentary was complex and detailed respondents’ who stated that access 
should be automatic made comments such as; 
Respondent: ‘If people put it out therefore others to see then they should be 
happy for anyone (the police) to see it.’- Survey Knowledge Question 4 
 
Respondent: ‘Open-source is freely available data; If anyone sticks personal 
information about themselves on the side of their house it is equally freely 
available.’ - Survey Knowledge Question 4 
 
Those who felt that it should not be automatically accessible made comments like; 
 
Respondent: ‘The police need to be mindful of privacy and freedom of 
expression in all aspects of policing.’ - Survey Knowledge Question 4 
  
 Respondent: ‘It would be misused!’ - Survey Knowledge Question 4 
 
While those who articulated the need for balance expressed themselves in the following; 
 
Respondent: ‘People are entitled to an expectation of privacy online just as 
they are on the street. We cannot just go and search someone on the street so 
we should not be able to search online without reasonable grounds.’ - Survey 
Knowledge Question 4 
 
Respondent: ‘This is incredibly intrusive and shouldn’t be used without 
justification.’ - Survey Knowledge Question 4 
 
The confidence interval for the population proportion of knowledge question 4. Is based 
upon those who answered ‘Yes’: 
 
 
The estimated population proportion range is between N=21,000 and N=24,000 MPS 
personnel who think the police should have an automatic right to view open source 
information, regardless how personal, for a policing purpose. The results of this question 
stand out from the survey as particularly interesting as they presented an opportunity for 
respondents to openly present complex views on security and privacy while representing 
some of the most comprehensive qualitative data of the research.  
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While the primary aim of the research was undertaken to consider police personnel’s use 
of social media and whether almost unfettered access constituted a form of surveillance 
this element of the research helps to understanding the phenomenon, by exploring the 
cognitive reasoning for police personnel to engage in such practices.  
 
With 57% of respondent stating police should have access to open source material 
regardless of how personal for a policing purpose this offers some insight as to why 
personnel engage in practices such as using their own mobile device and using their own 
social media accounts. There is a suggestion here that part of the reason for these activities 
is the cognitive way in which police personnel see the publics data and where they feel 
responsibility for that data lays, with one respondent saying;  
 
Respondent: ‘What do they expect (the public) if they are going to put 
information on for the world to see.’ - Survey Knowledge Question 4 
 
This suggests in part an internal rationalisation by police practitioners of their actions as 
acceptable in the context of policing surrounded by a reasonable belief that the public 
should expect the police to be looking publicly available information. From a practitioner 
perspective these actions can therefore be argued as legitimate, especially when embroiled 
in public safety and criminal investigation.  
 
Although privacy is not an absolute right and the police can circumvent normal boundaries 
with appropriate authority the presence of personal information is in the public domain 
appears to lesson practitioner’s consideration for treating it with diligence and respect. 
Again, as with the counterpart knowledge questions in this section they suggest the need 
to increase awareness potentially through a combination of training and corporate 
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communications around both policy and legislation, aiming to improve practitioner’s 
appreciation for the sensitivities of data privacy, even that which is in the public arena. 
While there may be a practical argument for accessing such open source information in 
real time for operational purposes such considerations must strive to look beyond the 
immediate incident to comprehend the overall impact on policing as an institution of trust.  
 
All of these pieces come together to position themselves in the debate of security vs 
privacy and while it is the responsibility of government and law enforcement agencies to 
balance public safety with protecting the privacy rights of the innocent engaging in lawful 
activities using those same technologies (London Assembly, 2013, p.32; Press 
Association, 2015). Finally, Table 27. summarises the key quantitative findings from this 
chapter and demonstrates that across each question almost half of respondents didn’t know 
how legislation, policy or the code of ethics impact the use of open source for 
investigations (open source) research. 
 
Table 27. Ch. 4.4 Summary of key findings and estimated inferences against MPS 
Population. 
Theme Survey Response (n) Percentage (%) Estimated  
Population Proportion (N) 
Knowledge Q1. RIPA  
Don’t Know  
304/624 49% 18,000 to 21,000 
Knowledge Q2. Policy 
Awareness – Don’t Know 
405/634 65% 24,000 to 27,000 
Knowledge Q3. CoP– 
Ethics Don’t Know 
368/624 59% 24,000 to 25,000 
Knowledge Q4. Security 
vs Privacy – Automatic 
Access 
355/624 57% 21,000 to 24,000 
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Chapter 5. Summary, Recommendations & Concluding Remarks 
 
5.1. Summary 
This research began with a null hypothesis that MPS personnel are generating OSINT 
and specifically SOCMINT within the remit of their training (or lack of training, at level 
one) without using their personal social media accounts, a false persona or their personal 
devices. The alternative hypothesis stated, with no training or authority MPS personnel 
are utilising SOCMINT for policing activities, exploiting access through personal 
mobile devices, personal social media accounts or by creating false personas to remain 
covert. These activities constituted a form of social media surveillance that are presented 
ontologically as for a ‘policing purpose’ by those engaging in the described practices. 
Table 28. Summarises the key findings that have been discussed in results and 
discussion chapter of this research and supports the rejection of the null hypotheses. 
Table 28. Summary of all Estimated Population Proportions across research areas 
Theme Survey Response (n) Percentage (%) Estimated Population 
Proportion (N) 
No Open Source Training 685/785 87% 30,000 to 39,000 
No Social Media Training 606/785 77% 29,000 to 31,000 
Level 1. Use of Personal 
Social Media Account 
101/785 13% 4000 to 6000 
Level 1. Use of False 
Persona 
24/785 3.5% 800 to 2000 
Use of Personal Device 279/785 35.5% 13,000 to 15,000 
Use of mobile device for 
the purpose of 
Investigation 
167/279 59.8% 8,000 to 9,000 
Use of mobile device for 
the purpose of Intel 
Gathering 
66/279 23.6% 3,000 to 4,000 
Use of mobile device for 
the purpose of 
Safeguarding 
110/279 39.4% 5,000 to 6,000 
Using mobile devices to 
monitor suspect SM Acc. 
33/785 4.2% 1,000 to 2,000  
Respondents not aware of 
i3 (Open Source Team) 
410/785 52% 19,000 to 22,000 
Not using i3 (Open Source 
Team) Too Consuming 
226/785 28.8% 10,000 to 13,000 
Not using i3 (Open Source 
Team) Own device 
166/785 14.8% 5,000 to 7,000 
Knowledge Q1. RIPA  
Don’t Know  
304/624 49% 18,000 to 21,000 
Knowledge Q2. Policy 
Awareness – Don’t Know 
405/634 65% 24,000 to 27,000 
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Knowledge Q3. CoP– 
Ethics Don’t Know 
368/624 59% 24,000 to 25,000 
Knowledge Q4. Security 
vs Privacy – Automatic 
Access 
355/624 57% 21,000 to 24,000 
 
The specific aims of the research were firstly to identify what open source and social 
media practices were being employed across the MPS and to establish whether they 
constituted a form of unauthorised surveillance. Through the use of focus groups and an 
organisationally distributed survey a combination of qualitative and quantitative evidence 
was obtained that demonstrated that MPS practitioners are using a combination of 
personal devices, personal social media accounts and unauthorised false personas in order 
to carry out online investigations. The research identified that these practices were taking 
place to varying degrees and that it had been suspected for some time but there had been 
no verification or quantification due to the lack of internal researcher access. In Egawhary 
(2019, p. 98) the researcher concludes that their research ‘cannot be said to demonstrate 
actual police practices’ in the use of social media surveillance which is where this 
research continues to hold ground and fill an important research gap.  
 
Arguably beyond the original aims of the research but equally important in identifying 
the presence of these activities was trying to understand the purposes for which they occur 
and the influences that make them an attractive policing tactic. As a result, this research 
has established some of the rationale behind the behaviours such as efficiency, restrictive 
access to official covert ICT and a determination to self-serve. More deeply is the 
normalising of covert practices that are largely decoupled from mainstream policing 
(Loftus, 2019, p.2086) as a result of being socially and culturally embedded and accepted 
in society; they become normalised within a policing context.  
 
The second aim of this research was to identify if there were any gaps in MPS policy that 
needed to be addressed. Again Egawhary (2019, p. 97) identifies fourteen forces across 
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the United Kingdom advised staff not to link their personal lives or personal social media 
accounts to their professional ones. However, this does not go far enough and requires a 
clear statement that police practitioners should not use their personal accounts for any 
type of police work/activity. A clear statement which until this research was missing from 
the MPS policy documents. The clarity on this point in MPS policy ensures police 
practitioners understand the risks they expose themselves, friends and family members 
through data leakage, unintended networking and countersurveillance together with the 
organisational and reputational risks that come with this practice.  
 
Finally, the third aim of this research was the delivery of a new theoretical interpretation 
of surveillance in the context of social media and policing. Through the analysis and 
discussion specific characteristics were identified that made this type of surveillance 
unique. As a consequence, the term ‘localised social media surveillance’ was established 
and considers the ‘localised’ nature of the surveillance activity to be the central 
characteristic. While traditional concepts of surveillance focus on panopticon scale and 
consider the phenomena from a top down perspective there has been a shifting paradigm 
with the advancement of technology that identifies the rise of lateral or peer to peer 
surveillance (Ball, Haggerty and Lyon, 2012, p.344). However, this research suggests a 
bottom up approach to surveillance within policing that operates across both theoretical 
planes of hierarchical and peer to peer surveillance. For this ‘localised’ surveillance 
activity is still being conducted by representatives of the state as power holders within 
the hierarchy of the social construct but uses social media platforms in a way that mimics 
lateral surveillance where the balance of power is considered equal by participants 
through common access to the information published.  
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The local nature of this surveillance is enhanced by the perceived anonymity practitioners 
have while conducting it. While the risk-reward aspect of this activity needs further 
research, commentary suggests that police practitioners conducting these activities see 
the risks of exposure as marginal compared to the benefits potentially gleaned from the 
activity itself. In reality it is an unknown risk as the algorithms and data exchanges that 
work behind the scenes appear to be shrouded in mystery even to Facebook (Tait, 2019) 
and those algorithms documented have changed regularly since 2004 (Cooper, 2020). 
 
The data suggests PC/DCs predominantly conduct these activities and that they justify 
their social media use in the context of a policing purpose. The quantitative analysis 
shows that officers are using their personal devices for a host of legitimate reasons such 
as ‘giving directions’ however, some of the reasons clearly fall into the category of 
surveillance specifically, ‘monitoring a suspects social media account’.  
 
The qualitative data goes on to strengthen the idea of this ‘local’ characteristic by 
indicating a known connection between the power holder and the audience or subject(s) 
through local knowledge of their existence. This can be through an investigative 
introduction, or where the subject is known locally to the power holder and they wish to 
gain intelligence about them, or where an individual has come to police notice as a result 
of a safeguarding matter, e.g. as a missing person. The fundamental element here is that 
the power holder conducting the surveillance is doing so in a targeted fashion isolating 
particular subject(s) of interest compared to mass surveillance which tends to be sweeping 
in its collection of data and cover potentially large demographics as illustrated in Figure 
30. 
 
 120 
Figure 30. Comparison between concepts of State Surveillance and Local Social 
Media Surveillance. 
 
 
Essential to cases of ‘localised social media surveillance’ are that police personnel are 
conducting their activities without official organisational support, not line management 
support but organisational support. Police practitioners are operating outside of the 
expected standards laid down in legislation and guidance in policy and in many instances 
those power holders are conducting these activities utilising personal devices but may 
also be utilising access through other routes such as official ICT infrastructure. 
Additionally, these activities also see the use of personal social media accounts or false 
personas to conduct the localised social media surveillance activity.  
 
In every way each part of the practice is kept close or local to the participant in order to 
remain covert from the audience they are surveilling and the organisation they represent. 
While this is presented in a policing context, it is clear that ‘localised social media 
surveillance’ could occur in any organisation deemed to be a power holder or 
representative of one in a democratic society.  
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There are clear risks in the use of ‘localised social media surveillance’ practices as the 
power holder is working in direct opposition to the official processes and practices 
established within their organisation. Practitioners not only expose themselves to 
potential internal disciplinary action for the breaches but risk the reputational damage to 
their institution which in the case of policing and covert surveillance has already suffered 
in recent times. But further to this, power holders risk exposing themselves, their personal 
information and in some instances their friends and family by engaging in practices such 
as using their own social media account. Raising the question is it worth the potential 
sacrifice of your own privacy and safety? Additionally, while there may be some limited 
immediate benefits to the practice of ‘localised social media surveillance’ such as the 
retrieval of information quicker than official channels in cases of a high-risk missing 
persons. Which may be arguably acceptable and down to the discretion of the officer 
involved; in most cases as demonstrated in this research, the information is for 
investigation purposes, to locate wanted offenders or gather intelligence. All representing 
slow time enquiries for which official channels exist to support this work demand and 
alleviate the need to conduct these enquiries through these localised practices.  
 
5.2. Recommendations 
 
In conducting this research, it has generated a number of recommendations, some of 
which are already being implemented within the MPS. Firstly, there is a clear need for 
frontline officers to be able to access open source and social media intelligence. It is 
inefficient for there to be a limited number of access points for police personnel to 
conduct these enquiries. As detailed in the literature review currently open source 
research is processed through the Local Intelligence Teams (LITs), regional Hubs and the 
central i3 Team (Open Source Team) but these avenues do not provide enough frictionless 
access to influence frontline practitioners away from their own devices. It is therefore the 
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recommendation of this research that the MPS consider the availability of official open 
source access to frontline personnel.  
 
By working in partnership with the Horizons Team this recommendation is currently in 
the process of being implemented. The removal of standalone terminals that are only 
located in specific buildings around the MPS estate will be replaced with a virtual 
platform that allows open source research to be conducted directly from the existing IT 
infrastructure. While not every officer will have access, the resource will be more widely 
available than it currently is and offer future scope for further expansion. While the 
product name cannot be discussed for operational reasons it is a fully audited system 
which will allow transparency and oversight to ensure the maintenance of standards.  
 
The second recommendation from the research is the targeted intervention and training 
of the key demographics engaging in ‘localised social media surveillance.’ Specifically, 
those of PC/DC rank who have had no training in either the use of open source for 
investigations and intelligence or social media for the purposes of community 
engagement. By targeting this demographic with training and guidance the practice of 
localised social media surveillance could be significantly reduced.  
 
The third recommendation is training and development for all police personnel, with the 
documented increases in the use of open source and social media combined with the 
research provided by LexisNexis the frequency of use is set to increase with time. As the 
results identified there has been significant investment in training to upskill UK officer’s 
knowledge of cybercrime, that includes the use of social media, but there has been no 
training or support on how to obtain intelligence or carry out investigations using open 
source and social media. Leaving frontline personnel without training and support will 
only increase the practices identified by the alternative hypothesis, further embedding 
them into the normative culture of the MPS.  
 123 
 
Recommendation four concerns those service currently available, including the Local 
Intelligence Teams (LIT’s) and the i3 Team (Open Source Team). The survey results 
identified that 52% of respondents were unaware of the i3 Team, and the most common 
answers given as to why they were not used centred around respondents not knowing 
their remit, opening times or how to contact them. As a consequence, the fourth 
recommendation is for improved communication across the MPS regarding the presence 
of the i3 (Open Source) Team so that frontline personnel are aware of the resources 
available to support them. Improved awareness of their capability will support the 
reduction of localised social media surveillance as personnel refer to them in slow time 
intelligence checks.  
 
A simple recommendation is the addition to MPS policy that MPS personnel should not 
utilise their personal social media accounts for the purposes of police work, whether that 
be an investigation, intelligence gathering or safeguarding. Clarifying this position 
removes any ambiguity around the acceptableness of this practice and ensures the MPS 
as an organisation is publishing guidelines that safeguard their employees. This 
recommendation has been accepted and is now MPS policy.  
 
The final recommendation would be for the collation and distribution of legislation and 
policy documents in relation to open source research and investigation.  They need to be 
organised and easily accessible so that personnel can refer to them directly. In relation to 
repeated viewing national guidelines need to be revisited, regardless of the number of 
times a personal site is accessed or viewed for a policing purpose this is surveillance by 
the state. The legislation needs to understand and reflect the policing need to access these 
platforms but ensure appropriate proportionality and necessity are factored into their use.  
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While this research has been able to explore and answer the three aims it set out to, there 
have been limitations in the data. Identified earlier the number of untrained level one (1) 
personnel is lower than the estimates provided by the MPS and is likely to be a knock on 
effect from promoting the survey to social media trained personnel through the use of 
Twitter, which equally represented a disproportionately high number of trained 
personnel. While the knowledge questions provided an insight into personnel’s  
understanding (or lack of) around legislation, policy and ethics in relation to the use of 
open source; the formulation of the questions and their positioning at the end of the survey 
may have impacted respondents willingness to provide detailed answers which may have 
impacted the validity and reliability of the data. Although the reliability coefficient for 
those knowledge questions was r-0.92 it would be prudent for a future study to explore 
these levels of knowledge independently to ensure an accurate reflection of understanding 
is captured.  
 
5.3. Concluding Remarks 
 
Future research should be considered across other UK police services as this is an issue 
that not only impacts the MPS but police services nationally and internationally. Once 
the MPS has adopted some of the recommendations it would be valuable for a follow up 
study to evaluate its impact and this would serve as an opportunity to re-evaluate the key 
findings of this research. However, the key challenge for researchers is access to the data.  
 
The plausible reality will be that regardless of the system implemented there will always 
be a proportion of personnel who will resort to their personal devices, they are 
immediately accessible, familiar and offer a covert method of conducting research that is 
hidden from the organisation they represent. As Loftus (2019, p.2086) concludes covert 
investigation is a key part of late modern policing…but argues that changes in the 
visibility of the police have both solidified and accelerated the spread of the covert 
mindset and practices.’  
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To this end the role of social media in investigations will continue to grow as the criminals 
continue to use the social media channels to further their criminal enterprise and share 
their criminal escapades. Advances in technology will undoubtedly make it easier on law 
enforcement to leverage this data into their investigative workflow more efficiently and 
effectively. Training on these tools and technologies will also be critical to ensuring this 
data is used to its fullest potential and in a secure manner to protect the officer and the 
agency (LexisNexis, 2014, p.15). However, if we do not tackle the challenges of localised 
social media surveillance, we risk policing legitimacy through a lack of transparency and 
respect for the publics privacy for which the police have a responsibility to protect. 
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Appendix A 
Focus Group Plan 
 
1. Ensure room is set up appropriately, name cards, water and refreshments 
2. Handouts for all participants, information sheet, consent forms, paper-based 
survey  
3. Introductions 
4. Read through information sheet and request consent forms to be signed. 
 
First Session: Survey Related Discussion Questions: 
Please complete the survey provided 
 
50 minutes to complete the survey and discuss the following: 
 
1. Having completed the survey what are your first thoughts about its 
structure and contents? 
 
2. The survey is intended to gain an understanding of how officers are 
using Social Media & Open Source Platforms in a day to day policing 
context. Do you think there are any other questions that 
could/should be asked? 
 
 
Second session: Focus Group Questions: 
 
30 minutes to discuss the following: 
 
1. In your experience do social media surveillance practices by the 
police officers take place. 
 
2. In your experience discuss whether social media surveillance 
undermines current procedural protocols and legislative guidance? 
 
3. Does the Metropolitan Police Service have sufficient procedural 
robustness around police social media surveillance and does the 
current MPS policy provide enough guidance? 
 
4. Is there anything else anyone would like to add in relation to police 
use of social media for surveillance purposes? 
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Appendix B 
Focus Group Discussion Information Sheet 
 
Title: Can I follow you? Social Media Surveillance and Policing Dilemmas 
 
Welcome 
Good morning and welcome to our session. Thank you for taking the time to join 
us to talk about the use of Open Source and Social Media in every day Policing. 
My name is Liam Cahill and assisting me is Paul Farmery. I am a Post Graduate 
student at Canterbury Christ Church University and currently studying for my MSc 
in Policing by Research. My assistant is from the Horizon Team in the Open 
Source Unit.  
 
 
Background 
In the last five – seven years, there has been a global shift in the way that police 
services communicate with the public. In part, this is due to advancements in 
technology, with 80% of the adult population having access to a mobile device, 
coupled with the introduction of social media and fundamental changes in the way 
society communicates with each other and the world around them.  
 
Police communications have had to embrace these changes to ensure that they 
have a presence in this complex digital space and are increasingly looking to 
Social Media to support their everyday work from finding missing persons to 
investigating crime. However, these changes continue to be rapid, arguably 
impacting every area of policing business, but have the police and other 
investigative agencies truly considered the implications of using these platforms 
in the trade-off between security, privacy and organisational legitimacy? 
 
The Metropolitan Police Service arguably has the largest Social Media presence 
of any Police Service/Force in the world. With this comes important challenges 
around training, technology, policy, understanding of relevant legislation and 
ensuring its ethical use by police officers. 
 
Each of you works on a borough as the SPOC or lead for Social Media and you 
have been invited here today as you have a working knowledge of the benefits 
and drawbacks of social media in a policing context. You have the front-line 
experience of how the MPS is managing and engaging with Social Media day-to-
day.  
 
Through your positions, you may have some critical reflections around the way 
Social Media is being utilised by officers.  
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Useful Definitions 
To assist you I have included the following key definitions. 
 
Open Source Information refers to publicly available information, which any 
member of the public could obtain by request or observation.  
 
In the context of this survey, Open Source includes any information that can be 
obtained by accessing the internet, such as social media, books, journals, TV and 
radio broadcasts 
 
Online Investigation or Open Source Research is the collection, evaluation 
and analysis of materials from sources online available to the public, whether on 
payment or otherwise, to use as intelligence or as evidence within investigations.  
 
Social Media is included in Online Investigation (Open Source) and refers to 
platforms where users generate and share content either openly or upon request. 
Examples of these platforms include Twitter and Facebook. 
 
What will you be required to do? 
The first part of the focus group is to ask you to complete a survey that we intend 
to distribute across the MPS in the coming weeks. We would like you to answer 
the questions and then discuss several areas of the survey. This should take 
approximately 50 minutes.  
 
We’ll take a short 10-minute break  
 
We’ll then come back for the second half of the discussion which will centre 
around the use of Social Media and policing. This should take approximately 30 
minutes. 
 
 
Ground Rules 
Please ensure all mobile devices are on silent mode before we start.  
 
It is important to remember that there are no wrong answers and please keep in 
mind that I am just as interested in negative comments as positive comments, 
and at times the negative comments are the most helpful.  
 
There is no rank in these focus groups and we would ask you to address each 
other on a first name basis.  
 
I’m tape recording the session because I don’t want to miss any of your 
comments. People often say very helpful things in these interviews and sadly I 
can’t write fast enough to accurately record everything.  
 
My role as moderator is to encourage an open interview in relation to the key 
subject areas of Social Media surveillance.  
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To participate in this research 
To participate in this focus group, you must work for the MPS either as an officer, 
PCSO, or member of staff and be involved in the borough maintenance or support 
of Social Media.  
 
Procedures 
Please use the cards in front of you to put your first names on. There are no 
wrong answers but rather differing points of view.  
 
Please feel free to share your point of view even if it differs from what others have 
said. Keep in mind that we’re just as interested in negative comments as positive 
comments, and at times the negative comments are the most helpful.  
 
You have all been given a feedback sheet. I would ask you to put your first name 
on the top and if you have any thoughts or notes you wish to make throughout 
the discussion please do so and we will collect these in at the end of the 
discussion. 
 
My role as moderator will be to guide the discussion. Talk to each other. 
 
Feedback and Dissemination of results 
The results of the research will be used by the Open Source Unit (SCO36) to 
improve the way that the MPS engages with Open Source platforms and consider 
whether officers have the right technology to safely utilise these resources. It will 
also be used to advise on policy improvements to support these endeavours.  
The research will also be published through Canterbury Christ Church University 
upon completion and submitted to the College of Policing for the continued 
improvement of policing nationally. This focus group will be pivotal in ensuring 
that the survey is ready for distribution and the valuable discussions you have will 
be used in the research to support recommendations for the future. 
 
If you would like to be notified when the research is complete and how to obtain 
a copy of the results please notify the interviewer. 
 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
All data and personal information will be stored securely and anonymously within 
CCCU premises in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and the 
University’s own data and storage guidance for a period of five years after the 
degree has been awarded.  Data can only be accessed by Liam Cahill, 
supervisors, examiners and auditors of Canterbury Christ Church University. 
After completion of the study, all data will be made anonymous (i.e. all personal 
information associated with the data will be removed). 
 
We will be on a first name basis during this discussion and we won’t use any of 
your names in subsequent reports. While I can assure you of complete 
confidentiality and any details recorded will be secured by the researcher and not 
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for public/organisational consumption I cannot guard against participants in the 
focus groups discussing details of what takes place or who was present.  
 
Please bare this in mind when agreeing to take part.  
 
Deciding whether to participate 
If you have any questions or concerns about the nature, procedures or 
requirements for participation do not hesitate to contact me.  Should you decide 
to participate, you will be free to withdraw at any time without having to give a 
reason. 
Any questions? 
Please contact Liam Cahill on l.cahill441@canterbury.ac.uk or my supervisory, 
Martin Wright p.wright537@canterbury.ac.uk   
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Appendix C 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: Can I follow you? Social Media Surveillance and Policing 
Dilemmas 
 
Name of Researcher: Liam Cahill 
Contact details:   
Address:  Ealing Police Station 
67-69 Uxbridge Road 
  Ealing 
  W5 5SJ 
   
Tel:  07976 702 598 
   
Email:  l.cahill441@canterbury.ac.uk 
 
          Please initial 
box 
  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for 
the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.   
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.   
3. I understand that any personal information that I provide to the 
researchers will be kept strictly confidential   
4. 
 
I agree to the focus group being audio recorded  
I agree take part in the above study.   
 
 
________________________ ________________            ____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
_________________________ ________________            ____________________ 
Name of Person taking consent Date Signature 
(if different from researcher) 
 
___________________________ ________________             ____________________ 
Researcher Date Signature 
 
 
Contact Details: 
Researcher - Liam Cahill l.cahill@canterbury.ac.uk  
Supervisor - Martin Wright p.wright537@canterbury.ac.uk   
 
Copies: 1 for participant 
 1 for researcher 
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Appendix C 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: Can I follow you? Social Media Surveillance and Policing 
Dilemmas 
 
Name of Researcher: Liam Cahill 
Contact details:   
Address:  Ealing Police Station 
67-69 Uxbridge Road 
  Ealing 
  W5 5SJ 
   
Tel:  07976 702 598 
   
Email:  l.cahill441@canterbury.ac.uk 
 
          Please initial 
box 
  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for 
the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.   
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.   
3. I understand that any personal information that I provide to the 
researchers will be kept strictly confidential   
4. 
 
I agree to the focus group being audio recorded  
I agree take part in the above study.   
 
 
________________________ ________________            ____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
_________________________ ________________            ____________________ 
Name of Person taking consent Date Signature 
(if different from researcher) 
 
___________________________ ________________             ____________________ 
Researcher Date Signature 
 
 
Contact Details: 
Researcher - Liam Cahill l.cahill@canterbury.ac.uk  
Supervisor - Martin Wright p.wright537@canterbury.ac.uk   
 
Copies: 1 for participant 
 1 for researcher 
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Appendix D 
Online Investigation (Open Source) staff survey 
Information Sheet 
 
Introduction: 
Online Investigation or Open Source research is an extremely valuable capability for the Police.  
It can be extremely useful in many investigations. However, to determine how Online Investigation 
(Open Source) is utilised within the MPS, we would like to understand how and when it is being 
used by you.  
 
When we talk about Online Investigation or ‘Open Source’ in your work, we are referring to how 
you access and use the internet to identify the information you require.  
 
Who is this survey for? 
This survey is for anyone who uses Online Investigation (Open Source) for engagement, 
intelligence, research or evidence gathering. It includes the use of social media or any platform 
via the internet and should take no longer than 20 minutes to complete. 
 
Purpose: 
The information you provide in this survey will be used to determine whether the MPS has the 
best infrastructure, policies, procedures and safeguards for officers and the public. As the use of 
Online Investigation (Open Source) research, intelligence and evidence becomes more prevalent 
in day-to-day policing and the fight against crime, it is vital that the MPS provides its officers with 
the right tools to access and use it effectively and efficiently. 
 
Definitions: 
To assist you in the completion of this survey we have included the following key definitions. 
 
Open Source Information refers to publicly available information, which any member of the 
public could obtain by request or observation.  
 
In the context of this survey, Open Source includes any information that can be obtained by 
accessing the internet, such as social media, books, journals, TV and radio broadcasts 
 
Online Investigation or Open Source Research is the collection, evaluation and analysis of 
materials from sources online available to the public, whether on payment or otherwise, to use as 
intelligence or as evidence within investigations.  
 
Social Media is included in Online Investigation (Open Source) and refers to platforms where 
users generate and share content either openly or upon request. Examples of these platforms 
include Twitter and Facebook. 
 
How your information will be used:  
This survey is anonymous.  While some demographics have been requested as part of the 
survey, this is to assist in statistical analysis and is not for identification purposes.   
 
The details you provide will be vital to the Met Intel Horizons Team who are evaluating the current 
use of Online Investigation (Open Source) research in order to identify potential improvements 
for the MPS. Additionally, Liam Cahill will be using the data as part of his masters degree in 
Policing by Research at Canterbury Christ Church University where he is researching police use 
of social media.  
 
Federation advice has been sought in relation to this survey and has been validated by Paul 
Clarke from HQ Strategy & Governance for the MPS. The MPS wishes participants to be open 
and honest when completing this survey for the ongoing improvement and development of the 
organisation.  
 
Further information: 
For further information on this survey, how the information will be used or the research being 
conducted, please contact Liam Cahill on l.cahill441@canterbury.ac.uk, his supervisor Martin 
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Wright on p.wright537@canterbury.ac.uk or e-mail the Met Intel Horizons Team - Met Intel 
Mailbox - Horizons Team 
 
 
 
PLEASE REMEMBER - THIS SURVEY IS COMPLETELY ANONYMOUS 
 
 
1. To what level are you trained in Online Investigation (Open Source)?  
 
 Level 1 (Not specifically trained)       
 Level 2 (Core Open Source Investigation/Research)    
 Level 3 (Advanced Open Source Investigation/Research)   
 Level 4 (Network Investigations)      
 Level 5 (Undercover Officer online, Covert Internet Investigator)   
    
         (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
2. Have you received any training in the use of social media?  If yes, please tick all 
that apply. 
 
Trained by the Department of Media and Communications (DMC)  
Trained by a Borough SPOC       
Self-taught         
No training received        
Other (please explain): (FREE TEXT – Max 100 words?) 
(NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
3. Do you use/have access to an Official MPS Social Media Account (such as 
@metpoliceuk etc.)? 
 
Yes  
No  
 
(NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
4. Approximately how often do you use Online Investigation (Open Source) research 
in your work? 
 
Very frequently (several times a day)    
Frequently (1-2 times a day)     
Occasionally (2-3 times a week)     
Rarely (2-3 times a month)     
Very rarely (once a month or less)    
Other (please explain): (FREE TEXT – Max 250 words?)     
  
        (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
5. If you are happy to do so, please briefly describe how you generally use/have used 
Online Investigation (Open Source) research in your work.  
 
 (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 words?)      
    
         (NEXT QUESTION) 
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6. Are you aware that the Open Source Unit at Cobalt Square is able to conduct Online 
Investigation (Open Source) research on your behalf? 
 
 Yes    
No            
        (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
7. How have you conducted Online Investigation (Open Source) research?  Please 
tick all that apply. 
 
Request submitted to Open Source Unit      
Request submitted to LIT        
Request submitted via CrimInt       
Used a Aware terminal (MPS desktop computer / tablet device etc.)    
 Used a Covert terminal (standalone, not overtly linked to the MPS)   
Used my personal, non-work related device (your own phone/tablet etc.)    
(sub question below) 
 Other (please explain): (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 words?)   
    
         (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
7.1 (If Personal device selected as a response to Q7)  
For what reason(s) did you use the personal device to conduct Online 
Investigation (Open Source) research?  Please tick all that apply.   
 
 Missing person enquiries        
 Criminal investigation         
 Domestic Incident         
 Civil Dispute          
 Road Traffic Collision         
 Critical Incident         
 Finding information for a member of the public     
 To give directions to a member of the public      
 To access information/a website that was blocked by Aware    
 To access information about a person/suspect/wanted offender   
 To update an MPS Social Media Platform      
 Monitoring of a suspected offender’s Social Media account    
 Other: (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 words?) 
 
If possible, please provide further details of the incident/occasion to help us 
understand why you used your own device. 
 
 (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 words?) 
         (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
8. Are there any specific occasions/reasons for why you have not used the services 
of the Open Source Unit?  If yes, please tick all that apply. 
 
Research could be carried out via own personal device    
Research could be carried out via Aware      
Research could be carried out via a standalone (incl. via LIT, a colleague)   
Didn’t or don’t know the remit for the Open Source Unit    
Didn’t or don’t know how to contact the Open Source Unit    
Didn’t or don’t know that the Open Source Unit is open 24/7    
My request to the Open Source Unit was refused     
Too time consuming to request research through the Open Source Unit  
Not applicable          
Other (please explain): (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 words?)  
(NEXT QUESTION) 
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9. Have you ever used your personal social media account (Facebook etc.) to conduct 
Online Investigation (Open Source) research? 
 
 Yes   Please explain: (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 words?)   
  
No    
        (NEXT QUESTION) 
10. Have you used a false persona (assumed identity to mask your own) to conduct 
Online Investigation (Open Source) searches/research?   
 
 Yes   (sub question below) 
No    
        (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
10.1 (If yes to Q10)  
What device(s) have you used when using a false persona?  Please tick all that 
apply. 
 
 Personal, non-work related device (your own phone/tablet etc.)   
  Aware terminal (MPS desktop computer / tablet device etc.)  
  
Covert terminal (standalone machine, not overtly linked to the MPS)   
         (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
11. This question is only applicable if you have ever used a personal, non-work related 
device/account for Policing purposes. 
 
Have you ever experienced any unwanted / malicious messages or calls etc. as a 
result of using your own device and/or social media account for Police work?   
 
Yes    Please explain: (FREE TEXT – Max 2500 words?) 
No       
Not applicable  
        (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
12. Would you benefit from easier access to the internet as an investigative tool? 
 
 Yes   (sub question below)  
No     
 
12.1 (If yes to Q12) 
 Please tell us more about how exactly you would benefit from better Internet 
access.    
 (FREE TEXT – Max 500 words?) 
        (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
13. Would you benefit from additional Online Investigation (Open Source) training? 
 
 Yes   (sub question below)  
No     
          
13.1. (If yes to Q13) 
 Please tell us more about how exactly you would benefit from additional training. 
 
 (FREE TEXT – Max 500 words?) 
         (NEXT QUESTION) 
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14. Please use the space below to make any comments or suggestions for 
improvement in regards to Online Investigation (Open Source) in the MPS? 
 
 (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 words?) 
(NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
 
15. To help us better understand your responses please tell us what your current 
rank/grade is.   
 
 Band E    
 Band D    
 Band C    
 PC/DC    
 PS/DS    
 Insp/DI    
 Prefer not to say  
Other - Please enter your rank/grade: (FREE TEXT) 
(NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
16. Please state your length of service. 
 
0 – 2    
2 – 5    
5 – 10    
10 – 15    
15 – 20    
20 – 25    
25 – 30    
30+ years   
 (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
17. Please select your age group. 
 
18 – 24    
25 – 34    
35 – 44    
45 – 54    
55 and over   
Prefer not to say  
 (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
 
There are just a few more questions which, if completed, would be of great benefit to Liam 
Cahill and his ongoing work.  We’d be most grateful if you could spend just a little more time 
in answering these last questions.     
 
If you’re happy to proceed, please click NEXT.   
 
If you would like to end this survey here, please click FINISH. 
     
   
(NEXT) – TO FINAL SET OF QUESTIONS BELOW 
 
 
(FINISH) – TO FINAL SCREEN 
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Thanks for your time.  It really is very much appreciated.  If you have any questions or would 
like to engage with us in regards to Online Investigation (Open Source) in the MPS, we would 
be delighted to hear from you.  Please contact the Met Intel Horizons Team via email - Met 
Intel Mailbox - Horizons Team. 
 
If you are interested in the research being conducted by PS Liam Cahill around police use of 
social media you can contact him on l.cahill441@canterbury.ac.uk  
 
(CLOSE) 
Thank you for completing the survey so far. The following questions are designed to help provide 
an insight into levels of knowledge around legislation and policy that affect the use of Social 
Media, together with your professional views around privacy. By answering the following 
questions it will support future training and policy development within the MPS.  
 
Once again please let me remind you that all of your answers are anonymous and that there is 
no right or wrong answer. 
 
(NEXT) 
 
1. Does the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA 2000) impact the way in 
which police obtain Online Investigation (Open Source) intelligence? 
 
Yes   (pop up) Please briefly explain why (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 
words?) 
No    (pop up) Please briefly explain why (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 
words?) 
Don’t know   
          
        (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
2. Does MPS Policy on the covert use of Social Media and Open Source Intelligence 
impact your use of these platforms? 
 
(FREE TEXT – Max 1000 words?) 
    
Yes   (pop up) Please briefly explain why (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 
words?) 
No    (pop up) Please briefly explain why (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 
words?) 
Don’t know   
       
        (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
 
3. Does the College of Policing ‘Code of Ethics’ apply to the use of open source 
engagement and research? 
 
Yes    (pop up) Please briefly explain why (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 
words?) 
No    (pop up) Please briefly explain why (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 
words?) 
Don’t know   
        
         (NEXT QUESTION) 
 
4. The privacy/security debate is an important one for society and the legitimacy of 
the police. Do you think the police should automatically have the right to view open 
source information regardless of how personal, for policing purposes? 
 
Yes    (pop up) Please briefly explain why (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 
words?) 
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No    (pop up) Please briefly explain why (FREE TEXT – Max 1000 
words?) 
Don’t know   
 
 
(FINISH) – TO FINAL SCREEN 
 
Thanks for your time.  It really is very much appreciated.  If you have any questions or would like 
to engage with us in regard to Online Investigation (Open Source) in the MPS, we would be 
delighted to hear from you.  Please contact the Met Intel Horizons Team via email - Met Intel 
Mailbox - Horizons Team. 
 
If you are interested in the research being conducted by PS Liam Cahill around police use of 
social media you can contact him on l.cahill441@canterbury.ac.uk  
 
(CLOSE) 
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Appendix E 
 
 
 
For Research Office Use 
  Checklist No:  
  Date 
Received: 
 
 
PROPORTIONATE ETHICAL REVIEW 
ETHICS REVIEW CHECKLIST 
Your application must comprise the following documents (please tick the boxes below to 
indicate that they are attached): 
Ethics Review Checklist  ü 
Risk Assessment Form x3  ü 
Copies of any documents to be used in the study: 
Questionnaire  ü 
Introductory letter(s)  ü 
Participant Information Sheet(s)  ü 
Consent Form(s)  ü 
Data Collection Instruments   ü 
Interview Questions  ü 
Focus Group Guidelines  ü 
 
Other (please give details) 
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For Research Office Use 
  Checklist No:  
  Date 
Received: 
 
 
PROPORTIONATE ETHICAL REVIEW 
ETHICS REVIEW CHECKLIST 
Sections A and B of this checklist must be completed for every research or knowledge 
transfer project that involves human or animal1 participants.  These sections serve as a 
toolkit that will identify whether a full application for ethics approval needs to be 
submitted. 
If the toolkit shows that there is no need for a full ethical review, Sections D, E and F 
should be completed and the checklist emailed to red.resgov@canterbury.ac.uk as 
described in Section C. 
If the toolkit shows that a full application is required, this checklist should be set aside 
and an Application for Faculty Research Ethics Committee Approval Form - or an 
appropriate external application form - should be completed and submitted.  There is no 
need to complete both documents. 
Before completing this checklist, please refer to Ethics Policy for Research 
Involving Human Participants and the Code of Practice for the Use of Sentient 
Animals in Research and Teaching on the University Research website. 
The principal researcher/project leader (or, where the principal researcher/project leader 
is a student, their supervisor) is responsible for exercising appropriate professional 
judgement in this review. 
N.B.  This checklist must be completed – and any resulting follow-up action taken - 
before potential participants are approached to take part in any study. 
Type of Project - please mark (x) as appropriate 
Research x  Knowledge Exchange  
 
Section A:  Applicant Details 
A1. Name of applicant: Liam Cahill 
A2. Status (please underline): Postgraduate Student 
A3. Email address: l.cahill441@canterbury.ac.uk 
A4. Contact address: 119A The Greenway 
Uxbridge 
UB8 2PR 
A5. Telephone number 07976 702 598 
1 Sentient animals, generally all vertebrates and certain invertebrates such as cephalopods and crustaceans  
2 Checklists for Undergraduates should be retained within the academic department concerned 
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Section B:  Ethics Checklist 
Please answer each question by marking (X) in the appropriate box: 
   Yes  No 
1. Does the study involve participants who are particularly vulnerable or unable 
to give informed consent (e.g. children, people with learning disabilities), or in 
unequal relationships (e.g. people in prison, your own staff or students)? 
   x 
    
2. Will the study require the co-operation of a gatekeeper for initial access to any 
vulnerable groups or individuals to be recruited (e.g. students at school, 
members of self-help groups, residents of nursing home)? 
   x 
    
3. Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without usual 
informed consent procedures having been implemented in advance (e.g. covert 
observation, certain ethnographic studies)? 
   x 
    
4. Will the study use deliberate deception (this does not include randomly 
assigning participants to groups in an experimental design)? 
   x 
    
5. Will the study involve discussion of, or collection of information on, topics of 
a sensitive nature (e.g. sexual activity, drug use) personal to the participants? 
 x   
    
6. Are drugs, placebos or other substances (e.g. food substances, vitamins) to be 
administered to human or animal participants? 
   x 
    
7. Does the study involve invasive or intrusive procedures such as blood taking or 
muscle biopsy from human or animal participants? 
   x 
    
8. Is physiological stress, pain, or more than mild discomfort to humans or 
animals likely to result from the study? 
   x 
    
9. Could the study induce psychological stress or anxiety or cause harm or 
negative consequences in humans (including the researcher) or animals beyond 
the risks encountered in normal life? 
   x 
    
10. Will the study involve interaction with animals?  (If you are simply observing 
them - e.g. in a zoo or in their natural habitat - without having any contact at 
all, you can answer “No”) 
   x 
    
11. Will the study involve prolonged or repetitive testing?    x 
    12. Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and compensation 
for time) be offered to participants? 
   x 
    
13. Is the study a survey that involves University-wide recruitment of students 
from Canterbury Christ Church University? 
   x 
    
 
14. 
Will the study involve recruitment of adult participants (aged 16 and over) who 
are unable to make decisions for themselves, i.e. lack capacity, and come under 
the jurisdiction of the Mental Capacity Act (2005)? 
    
   x 
15. Will the study involve recruitment of participants (excluding staff) through the 
NHS? 
   x   
    
Now please assess outcomes and actions by referring to Section C Ü 
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Section C:  How to Proceed 
C1.  If you have answered ‘NO’ to all the questions in Section B, you should complete 
Sections D–F as appropriate and email the completed checklist to 
red.resgov@canterbury.ac.uk.  That is all you need to do.  Once your application is 
assessed and if it is given approval you will receive a letter confirming compliance 
with University Research Governance procedures. 
[Master’s students should retain copies of the form and letter; the letter should be bound 
into their research report or dissertation.  Work that is submitted without this document 
will be returned un-assessed.] 
C2.  If you have answered ‘YES’ to any of the questions in Section B, you will need to 
describe more fully how you plan to deal with the ethical issues raised by your project.  
This does not mean that you cannot do the study, only that your proposal will need to be 
approved by a Research Ethics Committee.  Depending upon which questions you 
answered ‘YES’ to, you should proceed as follows 
(a)  If you answered ‘YES’ to any of questions 1 – 12 ONLY (i.e. not questions 13,14 or 
15), you will have to submit an application to your Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
(FREC) using your Faculty’s version of the Application for Faculty Research Ethics 
Committee Approval Form.  This should be submitted as directed on the form.  The 
Application for Faculty Research Ethics Committee Approval Form can be obtained from 
the Research Ethics pages of the Research and Enterprise Development Centre on the 
University web site. 
(b)  If you answered ‘YES’ to question 13 you have two options: 
(i)  If you answered ‘YES’ to question 13 ONLY you must send copies of this 
checklist to the Student Survey Unit.  Subject to their approval you may then proceed 
as at C1 above. 
(ii)  If you answered ‘YES’ to question 13 PLUS any other of questions 1 – 12, you 
must proceed as at C2(b)(i) above and then submit an application to your Faculty 
Research Ethics Committee (FREC) as at C2(a). 
(c)  If you answered ‘YES’ to question 14 you do not need to submit an application to 
your Faculty Research Ethics Committee.  INSTEAD, you must submit an application 
to the appropriate external NHS or Social Care Research Ethics Committee [see C2(d) 
below]. 
(d)  If you answered ‘YES’ to question 15 you do not need to submit an application to 
your Faculty Research Ethics Committee.  INSTEAD, you must submit an application to 
the appropriate external NHS or Social Care Research Ethics Committee (REC), after 
your proposal has received a satisfactory Peer Review (see Research Governance 
Handbook).  Applications to an NHS or Social Care REC must be signed by the 
appropriate Faculty Director of Research or other authorised Faculty signatory before 
they are submitted. 
IMPORTANT 
Please note that it is your responsibility in the conduct of your study to follow the policies 
and procedures set out in the University’s Research Ethics website, and any relevant 
academic or professional guidelines.  This includes providing appropriate information 
sheets and consent forms, and ensuring confidentiality in the storage and use of data.  Any 
significant change in the question, design or conduct over the course of the study should 
be notified to the Faculty and/or other Research Ethics Committee that received your 
original proposal.  Depending on the nature of the changes, a new application for ethics 
approval may be required. 
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Section D:  Project Details 
D1. Project title: 
 
D2. Start date of 
fieldwork 
D3. End date of 
fieldwork 
D4. Lay summary 
(max 300 words 
which must include 
a brief description 
of the methodology 
to be used for 
gathering your 
data) 
Can I follow you? Social media surveillance & policing dilemmas  
 
9th October 2017 
 
31st January 2017 
 
I will be researching how police officers use open source platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter and do they routinely engage in social media surveillance 
whether authorised or otherwise through the use of these platforms.  
 
I will begin by running a series of focus groups with the Single Points of Contact 
(SPOC) for social media from each of the 32 London Boroughs before 
deploying a survey across the MPS. 
 
This research is supported by the Metropolitan Police Service and College of 
Policing and is intended to demonstrate a new theoretical understanding of 
social media surveillance in a policing context. While establishing whether there 
is an organisational need to improve procedural protocols and legislative 
guidance to ensure that the police are not conducting, unauthorised, non-
auditable surveillance on digital society. In a wider context I will consider how 
the findings impact the security/privacy debate.  
 
Section E1:  For Students Only 
E1. Module name and number or 
      course and Department: MSc by Research 
E2. Name of Supervisor or module 
      leader 
Dr Martin Wright 
E3. Email address of Supervisor or  
      Module leader p.wright537@canterbury.ac.uk 
E4. Contact address: Canterbury Christ Church University 
School of Law, Criminal Justice and Computing 
Canterbury 
CT1 1QU 
Section E2:  For Supervisors 
Please tick the appropriate boxes.  The study should not begin until all boxes are ticked: 
The student has read the relevant documentation relating to the 
University’s Research Governance, available on the University web pages 
at: 
https://cccu.canterbury.ac.uk/research-and-enterprise-development-centre/research-
governance-and-ethics/research-governance-and-ethics.aspx  
 
 
x 
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The topic merits further investigation 
 
x 
The student has the skills to carry out the study 
 
x 
The participant information sheet or leaflet is appropriate 
 
x 
The procedures for recruitment and obtaining informed consent are 
appropriate 
 
x 
If a Disclosure & Barring Service (DBS) check is required, this has been 
carried out 
 
 
 
Comments from supervisor: 
The study enjoys the support of the College of Policing and the Metropolitan Police and is considered 
to be of importance. I wholly support this research.  
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Section F:  Declaration  
• I certify that the information in this form is accurate to the best of my knowledge and 
belief and I take full responsibility for it. 
• I certify that a risk assessment for this study has been carried out in compliance with 
the University’s Health and Safety policy. 
• I certify that any required Disclosure & Barring Service (DBS) check has been carried 
out. 
• I undertake to carry out this project under the terms specified in the Canterbury Christ 
Church University Research Governance Handbook. 
• I undertake to inform the relevant Faculty Research Ethics Committee of any 
significant change in the question, design or conduct of the study over the course of 
the study.  I understand that such changes may require a new application for ethics 
approval. 
• I undertake to inform the RKE Co-ordinator at red.resgov@canterbury.ac.uk in the 
Research and Enterprise Development Centre when the proposed study has been 
completed. 
• I am aware of my responsibility to comply with the requirements of the law and 
appropriate University guidelines relating to the security and confidentiality of 
participant or other personal data. 
• I understand that project records/data may be subject to inspection for audit purposes 
if required in future and that project records should be kept securely for five years or 
other specified period. 
• I understand that the personal data about me contained in this application will be held 
by the Research and Enterprise Development Centre and that this will be managed 
according to the principles established in the Data Protection Act. 
As the Principal Investigator for this study, I confirm that this application 
has been shared with all other members of the study team 
(please tick) 
ü 
 
Principal Investigator Supervisor or module leader (as 
appropriate) 
Name: Liam Cahill Name: Dr Martin Wright 
Date: 11.10.2017 Date: 11.10.2017 
Section G:  Submission 
This form should be sent as an attachment to a covering email, to 
red.resgov@canterbury.ac.uk  
N.B.  YOU MUST include copies of the Participant Information Sheet and Consent 
Form that you will be using in your study (Model versions on which to base these 
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are appended below for your convenience).  Also copies of any data gathering tools 
such as questionnaires, and a COMPLETED RISK ASSESSMENT FORM. 
All Participant Information Sheets, Consent Forms and Risk Assessments have been 
supplied separately to this document.
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 Appendix F 
 
 
 
 
 
18th December 2017        Ref:  
17/SAS/04F 
 
 
Liam Cahill 
c/o School of Law, Criminal Justice and Computing 
Faculty of Social & Applied Science 
 
 
Dear Liam 
 
Confirmation of ethics compliance for your study “Can I follow you? Social media 
surveillance & policing dilemmas 
” 
 
Your application complies fully with the requirements for full ethical review as set out in 
this University’s Research Ethics and Governance Procedures. 
In confirming compliance for your study, I must remind you that it is your responsibility 
to follow, as appropriate, the policies and procedures set out in the Research Governance 
Framework (http://www.canterbury.ac.uk/research-and-consultancy/governance-and-
ethics/governance-and-ethics.aspx)  and any relevant academic or professional 
guidelines.  This includes providing, if appropriate, information sheets and consent forms, 
and ensuring confidentiality in the storage and use of data.  Any significant change in the 
question, design or conduct of the study over its course should be notified to the Ethics 
Chair of Social & Applied Sciences, and may require a new application for ethics 
approval.  It is a condition of compliance that you must inform me once your research 
has been completed. 
Wishing you every success with your research. 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Carol Clewlow 
(On behalf on Dr Dennis Nigbur) 
 
 
Carol Clewlow 
RKE Co-Ordinator 
Tel: +44 (0)1227 922893 (direct line) 
Email: red.resgov@canterbury.ac.uk  
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Appendix F – Initial time line for the project  
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Thematic Coding Themes Focus Group 1 Focus Group 2 Focus Group 3
What are the phenomena of concern being mentioned?
Participant: ‘I think the wanted offenders’ unit use 
[social media to locate individuals] … We have had jobs 
come through where a wanted person whose checked 
into this pub and needs officers to do an arrest enquiry.’ 
Participant: ‘The one thing … it does get used 
for by some officers on social media is when 
you’ve got high risk missing people, you’ll 
search their name and see if you can get any 
information on them.’ [Focus agrees because 
they are high risk]
Facilitator: ‘Has anyone else been asked to look at
other peoples’ social media pages to gather
intelligence?’                                                     
Participant: ‘I get it quite a lot, a Duty Inspector
asked me to hack a person’s Facebook account… as
they were a missing person.’ 
Participant: '[using of social media for intelligence 
purposes] It does happen.'                                                       
Facilitator: 'Do you mean police officers are doing it?'        
Participant: 'Yes.'                           
Participant: 'I wonder if it could be 
generational, we've all had social media but 
we have all had [training] in the job. Where 
as the ones that are coming through brand 
new now have all got their own ward 
accounts. If something comes up and they 
want to look at someone, they might 
instantly think i'll go on Twitter or i'll go on 
Faceboook.'               [group agrees]                                                  
Participant: 'And they wouldn't even seem 
out of place.'
Participant: ‘The Twitter password was given out 
long before I got there. I know what I am doing … 
but you have people compromising our Twitter and 
potentially our Facebook because they have logins 
and then track other people’s accounts, which if 
that came out in the press…’ 
_ _ Participant: ‘A Duty Inspector asked me to hack into a person’s Facebook.'
When is the phenomena taking place? How long does it take and when does it occur? Any Time & Place
Participant: '[The use of social media for investigation 
purposes]. We see it all the time, its very very common. 
Participant: ‘The one thing … it does get used 
for by some officers on social media is when 
you’ve got high risk missing people.'
Participant: ‘If it’s 3 o’clock in the morning and the 
officer has a high risk missing child and they have a 
[social media] account, I expect there are officers 
you have done it.' 
Getting the Job Done
Facilitator: 'In terms of the survey does that draw out? I 
mean you guys have looked at it [and answered the 
questions], well I don't do that, I don't use my personal 
device or use [social media] for intelligence gathering 
purposes, but do the questions seek to find out if people 
are doing it?'                                                                         
Participant: 'It does happen regularly. We see it all the 
time, its very common and whether on YouTube or 
Facebook you seek the suspect. I mean it's very 
common.'
Participant: ‘You know we are adults! If we 
can’t do something one way we’ll find 
another, we won’t go back to mommy and 
say this isn’t working give me access. It’s 
time consuming, I wouldn’t even know how 
to get in touch with the whole web marshall 
thing. I just ignore it, when I see that page, I 
close it and just go to the phone because it’s 
there.’ 
Participant: 'We are in a massively changing world. 
It's changing far to fast for me to keep up with, 
which I accept, but is the job keeping up with it? 
Are the officers keeping up with it in order to get 
the job done legally to cover their backs.'
Don't Talk About It _
Facilitator: 'Are there any examples of people 
using social media for investigative 
purposes?'                                                                  
Participant: 'I know for a fact it happens.'                                                        
Participant: 'You just don't talk about it.'
_
What is the intention of the phenomena? Necessity 
Participant: ‘I think a lot of us are aware that we are not 
supposed to use our phones for this kind of research no 
matter how good our intentions are.’ 
Participant: 'I can't view videos on AWARE, 
so I have to use my phone to view the video 
via Instagram to see what it is because the 
public want a response from us. I need to see 
what it is so I can get back to them.
Participant: ‘If it’s 3 o’clock in the morning and the 
officer has a high risk missing child and they have a 
[social media] account, I expect there are officers 
you have done it (conducted searches) from their 
own devices … The argument becomes, yes I did it, 
but I would rather stand there in front of a 
disciplinary board and say I had a 14-year-old girl, 
high risk missing person who I was trying to locate 
… than stand in front of a coroner’s court 
[explaining why I didn’t conduct the search].’                                              
Participant: ‘You feel … they can justify doing it for 
that reason, if I get caught, I get caught, I feel like I 
am doing it for the greater good.’       
How much/how Strong? – How often is the issue emphasised?
Who are the persons involved? Police Personnel 
The phenomena being discussed was whether police personnel who have not received trained are utilising open source information obtained through personal social media accounts and devices for 
intelligence and evidence gathering and whether that practice constitutes a form of surveillance.
Appendix G – Focus Group Analysis – Figure 4. 
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Thematic Coding Themes Focus Group 1 Focus Group 2 Focus Group 3
What are the phenomena of concern being mentioned?
Participant: ‘I think the wanted offenders’ unit use 
[social media to locate individuals] … We have had jobs 
come through where a wanted person whose checked 
into this pub and needs officers to do an arrest enquiry.’ 
Participant: ‘The one thing … it does get used 
for by some officers on social media is when 
you’ve got high risk missing people, you’ll 
search their name and see if you can get any 
information on them.’ [Focus agrees because 
they are high risk]
Facilitator: ‘Has anyone else been asked to look at
other peoples’ social media pages to gather
intelligence?’                                                     
Participant: ‘I get it quite a lot, a Duty Inspector
asked me to hack a person’s Facebook account… as
they were a missing person.’ 
Participant: '[using of social media for intelligence 
purposes] It does happen.'                                                       
Facilitator: 'Do you mean police officers are doing it?'        
Participant: 'Yes.'                           
Participant: 'I wonder if it could be 
generational, we've all had social media but 
we have all had [training] in the job. Where 
as the ones that are coming through brand 
new now have all got their own ward 
accounts. If something comes up and they 
want to look at someone, they might 
instantly think i'll go on Twitter or i'll go on 
Faceboook.'               [group agrees]                                                  
Participant: 'And they wouldn't even seem 
out of place.'
Participant: ‘The Twitter password was given out 
long before I got there. I know what I am doing … 
but you have people compromising our Twitter and 
potentially our Facebook because they have logins 
and then track other people’s accounts, which if 
that came out in the press…’ 
_ _ Participant: ‘A Duty Inspector asked me to hack into a person’s Facebook.'
When is the phenomena taking place? How long does it take and when does it occur? Any Time & Place
Participant: '[The use of social media for investigation 
purposes]. We see it all the time, its very very common. 
Participant: ‘The one thing … it does get used 
for by some officers on social media is when 
you’ve got high risk missing people.'
Participant: ‘If it’s 3 o’clock in the morning and the 
officer has a high risk missing child and they have a 
[social media] account, I expect there are officers 
you have done it.' 
Getting the Job Done
Facilitator: 'In terms of the survey does that draw out? I 
mean you guys have looked at it [and answered the 
questions], well I don't do that, I don't use my personal 
device or use [social media] for intelligence gathering 
purposes, but do the questions seek to find out if people 
are doing it?'                                                                         
Participant: 'It does happen regularly. We see it all the 
time, its very common and whether on YouTube or 
Facebook you seek the suspect. I mean it's very 
common.'
Participant: ‘You know we are adults! If we 
can’t do something one way we’ll find 
another, we won’t go back to mommy and 
say this isn’t working give me access. It’s 
time consuming, I wouldn’t even know how 
to get in touch with the whole web marshall 
thing. I just ignore it, when I see that page, I 
close it and just go to the phone because it’s 
there.’ 
Participant: 'We are in a massively changing world. 
It's changing far to fast for me to keep up with, 
which I accept, but is the job keeping up with it? 
Are the officers keeping up with it in order to get 
the job done legally to cover their backs.'
Don't Talk About It _
Facilitator: 'Are there any examples of people 
using social media for investigative 
purposes?'                                                                  
Participant: 'I know for a fact it happens.'                                                        
Participant: 'You just don't talk about it.'
_
What is the intention of the phenomena? Necessity 
Participant: ‘I think a lot of us are aware that we are not 
supposed to use our phones for this kind of research no 
matter how good our intentions are.’ 
Participant: 'I can't view videos on AWARE, 
so I have to use my phone to view the video 
via Instagram to see what it is because the 
public want a response from us. I need to see 
what it is so I can get back to them.
Participant: ‘If it’s 3 o’clock in the morning and the 
officer has a high risk missing child and they have a 
[social media] account, I expect there are officers 
you have done it (conducted searches) from their 
own devices … The argument becomes, yes I did it, 
but I would rather stand there in front of a 
disciplinary board and say I had a 14-year-old girl, 
high risk missing person who I was trying to locate 
… than stand in front of a coroner’s court 
[explaining why I didn’t conduct the search].’                                              
Participant: ‘You feel … they can justify doing it for 
that reason, if I get caught, I get caught, I feel like I 
am doing it for the greater good.’       
How much/how Strong? – How often is the issue emphasised?
Who are the persons involved? Police Personnel 
The phenomena being discussed was whether police personnel who have not received trained are utilising open source information obtained through personal social media accounts and devices for 
intelligence and evidence gathering and whether that practice constitutes a form of surveillance.
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Thematic Coding Themes Focus Group 1 Focus Group 2 Focus Group 3
Easy/Accessible/Covert
Participant: ‘I think a lot of us are aware that we are not 
supposed to use our phones for this kind of research no 
matter how good our intentions are.’                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Participant: ‘You could argue that the MPS is 
trying to say, you can’t do this because they 
block sites like YouTube and certain aspects 
of Twitter. But it’s not clear, for us we are 
investigators and if one avenue is blocked, 
we will find another one. [Group agree] I 
can’t get it on Firefox, my phone will do it!’                                                                                  
Facilitator: ‘Do you think this is something 
that is happening regularly?’                                                                                
Participant: ‘Oh yeah.’ [Multiple members 
make agreeing sounds]
Participant: 'On Twitter for the last so many years 
we have been told to click on followers to see who 
is following us, it’s a bit of a grey area with 
Facebook we quiet often get suspects being tagged 
on their own wanted appeals and we might click on 
them to see who they are. We have had people 
charged off a screenshot of facebook.'
False Persona
Facilitator: 'How do you feel about false persona?'     
Participant: 'I think you would need some authority to do 
that.'
Facilitator: 'Level 2 open source training and 
above allows you to adopt a false persona to 
conduct online investigations, At level 3 you 
can befriend people and eventually at level 5 
you can engage in conversations.'                       
Participant: Does that mean if you are using 
the Met Twitter and you follow plumstead ... 
would that be legitimate?'                               
Facilitator: Not quiet, as  you are using a Met 
account you are being completely overt.
Participant: 'There are some things which I think 
creating a flse account for is perfectly acceptable 
for. Like when you have an online peadophile.' 
Participant: ‘I think a lot of us are aware that we are not 
supposed to use our phones for this kind of research no 
matter how good our intentions are.’                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Participant: 'I've tried using the work phone, 
its pointless.'                                                
Facilitator: And so you revert back to your
own phones?                                                             
Participant: 'Oh God yeah, we just revert back 
to wahtevers easy generally with all things.                                                          
Participant: It's easier just to use your own 
phone, your own minutes, i mean we all get 
free minutes now anyway, so it doesn't cost 
me anything to use my own phone.'
Participant: ‘I’ve heard stories of [police personnel] 
doing snapshots of Facebook using their phones to 
look for a missing person.’ 
Participant: 'The problem is that people are doing on 
their own phones, there is no record of what we're 
doing. People certainly aren't putting on any crime 
reports or Criminal Intelligence reports to say they are 
doing these checks.'
Participant: 'I find with AWARE you can't 
access stuff, it really restricts what you are 
able to do, so you have to go to your own 
device or a job phone for a lot of everyday 
things let alone anything else.'
Participant: 'Our social media is purely for good 
news stories and engagement with the public, I use 
my phone, my home computer because there's 
nothing coming back from it.'
Restricted Access to MPS IT
Participant: '[Using social media of intelligence 
purposes] It happens all the time and is always done on 
their own phones because they're access to AWARE is 
restricted.'
Participant: 'The biggest thing I find is when 
AWARE blocks so much stuff on the Internet 
… So a lot of the time we get videos sent to 
us that I can't view on AWARE, so I have to 
use my own phone to view the video via 
Instagram.' 
_
Discipline _
Participant: 'I think everyone has been told 
don't do this and don't do that which has 
definitely made some [oficers] not want to 
do it (engage on social media).'                            
[Group agrees] ...                                                  
Participant: 'They don't have any kind of SOP 
either because I had the complaints 
department come and speak to us because 
someone had posted a picture of a samuri 
sword which didn't identify the person but 
they complained stating people would know 
it was him by the picture of the swords.'                                                    
Participant: ‘People think [professional standards] 
are looking at everything, checking every story that 
you see. Every disciplinary to do with social media 
is because someone has posted something 
inappropriate.’                                                                                     
Participant: ‘It’s people posting their own stuff, it’s 
not you searching, it’s not researching on other 
people it’s people posting on their own stuff, 
people messaging each other with stuff that really 
shouldn’t be going around, that’s one thing bas as 
far as investigations or using your own phone to 
investigate, I’ve never see anyone disciplined for it.’ 
By which – Means/Tactics and strategies for achieving the aim. How are they doing 
it?
Use of personal mobile device
How – Which aspects of the phenomena are being mentioned/omitted?
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Facilitator: 'My feeling is that there is a grey area 
around the definition of 'repeated viewing' and what it 
means in practice.'                                                                       
Participant: 'I don't know, it's quiet confusing, it 
depends.'
Participant: 'Why can't I just have a look and 
see what all his tweets say. I had a case 
where we were directed to a graffiti artist on 
YouTube. So we have gone there, found him 
and taken screen shots to evidence the 
phrase linking him to the graffiti. But we 
don't know if we have crossed any intrusions. 
I did it and i didn't think i was, because it was 
all there, your just thinking its open source.'            
Facilitator: Well was there any 'repeated 
viewing?'                                                          
Participant: I did it in the space of an hour 
and a half.
Facilitator: 'What does Social Media Surveillance 
look like?'                                                                     
Participant: 'Surveillance as opposed to a snapshot. 
It would be continual monitoring of all available 
social media.'                                                              
Facilitator: 'Does it have to be repeated viewing or 
can it be a one-off viewing as well?'                     
Participant: 'I believe it can, if you're not meant to 
be viewing it and you have, whether it's continous 
or just a one off, you have still intruded in there.'
_ _
Participant: 'When does a snapshot stop being a 
snapshot? When it's multiple viewings, is that 
multiple viewings of the same account, multiple 
viewings on the same day, same week, same year, 
is it multiple viewings for the same purpose or 
because you also looked at his friends?'
Facilitator: 'Is there any consideration around what the 
public might percieve as their privacy [on social 
media]?'      Participant: 'I don't think they think about i. 
I don't think they think the police are going to look 
through their social media for any reason whatsoever.'                         
Participant: 'If we have to circumvent privacy settings, 
then maybe that's a barrier, where authority may be 
required.'                                                                    
Facilitator: 'Then the onus of privacy is the responsibility 
of the people using the platform.'                                      
Participant: 'I think so.'
Participant: 'If someone is happy to put their 
world out on social media … that's effectively 
what they are doing so is it our job to be 
responsible for those people and resposnible 
for Facebook, Twitter and the like. They have 
privacy settings, we are fighting with both 
hands tied behind our backs because we are 
not confident to use [social media]. I think it 
comes back to clarification about what we 
can do as these are things that people are 
voluntarily giving us.
Facilitator: 'What's your feeling about the last 
question on the privacy/security debate?'                 
Participant: 'If it's a snapshot, a one off, for policing 
purpose, that's entirely different to then deciding to 
monitor one. Yes its open source but why are the 
police following? It becomes the definition of , 
'what's a policing purpose?' Well we know this 
person's a criminal, so we will go and see if he 
trips up on there. So you dedicate someone to 
watching their social medai account or you are 
constantly doing snap shots on it to try and find 
something to get them for? Does it breach his right 
to privacy and family whether its on social media or 
not?'                                                                               
Participant: Just a new age way of digging!                                                                        
Participant: 'Fishing!'                                    
Participant: 'Yeah its fishing.'                  
Participant: 'The same standards of privacy should be 
translated to social media [as they are in the real 
world].'
Facilitator: 'Do you feel once [information] is 
out on social media and the privacy settings 
allow it, then it is fair game [for the police]?'  
Participant: 'Yeah, yeah, I think its how it 
should be.'
Facilitator: 'How far should police officers go?'      
Participant: 'It should depend on the crime, it 
should be proportionate, a serious crime llike 
murder should [give you greater] access but if it’s a 
petty theft then no you shouldn't be able to hound 
some poor person.'                                                  
Participant: 'If someone puts something out on 
'social' media then i suppose anybody should be 
able to look at it. If their posting stuff on Twitter, 
the same as a celebrity might Tweet and you 
follow them and look at them.'
Participant: 'As I say if something is in the public domain 
then it is out there for everbody anyway. If you suddenly 
decided to target that person you would need 
justification.'                                                                   
Facilitator: 'But do we at that point?'                                 
Participant: 'It depends, if its in the public domain then 
are we being intrusive? No, because its in the public 
domain.'
_
Facilitator: 'What do you think the publics 
perception is of a state entity or investigative 
agency looking for their own purposes?'                                        
Participant: 'No, I don't think they have an 
awareness of it.'  Participant: 'I suppose if their 
profile is on private, then they assume that its peer 
to peer rather than it can be accessed by higher up.'
Repeated Viewing
Privacy
How – Which aspects of the phenomena are being mentioned/omitted?                 
(Continued)
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Participant: Say you’re looking for a missing person. A 
search for their Facebook account, I would say is a basic 
enquiry. Looking at the person’s social media and what 
they’ve said in the last 24/48 hours would be a basic 
enquiry.’
Participant: ‘The one thing … it does get used 
for by some officers on social media is when 
you’ve got high risk missing people, you’ll 
search their name and see if you can get any 
information on them.’ [Focus agrees because 
they are high risk]                              
Participant: ‘You can almost do anything, 
can’t you? To protect the person!’
Participant: ‘I’ve heard stories of [police personnel] 
doing snapshots of Facebook using their phones to 
look for a missing person.’ 
Participant: 'It's immediate, if there's an immediate 
requirement and this person is vulnerable, a risk 
assessment has been done and we need to try and 
locate them ASAP. So the initial enquiries need to be 
done and I personally would think that n immediate look 
at their social media [would be ok].'
Facilitator: 'Do you feel that actually if it's a 
vulnerability issue [rather than an 
investiation] then the means justify the end 
in terms of looking at open source?'                      
Participant: 'Yeah, you would often go to your 
Local Intelligence Team (LIT) team for this, 
but if its a Sunday night or a night duty and 
no ones in, what else are you going to do. If 
you don't know there is 24/7 support you are 
going to look it up yourself.'
Participant: 'Its risk, its immediacy and 
prorotionality. Is it worth checking [social media] to 
see where you have checked in in the last two 
weeks because you’re a shoplifter? No. However, 
you are a regular missing person, you're a child and 
you constandly go missing at the weekend and i can 
see that you are at the same nightclub for the 
same five weekends.'                                                  
Participant: '99% of the public would support that.'
Facilitator: 'Do you think we, as police officers should be 
able to just, if you have suspicion that a person may post 
something that gives him away or his position or who he 
is dealing with, the right to monitor?'                              
Participant: 'Absolutely.'                                         
Facilitator: 'Just keep looking?                                         
Participant: 'When i say absolutely, I mean allowing 
everyone to have access and knowing where the 
boundaries are.' 
Participant: 'But we don't know if we have
crossed any intrusions. I did it and i didn't
think i was, because it was all there, your just 
thinking its open source.'        
Participant: ‘I think they understand (senior leaders) 
how powerful social media is and think we can 
exploit it. Even when you attend the Local 
Intelligence Teams you get Inspectors not 
understanding the difference between running a 
snapshot for a missing person and running 
continual surveillance on their Facebook page.’ 
Facilitator: 'What about invesitations in contrast [to 
safeguarding]?'                                                                   
Participant: 'It should be down to the fact that it is in a 
public profile, that its an open public profile. Then I can't 
see any major issue becuase its out there anyway. I 
can't see any issue of going to somebodies Facebook 
account becasue we've done it before. It's an open 
profile. there is nothing stopping anybody looking at it.'
_ _
Participant: 'The way I look at it if I were going to look 
up little johny and what he is doing and I have been told 
he is on South Street, I would go to South Street, I 
wouldn't need RIPA because I am physically in full 
uniform going there, its not covert policing. In the same 
way, if that information is available at the click of a 
button and is available for everyone to view, i would 
treat it the same way. I would hope that we would be 
allowed to treat it the same way because it is open to 
everyone, so why should it be any different for officers.' 
_ _
Participant: 'But see I view the problem of using police 
computers in terms of it obviously leaves a footprint. 
People need educating and training around that.'
Participant: 'You look at the training we got 
two years ago when we started using Twitter 
[for engagement]. The training now is 
completely different. The [MPS] has only 
learned from athe mistakes we have made.' 
Participant: ‘I think [training] higher up as well to 
make it clear, we can turn around and say I am not 
doing it, but if you have a Duty Inspector who is 
desperate because they have a high risk missing 
person and you have Twitter, you access it!’ 
Participant: 'Improve awareness of what to do if you 
need information for a warrant or need to follow the 
activity of someone they probably know is up to no 
good.'
Participant: 'There is no training on the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 
from the Department of Media and 
Communications (DMC). The training they 
provided details when you can post pictures 
and details of investigations but there is no 
training in terms of investigations and RIPA.' 
Participant: 'I think with the training, Spcialist 
Crime and Operations (SC&O) will get everything 
but the people who do the ground work is 
Territorial Policing (TP). I think if there is more 
training in relation to open source it should be 
rolled out fairly. A lot of the stuff we just don't get 
and the coppers need to do a job.' 
Training
Vulnerability
Why – Which reasons are provided or constructed?
It's Open Source
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Facilitator: 'Do you think the organisation understands 
social media at the higher levels … or do you think that 
people are just left to get on with it?'                            
Participant: 'I think people are left to get on with it.' _
Participant: ‘I get it quiet a lot, a Duty Inspector 
asked me to hack into a person’s Facebook… I don’t 
think they understand. Do they! That's them not 
understadning. Its been several times, can you get 
to this Facebook account or can you check this 
person?'
_ _
Participant: ‘I think they understand (senior leaders) 
how powerful social media is and think we can 
exploit it. Even when you attend the Local 
Intelligence Teams you get Inspectors not 
understanding the difference between running a 
snapshot for a missing person and running 
continual surveillance on their Facebook page.’ 
Facilitator: 'So we have said that these activities are 
taking place but are individuals intentionally going 
against current policy?'                                                       
Participant: 'I don't think that [police personnel] know 
they are doing anything against the procedures, they 
think they are allowed to do it.'
Participant: 'I think a big problem would be if 
you came up with a MET Policy (SOP) for 
Twitter we would just be tweeting crime 
prevention advice [Group Agrees] and we'd 
have no followers.'                                        
Facilitator: 'Coming back from the 
engagement side what about guidance and 
policy around investigations and how to use 
ssocial media for it?'                                                        
Participant: 'Even less.'                                  
Participant: 'Yeah, there is nothing.'
Facilitaor: 'What about the survey questions around 
MPS Policy and Code of Ethics, are these issues that 
officers are aware of or take into account?         
Participant: 'I don't think there is enough 
knowledge.'  [Another agreed]                                                             
Participant: 'I don't think there is enough 
knowledge either.'
Participant: 'RIPA demands that if we are intruding into 
someone's personal behaviour, authority is required.'
Facilitator: 'What about the Code of Ethics 
question, does anyone what the Codes are? 
Participant: 'Yes, I wouldn't read that and 
think I have read the College of Policing 
Codes of Ethics.
_
Participant: 'The way I look at it if I were going to look 
up little johny and what he is doing and I have been told 
he is on South Street, I would go to South Street, I 
wouldn't need RIPA because I am physically in full 
uniform going there, its not covert policing. In the same 
way, if that information is available at the click of a 
button and is available for everyone to view, i would 
treat it the same way. I would hope that we would be 
allowed to treat it the same way because it is open to 
everyone, so why should it be any different for officers.' 
Participant: 'When I first read the question 
about RIPA, I thought I should know the 
answer to this.'
_
_
Facilitator: 'In terms of social media and 
RIPA does anyone know how they interact?   
Participant: 'There is no training on the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 
from the Department of Media and 
Communications (DMC). The training they 
provided details when you can post pictures 
and details of investigations but there is no 
training in terms of investigations and RIPA.' 
_
Policy/Code of Ethics/RIPA
Senior Demands
Why – Which reasons are provided or constructed?                                                
(Continued)
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Appendix H - Survey Results 
 
Question 1. To what level are you trained in Online Investigation (Open Source)? 
 
Table 1.  
 
 
n=785, modal response – Level 1(685), Med=Level 1. 
 
 
  
Level 1
87%
Level 2
10%
Level 3
2% Level 40%
Level 5
1%
Figure 5. What level of training have you had in Internet Investigation and 
Research?
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
Level of Training Frequency Percentage 
Level 1 – Not specifically trained 685 87 
Level 2 – Core Open Source Investigator/Researcher 78 10 
Level 3 – Advanced Open Source Investigator/Researcher 17 2 
Level 4 – Network Investigations 1 0 
Level 5 – Undercover Officer Online/Covert Internet Investigator 4 1 
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Question 2. Have you received any training in the use of social media? If yes, please tick 
all that apply. 
 
Table 2. 
Methods of Training Received Frequency Percentage 
Department of Media and Communications (DMC) 104 13 
Borough Single Point of Contact (SPOC) 75 10 
Self-taught 247 31 
No training 359 46 
 
 
n=785, modal response – No Training (359). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
13%
10%
31%
46%
Figure 6. Have you received any social media training? Tick the highest level that 
applies.  
Department of Media and Communications Borough SPOC Self Taught No Training
 176 
Question 3. Do you use/have access to an official MPS social media account (such as 
@metpoliceuk etc.)? 
 
Table 3. 
Access Frequency Percentage 
Yes 234 30 
No 551 70 
 
 
 
n=785, modal response – No (551). 
 
 
  
30%
70%
Figure 7. Do you use/have access to an official MPS social media accout? 
Yes No
 177 
Question 4. Approximately how often do you use Online Investigation (Open Source) 
research in your work? 
 
Table 4.  
Frequency of use Frequency Percentage 
Very frequently (several times a day) 68 9 
Frequently (1-2 times a day) 91 12 
Occasionally (2-3 times a week) 185 23 
Rarely (2-3 times a month) 126 16 
Very rarely (once a month or less) 246 31 
Other (Never) 69 9 
 
n=785, modal response – Very Rarely (246). 
 
Summary of Comments made by participants who selected ‘Other’ as an option: 
 
Those who chose ‘other’ all wrote that they never use Online Investigation (Open 
Source) research 
  
9%
12%
23%
16%
31%
9%
Figure 8. Approximately how often do you use Onling Investigation (Open Source) 
research in your work?
Very frequently (several times a day) Frequently (1-2 times a day)
Occasionally (2-3 times a week) Rarely (2-3 times a month)
Very rarely (once a month or less) Other
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Figure 9. Qualitative Comments and Thematic Coding: Question 5. If you are happy 
to do so, please briefly describe how you generally use/have used Online Investigation 
(Open Source) research in your work? 
 
Thematic Coding Themes Respondent Answer Respondent Answer Respondent Answer Respondent Answer
What are the phenomena of concern being mentioned?
google to find if suspects/mispers have been 
on/used social media, intel on employers, business 
premises, google maps for potential addresses, to 
confirm location re phone intel (triangulation) gang 
terminology, street terminology etc
Gumtree, Ebay to ascertain sales of 
suspected stolen goods.  Facebook to gain 
photo's of suspects and lifestyle information. 
Searches to locate suspects / victims / witnesses / 
associates and for info on suspect that may be relevant to 
the allegation(s) made against them.  Re investigations  
involving CSE (distribution of IIOC and inciting sexual 
activity) accessed the websites used by the suspects in 
order to ascertain what steps are required to register and 
use the website in order to get an idea of what digital 
footprint the suspect may have left behind.
Use in investigations to identify suspects, also 
used via open source trained colleagues for 
gang affiliation statements to assist in 
securing convictions at court, intelligence from 
youtube videos created by gang members and 
gang nominals twitter accounts in serious 
investigations.
Investigation - Handling Stolen Goods (Pedal 
Cycles) Looking at sellers on Ebay and Gumtree etc
Looking into interactions between suspects 
and sexual offence complainants
General internet research, e.g scam building companies, 
legal questions, but don't use an open source computer.
Victim and suspect intelligence.
Location of suspects and witnesses for 
investigations
gang related crime, evidentailly following assaults, 
etc. BAd character (youtube videoes), to 
deomnstrate association. 
basic searches to look for suspect/witness on 
open source forums 
Searching for owners of lost property, usually LinkedIn or 
facebook.
locating of suspects. researching victims. 
Googling suspects to see what comes up.  Using 
Facebook and Twitter to look for suspects or 
confirm identities.
To obtain current photographs of subjects. To 
identify associates through subjects.
Seeking further information about named suspects or 
witnesses who don't appear on police indices.  Misper 
investigations.  
Used in investigations, to trace suspects, to 
establish if victims have contact with the 
suspect. For disclosure purposes.
In the location of suspects Entered suspect name on facebook to see 
photo
To assist investigations. used the internet  to locate find witnesses / 
suspects / phone numbers  
Social Media search request to help assist with 
locating wanted offenders
Social Media search to locate evidence in an 
investigation, trained officer created profiles to 
assist with a sought video that showed similar fact 
offence to be used in court 
Searching phone numbers/names in 
Google/Facebook/Other social media
Have requested Opensource checks
Used own device to assist searching for stolen mobile 
phones, tracking victim's friends down via Facebook for 
communication purposes, searching on Whatsapp and 
other social media.
I investigate CSE, and in order to identify 
subjects, their contacts, and to read 
messages/status updates they may have 
posted, Open Source research is used. 
Used in investigations into CID main office crime 
where there is an online element (increasingly 
seems to be the case) and for high risk missing 
persons or manhunts.
Victims - to contact them after a robbery for 
example when they dont have a phone as it 
has just been stolen."
SO15 Officer using Open Source stand alone terminal to 
research info from comms data / Social Media
Location search and suspect/victim 
information checks and searches, general 
searches with regards to investigations. 
Facebook/Google...
was sued to track down suspects in jobs and to 
develop local neighbourhood intelligence around 
street names and associations
Trying to identify suspects and their locations 
on Facebook.  Trying to access social media 
profiles to capture evidence of things posted 
to their accounts etc
follow prospective protest groups on twitter or facebook
verified identities and/or associates of suspects
checked addresses
I use it to access open source profiles of 
people I am investigating, and also 
investigating topics about which I know little 
or nothing.
Suspects in crime - to try and identify associates, 
suspects, etc
Two separate areas, counter terrorism work 
were the research would be conducted on a 
stand alone computer. The second is research 
on subjects and conflicts for War Crimes 
Investigations.  
Normal requests relate to suspects' social media accounts. 
Global searches for accounts and email accounts that may 
lead on to RIPA applications. Previously use open source 
requests to capture things displayed on the internet. 
Facebook - to identify suspect whereabouts, 
friend groups. Internet google searches for 
vague company details.
To locate subjects who are either wanted or 
deportable
Trying to identify ISIS leaders or preachers or 
terrorist suspects or locations in the UK or 
the rest of the world .
Investigation into suspects and missing people Wanted offender research and malicious 
communications investigations.
This is used when conducting research especially 
when looking at historic offences.
This can be used to trace further victim's, 
witnesses and suspects or contacts within 
organisations that are no longer running.
Find out information about a suspect which 
will assist in affecting an arrest (e.g to find a 
photo of them to enable identification).  
Assess lifestyle/pattern of behaviour for 
arrest strategy.  To find personal details such 
a contact details for a suspect to enable 
further IIP searches etc.
I'm not sure whether this question relates to a particular 
method or department, or is just asking how often I use 
open sources in my work. If it is the latter I use it regularly 
where pertinent (and proportionate) in investigating 
crime, usually related to someone in custody, due back on 
bail, who has missed bail etc. Unfortunately we only have 
one open source terminal which is used by the Local 
Intelligence Team so it's very rare I have access to 
something thatI can use evidentially. 
To try and identify suspects using Facebook
To check for undermining material relating to 
victims. 
research areas, subject profiles, business profiles If I need to find a telephone number, an 
address, a route used or contact numbers for 
agencies. Or to find out about a suspect i.e. 
linked in
To view social network accounts of registered sex 
offenders to check contacts etc. 
Investigation into an active OCN. 
1)  Capture of evidence from a social media site, 
i.e. abusive messages.
Locating suspects. Suspect associates. 
General research on a suspect. 
For Phased enquiries into EWMS subjects. When a suspect is wanted by police to 
research potential locations/obtain contact 
details.
used to help find suspect through social media To find owners of lost property, to check 
locations of venues and verify information 
given by people, to find the names of 
wards/SNT teams
Looking at addresses on google maps to plan deployments. 
Finding people on social media - 
suspects/mispers/restoring lost property.
it helps trace outstanding suspects
the borough IOM Unit's Enforcement Team would 
aim to use OS to locate and arrest members of the 
cohort unlawfully at large. 
The Engagement Team (my side) would aim to 
exploit OS to identify associates, indications of 
offending (or abstention from offending), risk 
management and lifestyling in support of 
operations by central squads.  We would us it to 
obtain clothing descriptions, linked VRMs, 
addresses and details of girlfriends, locations 
frequented, the state of family relationships. To 
confirm or deny stories given to partner agencies.  
This kind of work has an almost fractal nature, the 
amount of intelligence you can obtain is only 
limited by the amount of time you can spare.  It's 
an incredibly useful tool and the proliferation of 
Social Media Apps means the intelligence available 
has increased exponentially.
WhatsApp - by adding a SUSP's number to 
phone via number provided, we were able to 
obtain an image of them, as they had their 
photo as their profile photo. They cannot tell 
that we have added them just by our saving 
their phone number to our mobile phone.
Otherwise was not aware we were able to 
access Facebook / Twitter / other for intel 
purposes, although I have done this o/s the 
MPS in my day job (I am MSC).
i am based in the volume crime unit which deals with 
various offences such as harassment, lending letters, mal 
comms, obviously the majority of this happens on social 
media and we regularly have to carry out research on 
suspects not just to prove the offence but for location and 
apprehension. i have to scout around for somebody who is 
trained and free to assist.
Identifying suspects from social media 
accounts, tracking suspect's historical 
movements (eg were they in the UK at the 
time of the offence), making 
familial/friendship links, tracing ongoing 
feuds/arguments/relationship breakdowns, 
bad character for suspect and victim
Examining the social media of victims and suspects 
in sexual assault cases
To identify gang members in homicide 
enquires and other suspects.
mainly used to look at social media profiles of wanted 
offenders /or subject of long term investigations 
this is a great tool to identify suspects, trace 
were abouts, and find missing persons 
Type in suspect names. To locate suspects To search for wanted people
In CID we regularly research 
victims/witnesses/suspects so that we know who 
intel checks, open source information to 
locate/identify investigative opportunities
To identify suspects or person of interest or associates of 
young girls. 
In order to identify suspects. If a name is 
known social media is an effective way of Of en used to link suspects together in li ked 
series, ascertain people's locations from posts, and 
In the gangs unit we frequently have cau e to 
enquire about open source info on our 
Research for suspects names using Facebook etc. I have used twitter to disprove an account 
provided that a suspect did not have access to as a chools officer kids use social media t  comitt 
crime such as sexting 
Researching perso s f interest i  
investigations
Locate and identify outstanding suspects have contacted Gumtree & eBay for 
information on sellers on their sites. Have I hav  requested research into social media 
accounts to try and identify suspects/obtain images 
wh n searching for a person where 
conventional methods such as arrest 
We have used in the past Facebook to assist with 
identification of European suspects involved in violent 
domistic
basic facebook search looking for suspects Investigating bus c mpanies and the 
regularity of complaints received in RTPC and 
Usi g google maps for CCTV enquiries r for locating the 
scene of an incident. Using an informant's snapchat to 
Identifying and tracing suspects. 
When you have a suspect or person you cant trace 
using met systems i would search google or social 
Investigati n f cases re online hate crime TO LOCATE VICTIMS OF CRIME - I.E. PICKPOCKET VICTIMS 
THAT HAVE BEEN SHOULDER SURFED, HAD THEIR CREDIT 
Mainly within my role as CSE Spoc on borough 
High Harm Manhunts, High risk Mispers, C vert 
Proactive investigations 
Tracking offenders who are wanted. I would 
have to request an open source trained 
I will occasionally look on the internet (i.e. Google search) 
for suspect or victim if it is relevant to the investigation. my open source is o ID suspects & background 
checks on witness/victims
Use internet maps. Investigate company links 
for suspects. Research for suspect 
identification, missing person enquiries. 
Wanted offender enquirie  and for domestic abuse related 
offences such as harassment, malicious comms and 
sharing private sexual images.
Obtaining email address's or telephone 
numbers of victims.
Use of daris, crimint and cris to identify suspects 
and victims currently on my ward
I am part of the East Area Proactive Unit and 
I used open source to assist in conducting 
man hunts. This helps a lot. 
Researching suspects through social media, background 
research on companies and employees.
Primarily in criminal 
investigations/Intelligence around EWMS 
suspects.
To find contact details for premises, to determine 
likely routes travelled by suspects, to get a clearer 
understanding of a venue/location detailed in a 
crime report, to get a background on a suspect.
Looking for addresses via googlemaps 
searching for business addresses searching 
for social media profiles for outstanding 
suspects
I use this and would use it more if access was better to 
looking for offenders and any indication of their offending 
which they may post of social media. Also opens source 
such as the voters register, LinkedIn etc. 
Hunting suspects, identifying suspects
Researching witnesses, suspects and persons of 
interest in my investigations.
In child protection cases, mostly historical, 
identifying where suspects are and locating 
first complainant.
To help identify and link offenders Facebook for suspect photos or associates etc
Q.5 If you are happy to do so, please briefly describe how you generally  use/have used online investigation(Open Source) research in your work?
Investigation/Suspect
W
hy – W
hich reasons are provided or constructed?
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Thematic Coding Themes Respondent Answer Respondent Answer Respondent Answer Respondent Answer
What are the phenomena of concern being mentioned?
I have asked for open source checks in relation to 
missing persons. 
Investigation into suspects and missing 
people
In trying to identify sex offender on line identities or to 
establish profile for missing persons. 
Facebook for photographs of MISPERs
Whilst working on the misper unit - open source 
research on for example Facebook was a great tool 
for monitoring some of the mispers who were out 
of 'contact'  but would post on social media at 
least we could establish that there were alive and 
seemingly well .   
It was used to obtain an idea of proof of life 
etc for missing people, it was not used as a 
replacement fro a proper debrief but it added 
to thye risk assessment to see if there were 
any sudden changes in behaviour.  The public 
image was also useful for up-to-date images 
of the missing person where there were not 
always current images from their family.
For fast time research on intel about possible raves and 
bikelife events on Borough as part of the Hot Desk Sgt role 
within Borough GPC
Also trying to research Mispers and to identify addresses 
that are new developments not shown on current MPS 
Mapping software or known to the CAD system.
To assist in identifying and locating 
offenders/mispers and to assist in 
investigating evidence of offences on line
Missing people - to try and identify friends names/ 
addresses for them.
For information on Mispers. Identification of 
critically injured persons in RTCs
Usually for Facebook enquiries for missing people or for 
investigating crime
During missing person investigations or where 
social media public order related offences are 
reported.
Searching and risk assessment on MISPERS, 
identification of social media accounts, ISP, 
Missing persons investigations - high risk social media like try and check Misper social media 
accounts , or fb
Misper enqs
Mostly used to research high risk missing persons, 
to ascertain social media use, friends etc and if 
there is anyting useful on their profiles.
Use of sites search facilities within Facebook, 
Twitter, Pipl, Google, Bing to identify and 
research internet presence for suspects, 
victims and MISPER
To track movements from High Risk missing people I  work in the Misper/CSE dept. It is useful to 
look at locations/places frequented. Peer 
associations and photographs can help with 
confiming identity.
I am involved in missing persons and CSE related to 
children. The social media provides a better insight 
into investigating these types of offences better 
than any other METR system. 
Misper Enquiries.
 Information around offences. (CPS) 
Identifying partially known suspects or locating missing 
persons
Missing persons and generally cyber crime to 
do with young persons or young people 
posting suicidal posts
I work in a Borough Missing Person Unit and as 
about 70% of our work is looking at peoples face 
book accounts we have all set up individual face 
book accounts in our names with our Met Police 
Email addresses.  That is the only social media 
platform that we can access.  We are waiting for a 
smart phone to be allocated to our unit to enable 
us to access WhatsApp.  Social media is a 
significant investigative tool.  We will request 
Open Source checks but often we are asked what 
social media platform checks we have done prior to 
asking for an Open Source check.    
Open source investigations can be very useful 
when dealing with missing persons, where 
time is of the essence. Nearly everyone has 
some form of electronic footprint these days 
and to be able to use these platforms is 
extremely useful. 
Normally around locating high risk mispers or high risk 
suspects.
I work on response team and this is when no one is 
available with an approved Facebook account. This is when 
the research is time critical.
I know I should not but for the sake of expediency I have 
created a Facebook account solely for this purpose.
Using google maps for CCTV enquiries or for 
locating the scene of an incident. Using an 
informant's snapchat to tracks movements of 
Mispers if they have their location active. 
Investigating high risk missing people through their 
use of social media
as duty officer require open source 
intelligence for variety of situations form 
missing persons through to public disorder
Locating/researching missing persons, regularly use 
Facebook, twitter, Instagram.
Researching social media to find "friends" of 
MISPERS.Using Social Media to message 
MISPERS. regular TWITTER on behalf of 
Borough and SNT
Social media: events happing in my ward 
(UME/Raves), names/nicknames of people 
encountered in investigations.
When researching I routinely use open source 
routes to corroborate information, evaluate 
weight and assess options to progress.
Its useful to look at gang members online 
profiles, their associates and activities. 
I just want to view youtube videos and the odd 
facebook page for researching large music events.
2)  Research locations and events e.g. tracing 
the landscape in the background of a 
photograph sent by a missing person."
Normally for operation planning, using Google for maps, 
images of venues, etc.
Open facebook profiles and Instagram 
accounts.
to find people's full names and addresses,  finding 
them on social media and completing searches on 
Met Police Systems to cross reference and see if I 
can find the revelant the information 
to find the inline footprint of persons of 
interest, to identify lines of inquiry, contact 
details, etc
Establishing post codes for various addresses, for crime 
reports and other purposes. Location/mapping to establish 
directions for MOP. Use of Google maps and Google earth 
for briefings etc. Use of twitter for contacting the 
communinty.
Linked In for vetting purposes
Front Office enquiries - Property, Suspects Personal research on addresses/post codes 
via mobile internet
T  validate phone numbers, addresses, locations, 
companies house. Don't use social media to review 
persons of interest.
mainly used for address searches 
Manhunts
Evidence Gathering
Witness Appeals
Appeals in general
Intelligence Gathering. Generally, if something 
might be online, I use the internet to find it!
We would use it more but not open sourced 
trained. Gang member 
Facebook/twitter/instagram accounts can 
provide vital evidence of assaults, drugs 
weapons carried etc.
Searching for locations, buildings and unfamiliar 
addresses. Can sometimes be used to help in planning 
patrols. I have used the internet in the past to establish 
the veracity of claims made by somebody I was dealing 
with. Very useful indeed. Sometimes use internet to look 
up news or current affairs which affects us in the 
workplace.
CT Protect Borough Support Officer. Use open 
source searches on internet to find back 
ground details on events and venues, no 
requirement for any covert searches. 
Operational Planner needing to research festivals 
around acts playing 
researching gang members using facebook and/or Twitter to get information about 
events
Have previously used sociual media sites to try 
an obtain photographs of suspects and/or 
Mispers.
I have used both MPS internet facilites and my own 
personal devices to conduct basic open source 
research, such as reading Facebook, Twitter and 
public websites - in my case usually ticket webistes 
such as Shoobs for information regarding music 
events.
frequently use the internet to investigate 
addresses and telephone numbers. Often 
have a requirement to conduct research on 
offenders social media accounts however as I 
am not personally trained this work has to be 
farmed out to other departments. 
research in to gang members and their associates. fast 
time intelligence in to gangs re youtube facebook and 
others social media account. 
Googled various questionable 'business's' to 
find out legitimy for an investigation.  I have 
used to find information on an address for a 
warrant execution.
Borough Event Planning, for large scale 
events
Assessing Community impact after events. Corroborating 
intelligence received to manage risks. Tracing Missing 
persons.
Looking for potential companies etc regarding 
suspects/victim details
investigate improper use of social media by 
students at school
to identify Facebook and Instagram account 
user identities/activity
To assist with ward enquiries.
Business phone numbers and locations etc. 
Identifying potential social media accounts to 
provide to open source to complete research. 
Input of telephone numbers into social media Search suspect phone numbers, emails, IP addresses on 
Google before completing OPTICA applications. 
Research in connection to high risk misper's. 
Fed Rep - Research for case and work related 
items
Very rare I use in current role. If it is it is to find out 
information on a venue or guests that the BOCU 
Cmdr will be meeting.
intelligence around OP VENICE / motorcycle 
theft
Looking at Facebook accounts/pages relating to illegal 
raves
Obtain personal details from social media 
usernames.
Google, rand fraudulent phone numbers through 
IIP, no hits, Google was able to identify the number 
as a scam
Use search engines for phone numbers 
related to vice to find any websites related or 
for house address/google instant view to see 
what an address looks like. To get contact 
details of businesses/individuals. Sometimes 
to access legislation websites to check points 
to prove. 
Voters checks, Facebook vis Misper unit, GB Accelerator 
via other officers.
When investigating two crimes where 
suspects have decamped and information on 
the suspects was given Met Intel contacted 
and the relevant forms completed for them to 
undertake the request  
Confirming locations, establishing routes to and 
from locations, obtaining contact details, gathering 
information, locating suspects, identifying subjects, 
researching legislation, researching best practice, 
identifying new resources, language translation, 
travel arrangements, interpreting data (such as 
converting ANPR co-ordinates into Google Maps). 
I used to use it to locate stolen goods sellers 
in our area e.g. by by looking for easily 
identifiable LOS property amounst items for 
sale on line. Or a local seller selling mutltiple 
pedal cycles.
We were trained very breifly in EBay stuff a 
course called ECOP's but the MPS stopped 
subscribing so we now have no access.
Use internet to check location for research (crime 
investigation / officer safety risk assessment / pre-
planned operation etc) 
Use internet to check on victim / witness (risk via media 
profile)  
use twitter to search for evidence - moped enable offence. 
If deployed as an Intelligence Gatherer, before 
or during the event , usually a public 
demonstration , I have used my own personal 
twitter account to search relevant hash tags to 
get an understanding of the mood of the 
demonstrators any any potential target 
locations. If I have ever found a possible target 
venue, I have alerted the relevant intel pod at 
GT.
Open source on social media provides valuable 
intelligence on subjects under investigation so at 
every opportunity social media is checked for latest 
photos, personal information on whereabouts both 
past and current. This can be used obtain 
information which can then allow police to apply 
for further apps. 
Search engines such as Google, Piple, Bing. 
Search for social media profiles primarily on 
Facebook but also on others using name, 
phone number or email address in order to 
identify relevant accounts to further an 
investigation. For example, subsequent 
CIU/RIPA application
I use it to identify issues that may have occurred on my 
ward and to also obtain details and what the subjects are 
known for those I encounter causing current issues  
Gain access to media sources/social media 
sources pertinent to job role.  ie university 
liaison officer - universities + university 
societies use those sources to engage with 
their audience.
Used to research suspect's for various levels of 
criminal investigation.  Used to identify and locate 
suspects and their criminal associates, platforms 
such as instagram, facebook and twitter.
I recommend it in finding wanted persons 
and it can also be useful to gain information 
as part of an investigation.
searches can identify addresses & locations; reveal 
proximity and also provide pictures relevant to the 
investigation which I have exhibited. searches can also 
identify new witnesses/suspects to obtain statements 
from or interview.
various documents have been printed and I have exhibited 
them for Court.
I am a Licensing Officer and often need to risk 
assess applications for late night events or 
Crimints relating to potential illegal events / 
raves. A private birthday party for friends / 
family may be shown to be a commercial 
concerns when the site advertising ticket sales 
is located.
SUS research, phone numbers addressed etc. Find addresses and postcodes, telephone 
numbers
Research into proposed events on licensed premises. Immigration work, checking location of places 
and details given 
I was made aware of it by KF Gangs when ding 
some research on a Borough nominal
I regularly search the internet and social 
media for Intels and Info purposes to help 
and assist with events planning.  Although 
we have a LIT team, they are often busy with 
other requests and mainly deals with crimes 
rather than public order.
Use of government website for up to date info in relation 
to mot status of vehicles and potential defects also Google 
maps and Google translate to enable communication with 
non english speakers.
Also used to build subject profiles to 
demonstrate the suspects quality of life.  
(excessive cash spending, purchasing high end 
cars and often openly using drugs on social 
media
Usually through Google, checkling locations or 
building frontages via google maps for warrantsor 
to confirm crime legislation, again via google 
whilst out on patrol.  
Used VRM 'we buy car sites' as interim 
measure when PNC was not available. 
Google street view to assist warrant 
planning. 
Looking for more information on suspects for offences - 
location, images of them, etc.
I often use google to assist in research of 
certain topics and laws not commonly come 
across e.g. dogs act offences in order to obtain 
a better understanding and examples to assist 
my learning  
my role requires me to book venues / events and 
use web based sites to submit reports.
Before during and after public order events Use twitter for engagement and monitoring when critical 
incidents 
Companies house checks, phone number 
research on those used by suspects/victims, 
google maps and satellite view.
I work in CSE which requires OS work on every 
suspect before any CIU actions can get the go 
ahead. OS is very useful to my area of work and 
usually reveals some useful information.
Primarily I carry out research on emerging 
trends ,the wording of, the location/s of and 
the and cultural practices across the world 
relating to the offences I investigate the 
operations I plan, the community 
relationships I build.
Googling addresses, street view to see if vehicles are in 
locations, how premesis are layed out. Zoopla searhes for 
floor plans prior to premesis searches. Identifying 
communications service providers prior to RIPA requests.
If I am putting someone's details through IIP I 
usually also put them through Google. This 
happens most days.
To look at stakeholders, Read business proposals 
Anything and everything possible to do with SNT
Working in the Local Professional Standards 
Unit to look up businesses being run by 
officers who have not declared a business 
interest.
To check locations provided in reports Use publically available information such as 
DfT data for MoT / Operators and Companies 
House for director information.
Q.5 If you are happy to do so, please briefly describe how you generally  use/have used online investigation(Open Source) research in your work?
Vulnerable
W
hy – W
hich reasons are provided or constructed?
Intelligence
W
hy – W
hich reasons are provided or constructed?
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Question 6. Are you aware that the Open Source Unit (OSU) at Cobalt Square is able to 
conduct Online Investigation (Open Source) research on your behalf? 
 
Table 5. 
Awareness of OSU Frequency Percentage 
Yes 375 48 
No 410 52 
 
 
n=785. 
 
 
  
48%
52%
Figure 10. Are you aware that the Open Source Unit at Cobalt Square is able to 
conduct Online Investigations (Open Source) research on your behalf?
Yes No
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Question 7. How have your conducted Online Investigation (Open Source) research? 
Please tick all that apply. 
 
Table 6. 
How was Research Conducted? Frequency 
Used my own personal, non-work-related device 279 
Used a Covert Terminal 186 
Used an AWARE Terminal  445 
Request submitted via CRIMINT 171 
Request to Local Intelligence Team (LIT) 289 
Request to Open Source Unit (OSU) 253 
Other (Never used open source) 47 
 
 
n=785 Respondents. 
  
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Never used Open source
Request to Open Source Unit (OSU)
Requet to Local Intelligence Team (LIT)
Request submitted via CRIMINT
Used an AWARE Terminal
Used a Covert Terminal
Used my own personal, non work related device
Figure 11. How have you conducted Online Investigation (Open Source) research? 
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Question 7.1. (If personal device selected as a response to Q.7) 
For what reason(s) did you use the personal device to conduct Online Investigation (Open 
Source) research? Please tick all that apply. 
 
Table 7. 
Reason for Using Personal Device Frequency 
Missing person enquiries 110 
Criminal investigation 131 
Domestic Incident 26 
Civil Dispute 31 
Road Traffic Collision 46 
Critical Incident 37 
Finding information for member of the public 161 
Giving directions to members of the public 189 
Accessing information about a person/suspect/wanted offender 74 
Access Information blocked by AWARE 184 
To update an MPS social media platform 48 
Monitoring of a suspected offender’s social media account 44 
 
 
n=279 Respondents. 
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Figure 12. Reasons for using a personal device to conduct Online (Open Source) 
research.  
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Figure 13. Qualitative Comments and Thematic Coding: Question 7.1 
If Possible, please provide further details of the incident/occasion to help us understand why 
you used your own device. 
 
 
Thematic Coding Themes Respondent Answer Respondent Answer
What are the phenomena of concern being mentioned?
Whilst on foot patrol, numerous members of public asking for directions, asking what 
buses they need, checking bus times, store opening times, 
Maps won't allow desk tops or tablets into you tube or many social media but I can use a huge 
amount of law
Directions and advice to elderly passenger on bus. Advice about Help the Aged and 
useful contact numbers.
with regards to directions / information for the public, we are expected to know EVERYTHING and 
get complaints of being unhelpful if we don't and suggest they use their own smart phone they are 
holding in their hands as they ask their question."
Usually to identify locations on a map etc. Map application
Out on the street you may have to use google maps to help with giving directions Google maps for when the MDT won't log on, particularly because of the accurate house numbers. 
Directions and to promote work. Address/post code search
Directions given to MOP in central London, best way to show them on a map where 
they are and where they need to go. Also checking postcodes and directions to them 
when attending a call.
Directions and advice during public order. To educate myself on the stance and view points of 
demonstrators prior to a PLT deployment to enable me to communicate with a better 
understanding. 
directions given on the street and personal device is only available On Aid in an area I don't know well. Wanted to help member of the public by using maps on my phone to give directions. 
Anyone asking for directions
Wanted person who had a semi open facebook profile.  Could see that they were out of 
the country.  Also a victim of crime found their stolen bike on gumtree.  Looked at the 
details of the advert. 
Checking websites in relation to fraud, where Aware otherwise would block searches.
fast time enquiries on street or OMPD. They need to show me the snapchat messages etc so I can see their part and what the other party has done
Whilst making enquiries with a witness to identify a suspect and was told he had a 
Facebook profile. I logged onto Facebook using my own account and they identified his 
profile for me so I print screened his profile page and sent it to myself before logging 
out again. 
Social media incidents and students cannot access the accounts due to school blocking / no data
Wanted to search for detail of a suspect and related witnesses on a facebook group. 
Did not want to leave a met police footprint on the facebook search, also do not think 
we are supposed to use facebook on aware computers?
To look up linkedin to look at a photo to confirm a victim was the person I was looking for and 
where they worked.
Used own device to assist searching for stolen mobile phones, tracking victim's friends 
down via Facebook for communication purposes, searching on Whatsapp and other 
social media for photos of Mispers/wanted people if not on custody imaging.
Used own device to assist searching for stolen mobile phones, tracking victim's friends down via 
Facebook for communication purposes, searching on Whatsapp and other social media for photos of 
Mispers/wanted people if not on custody imaging.
Trawling social media quickly reacting to information from a victim to determine if the 
information was accurate and would lead to a potential suspect being identified. Once 
confirmed that the information was accurate I then submitted an official request to 
have the social media account evidentially captured.
Track a Romanian burglar who created a number of profiles. Male had not been arrested before and 
we could not locate him. Used Facebook to try and discover friend groups that he was associating 
with and locations of picture he was uploading.
Open source research of information in the public domain relating to historical 
information to assist in linking subjects, locations searching for organised crime suspects and associates 
Looking for any youtube videos which may have been posted of the collision to use as 
evidence. Used my own device as Job computers do not allow access to youtube Lots of incidents when trying to access websites and social media profiles to obtain evidence. 
Investigation relating to betting Office. unable to access website because blocked on 
aware. 
Looking at pictures on Facebook is quicker on my phone. A large rave had taken place and pictures 
had been uploaded ot Facebook. I was looking at the pictures to identify the organiser.
I have used my personal mobile and tablet to see facebook profiles and gain info from 
the press. It is the quickest way of seeing the information that is in the public domain.
I have used my personal device to look at profiles of suspected brothel ladies in relation to phone 
numbers being advertised
Another case involved harassment and this involved requesting LIT team to interrogate 
the facebook account for images of the suspect"
I had a hate crime involving a post on facebook and the suspect had images of the area around his 
house, this was identified from google maps and then voters.
I fully understand why many seemingly harmless internet sites are blocked on MOS 
Aware terminals - internet security is of course very important but it is a nuisance! I 
am involved in offender management (low level stuff on borough) trying to monitor 
IOM nominal and also trace outstanding wanted persons
As when trying to locate possible named SUS would look at FB for a possible sus pic 
Complaints investigation for details of potential witnesses and to view maps etc when Social media to invalidate a defence
Used map function no mobile to direct a MOPs. Used Facebook to explore family ties 
following the creation of a Merlin Sometimes need photos of misper urgently.
Understand lifestyle of person in minutes as opposed to hours.- Crime and misper. No other suitable access to internet available on the street. Obtain local partner agencies contact details to assist with helping a vulnerable person.
Facebook searches for missing persons because I don't have an MPS account." Mobile unit on missing person investigation. No access to portable MET issued device. 
It has been used to for high risk misper enquiries. It is used to search for suspects. High risk issing person - needed to identify a landline telephone number and company name. 
Female critically injured in RTC had very rare surname. Used Facebook to locate 
potential Misper's location. 
Fast time enquiries into sex offenders and High Risk missing persons. 
Q.7.1. If possible, please provide further details of the incident/occasion to help us understand why you used your own device.
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Thematic Coding Themes Respondent Answer Respondent Answer
What are the phenomena of concern being mentioned?
Where there is no aware terminal available or AWARE blocks the site. I would not log 
into my own social media account to search, but only use publicly accessible sites. I have used the internet to look at venues that feature in investigations."
Websites frequently blocked on Aware, most recent example being a YouTube video 
linked to a gang-related murder that could not be viewed on Aware. Everyone on the 
MIT team had to view the video on their personal phone. Google Maps is unusable on 
Aware via Firefox. 
To access certain websites for night club venues which are blocked by aware. Access required for 
research purposes into events and DJ's. Our current job issues device(Blackberry) does not provide 
this to a satisfactory standard. "
When I am out of the office until very recently I did not have an MPS issued  mobile 
device that I could use to access the internet. Own device has been used when websites are blocked by Web Marshall or out of MPS building.
Research frequently conducted using Google Street View which has to be conducted 
via Google Maps app on personal devices. Internet access on Aware is sometimes so 
slow it's just easier to use you own device.
Until recently our computers were only running XP and were so slow that I brought in my own 
computer so that I could be far more efficient at work. Social media is used by everybody today and 
I can not believe that the MPS are so slow to act to bring us to speed.
Website blocked unknown reason eg. of University while looking for contact details, 
Misper description from Facebook, Aware terminal crashed/frozen or general ease of 
access, locate info from TfL e.g. precise bus stop details for Cris report [letter, name, 
direction, etc]
I recently tried to access Ladbrokes website to obtain details of locations of their betting shops in a 
particular area, but the web marshal blocked it because of 'gambling'.  It is lamentable that in this 
day and age a Scotland yard detective is prevented from accessing websites to try and obtain 
important information to assist an investigation, just in case he might 'place bets' or 'view 
pornography'?????    Where is the trust element, treating staff like adults etc
Unable to use work desktop as block, out and about assisting members of public.
To find open source items when no access to a terminal normally fast time. Also to look at 
legitimate business sites that have information provided by premises used by suspects. social 
media sites have only been search via a medium of google to prevent me leaving a digital foot print 
behind. 
To google information as the work computers take too long no access to information using work terminals. Eg checking social media for missing people and accessing blocked websites.
MPS systems are not up to scratch or capable of conducting most but the most basic 
research. I have attempted to get LIT team to do research but the mailbox was not 
monitored real-time and by the time I got a response the oportunities would have been 
lost. "
To establish what I was looking at. A victim of Rape stated that she met the suspect on a site called 
Whisper, so I researched Whisper to see what it was about.
I occasionally look at You Tube videos that are blocked by AWARE (You Tube ONLY - I 
am aware of the security risks to myself by clicking on other - less reputable - 
websites).  "
MPS terminals make me want to die
Lack of provision of suitable hardware by the police. When on the street and 
information is required there and then it is easier to use your personal device rather 
than wait on the radio for someone to check it. If every officer had a job issued phone 
that was fit for purpose then this would be eradicated.
Mainly because sites were blocked on Aware when investigating brothel closures.
It happens multiple times as the aware terminals are quite restricted, the stand alone 
terminals are few and far between (or hidden in a proactive teams office), it is usually 
the quickest and easiest way to carryout the task at hand.
I would only use my own device if there is an issue with aware and it wont allow me to access the 
information i need.
This was blocked by aware as it decreed it business use. In general terms, MPS technology is so poor, slow and unusable, that to get the job done you have to use other means.
Due to the fact the MPS systems are slow and not user friendly or at that time not 
readily available for use. could not access linked in as confidential work station
cant access social media account via aware, no other easy way to do so AWARE not available or is slow
Being blocked by job firewall Better access to certain social media platforms (snapchat username searches/Instagram) 
Youtube and videos are blocked on aware terminals. However, colleagues and I have 
been part of videos filmed by DMC or have crime prevention videos which we want to 
promote on met social media but can't view unless view on our own devices. Once the 
video has been viewed, I then share it on social media using an aware terminal as I 
now know the content is suitable.
Because the Aware system blocks us from so many websites its easier to use my phone most of the 
time.  Or i use my phone when im out on patrol as its quicker than the brand new tablets we have 
been given.  
As an Liaison Officer I needed some info from websites that were blocked by Aware. I 
also use both the Twitter and the NCDV apps on my personal mobile.
Checking facebook and twitter accounts of a suspect. No access to MPS log ins to be able to check 
details - Was required to log in to proceed further
Aware is slow and security settings often preclude this - some data is large and the 
Met systems cant always handle the download bandwidth. Those times when I am away from the office and want to check info about an event.
WhatsApp - by adding a SUSP's number to phone via number provided, we were able 
to obtain an image of them, as they had their photo as their profile photo. They cannot 
tell that we have added them just by our saving their phone number to our mobile 
phone.
Social media sites blocked on aware terminals.
Vehicle blocking road.  Keeper details checked using IIP to try and contact the keeper to 
move vehicle.  Keeper was a company and internet used to look at web page to obtain 
contact details. The driver was then contacted and moved vehicle. 
On aid to ascertain football results at other local clubs in anticipation of increased tensions of 
supporters when leaving the grounds after a match as a neighbouring club."
Details provided to another member of public regarding Citizens Advice Bureau. Social media sites blocked by MPS. Covert terminals not available
To identfiy location of an organised event where no risk to self. Short staffing means longer wait times to get the information needed quickly. Tablets have now been issued so this should prevent the need to use personal devices 
The MPS aware terminals do not load twitter correctly so it is easier to do it from my 
own phone.
Especially looking at events and groups on Facebook which normally on MPS aware terminal wont 
allow you to access certain pages without logging onto Facebook.  If I require to screen shot a page, 
I normally copy the link from personal device and input into MPS aware computer.
The document is of a large size 14Mb + or blocked as met police believe the council 
and government websites are unsafe.
There is only one covert open-source terminal in the borough. It is frequently unusable because of 
connectivity or administration issues (eg no up to date virus software). OSU is an option but it 
requires quite a bureaucratic form
The met equipment simply does not work the MPS blocks sites or links related to PFEW
pointless trying to do it on work computers. The aware system would not allow me to see the information I wanted regarding a missing young person. And information is easier to obtain.
Out and about if someone needs a phone number or address for various organisations. 
Taking photos of a photo of a high risk misper to quickly email to other officers dealing.
The Aware Firewall blocks many sites which have blogs and other types of media incorporated 
within them. This includes sites attached to University Faculties which house details of research 
projects related to Policing and criminal justice, even those projects in which the Met are involved.
Find locations of where someone may be when someone can describe location but 
does not know address. MPS Systems are not compatible with Apple. Find My iPhone can't be used but is an excellent tool.
On occasions when we happen upon a licensing issue whilst out and about. To access 
the local authority licensing register to view current licenses and licence conditions.
Every person (nearly) has access to a smart device with internet access. It is ridiculous to not use a 
tool that has access to a wealth of all human knowledge that sits in the palm of your hand. It would 
be preferable not to use my own device (due to personal costs to have it and access services) but it 
is foolish not to use something that would aid in your day to day work/life.
Because MPS technology is not up to scratch and going through the Open Source Unit 
can be so time consuming and pointless, depending on who does the search. because MPS devices are so restrictive ..... We need to get the job done!
because i did not have any Met computer while checking information against council 
register of licences at the premises. this is done regularly as we did request a IPad but 
refused so we have no option.
because aware terminals are slow and seldom work! Every enquiry gets blocked and I often find it 
quicker and easier to use my phone.
Because AWARE does not allow me to watch video footage Aware terminal very slow and unable to access some websites due to the firewall. It's quicker to use my own device to get directions than anything provided by the Met.
W
hy – W
hich Reasons are Provided or Constructed?
Q.7.1. If possible, please provide further details of the incident/occasion to help us understand why you used your own device.
IT System
 &
 Restrictions
Its O
pen Source / Covert
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Thematic Coding Themes Respondent Answer Respondent Answer
What are the phenomena of concern being mentioned?
Been to a call where the person needed to contact action fraud. I used my mobile 
phone to conduct an internet search for the Action Fraud Number. Royal Mail website does not run (possibly browser issue)
Varied occasions. Never used for specific criminal investigation or intelligence 
enquiries. 
Mostly it's to find out uncontroversial information (such as directions, finding a newspaper article 
etc)
To assist members of public enquiries whilst on foot patrol, maps, quick routes to get 
to emergency calls, 
Disorder planned and occurring live on periscope. I was unable to access this via the 
open source terminal.
Usually use my own device as I am out of the station and do not have access to an 
aware terminal or I will have been at the station and there were no free working 
terminals
MPS devices do not always allow access to certain sites. Completing a form to request someone 
else accesses the internet on my behalf, then waiting for the result, is archaic. The internet was 
born almost 25 years ago.  It is beyond comprehension that an organisation can be so far behind the 
times.
Speed, necessity, ease of use. I have also used my phone to update a work twitter account due to my phone having a better camera and being faster.
Quicker, more efficient, sites are not blocked, working away from the office/terminal Its faster, its a better connection, wider access to sites
its far quicker to conduct for fast time investigations and having to avoid a second person.
Quicker than using work computer it quicker, and easier to access  
Performing a specialist role such as forward intelligence makes it necessary , in order 
to be more effective, to be aware of tensions and consider where target locations for 
direct action may be. 
It was most convienient. Before teams were given smart phones, aware terminals were pretty 
temperamental and the quickest way would be to use a personal device.
Purely ease of access as I was logged into something else It is the 21st century. Why would i waste time making a request when I can do it on my phone which is in my pocket.
nothing else available Unless I needed it in an evidential format and for a paper trail for legal reasons there is no way I would bother making an official request. Unless I had been given the training to do it myself.
not issued with a MPS device to use on the street it is quicker when doing admin
not in a police building, on the street I find it easier to update the police twitter account using my own phone than a terminal
Not been issued with any mobile job device i.e. laptop or PDA capable of this. It is quicker and easier to use than an aware terminal.
No access to an MPS mobile device to conduct searches for information for members 
of the public
In any case where the material sought is for intelligence rather than evidential purposes. Because I 
can do a more thorough job and get quicker results doing it myself than sending a request to LIT or 
the Open Source Unit. 
I am in a LIT (intelligence team) so complete research using various socioal media and 
internet searches. The open source unit will only complete the more serious or 
complex research as often the open source unit consists of a single officer on duty. The 
ability to search should be opened to all officers.
If out on patrol when no other device available or if the information was blocked on the internet ie 
sometimes journey planner is blocked and the fastest route is required to reduce wasted time.  Whi 
is this blocked on Met systems?  Who knows but if it isn't rerstricted personal phone is often faster 
and easier to use than desk top. 
No access to a portable device - however this has now changed as I have an MPS 
laptop.
I have used Google Translate to communicate with a Farsi speaker as Met radios are a joke in 
terms of connectivity, and the service from official Language Line is abysmal. Not only do you have 
to wait an age to speak with anyone, once a translator has been located, they, very often, are 
rubbish, i.e. they are incapable of speaking/speak very poorly the language requested, which is 
frustrating for the member of the public and makes us - police - look like a joke.
I have used my personal device because it is convenient to do so. If I am out and 
mobile conducting enquiries then it is easier to use my own equipment. I am response team, and this is the only internet access I have whilst on duty unless back at base.
My own device is powerful, cloaked and far better than anything that the MPS supply. For speed and convenience. Only 1 open source computer here. The room is locked when nobody is working in that office.
faster and more effective way of doing getting the information rather than the 
outdated technology that we have to use For facebook you have to deal with the authentication bots, it's just quicker on my phone.
Do not have access to a standalone where I work few years ago, was quicker, no paper work and needed intel to build the picture.
Job phone had been previously used during course of same tour of duty for same 
purpose, out of office on live operation deployment and information was required. "
closed groups. anonymity. ease and speed of use. I am not provided with ANY equipment at work 
capable of doing it. My aware terminal barely lets me book on let alone use it for anything 
contructive that could help in my job.
At the time i was unaware of who or how to get it completed properly and requesting 
it would take longer than just doing it. Away from office with no other devices available.
As you cannot use police AWARE computers and contacting an Intel team would take 
to long or unaware of who to contact. At hand, ease of access.
Apps such as vehicle smart not available on met systems. Google maps and location 
services disabled on met systems 
Access is easier and being able to use Firefox etc makes use of external website quicker/better                                                                                                                 
1) to access sites that are blocked by the MPS                                                                                                             
2) to monitor information away form an MPS terminal                                                                                        
3) to make use of anonymisation techniques (VPN or TOR mostly) in order to complete the above.
W
hy – W
hich Reasons are Provided or Constructed?
Q.7.1. If possible, please provide further details of the incident/occasion to help us understand why you used your own device.
N
ot for Intel
easy/access/speed
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Question 8. Are there any specific occasions/reasons for why you have not used the 
services of the Open Source Unit? If yes, please tick all those that apply. 
 
 
Table 8. Reasons why the Open Source Unit (OSU) were not used Frequency 
My request to the OSU was rejected 33 
Too time consuming to request research through the OSU 226 
Research could be carried out via own personal device 166 
Research could be carried out via AWARE 260 
Research could be carried out via a standalone (Inc. LIT or colleague) 184 
Didn’t or don’t know the remit for the OSU 293 
Didn’t or don’t know how to contact the OSU 263 
Didn’t or don’t know that the OSU is open 24/7 216 
Not Applicable 127 
 
 
n=785  
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Not Applicable
Research could be carried out via own personal device
Research could be carried out via AWARE
Research could be carried out via a standalone (inc. LIT
or college)
Didn't or don't know the remit for the OSU
Didn't or don't know how to contact the OSU
Didn't or don't know the OSU is open 24/7
Too time consuming to request research through the
OSU
My request to the OSU was rejected
Figure 14. Reasons why the Open Source Unit were not used 
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Figure 15. Qualitative Comments and Thematic Coding (Other Comments): Question 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Thematic Coding Themes Respondent Answers
What are the phenomena of concern being mentioned?
I've found things on my phone through one quick search that they can't find and it 
takes them days to reply.
A quick enquiry is more easily done on your own device
Yet another form to complete and get approval for.
Beuracacy of FORM for simple request
Far too bureaucratic process
bureaucratic proccess/little staff available/hard to access 
Why include them when you can do it now
As an OIC I would rather do the work myself and be assured that it has been done to 
high standard.
The requested open source work was not of a such a high priority or urgency that the 
Open Source Unit had to be involved
Requested then did own research in the meantime to save time
Prefer to conduct research myself - do not have faith in borough-based PCs to 
investigate.pointless waste of time for basic inquiries which can be carried out 
yourselfOpen source unit do not provide the level of evidential open source work that the 
SCOIS units require for Murder jobs we are therefor trained to do our own evidential 
researchThe fact it is open source means it is easily accessable.
I can complete this within minutes on my own. In a time pressured environment I'm 
unwilling to spend time tasking another unit then waiting for results which might not 
be what I want when they come through
Easier to look myself than to brief someone else, especially if I don't know what I'm 
specifically looking for until I've found it
By the time i jhave explained to them what i want i can do it myself ten times 
over...... We need to get into the modern age. The open source unit is just another 
central unit that spends more time telling us why they cant do it. Centralise 
something and we have lost it on the boroughs.
pointless waste of time for basic inquiries which can be carried out yourself
Tend to use OSU mostly when the product may be required evidentially, when it is 
"not safe" to do myself, or also when I have been unable to locate the desired data
Somethimes the information needed quickly. Has been multiple occassions where 
local LIT have failed to identify images/information on suspects that I've managed to 
find on my personal device.
Research could not be carried out via MPS terminals and the open source unit 
invariably reply saying they couldn't find what I was looking for.
complete forms and await results several days later in previous delaings/requersts. 
Open source unit do not do evidential work they only provide a quick snapshot
Not operationally effective to continually make requests , information required at that 
point.
In many of my investigations, the information gleaned from one search will then lead 
onto another relevant area which another person would not realise this and not 
perform the additional searches; this is probably the most important reason why i do 
the searches myself and not trust them to another officer.
Open source isn't completed to my standards by other departments. if you want it 
done properly you have to do it- other faceless departments aren't motivated to do it 
well. Not trusting of the results and would prefer to conduct them myself
I have had requests processed by the Open Source Unit before, and the infomration 
they have obtained was not of a satisfactory standard.
I am already adept at conducting open source reasearch, and the work I have received 
from 
Open Source in the past has been sub-standard and missed obvious things I have later 
found myself with minimal effort. Having a dedicated unit to conduct internet 
research when each officer has access to the internet seems like a poor use of 
resources.Thought it would take a long time to get the result
Required fast time and not able to be completed quickly
OSU unable to assist quicktime due to workload
Open source unit doesnt work fast enough for fast time manhunts
Was unaware that the Open Source Unit existed
I do not know what an open sourse unit is.
Efficient
Poor Standards
Time Consuming
Didn't know they exist
Why – Which reasons are provided or constructed?
Personal Devices
By which – Means/Tactics and strategies for achieving the 
aim. How are they doing it?
Bureaeaucratic
Should be able to do it myself
Q.8. Are there any specific ocassions/reasons why you have not used the services of the Open Source Unit? - Other
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Question 9. Have you ever used your personal social media account (Facebook etc) to 
conduct Online Investigation (Open Source) research? 
 
Table 9. 
Used Personal Social Media for Research? Frequency Percentage 
Yes 101 13 
No 684 87 
 
 
n=785. 
 
Figure 17. Qualitative Comments and Thematic Coding: Question 9. 
 
 
13%
87%
Figure 16. Have you ever used your personal social media account (Facebook, etc) 
to conduct Online Investigations (Open Source) research?  
Yes No
Thematic Coding Themes Respondent Answers Respondent Answers
What are the phenomena of concern being mentioned?
You're kidding, right?! I'd rather not have and links to suspects on social media. The 
algorithms on social media sites are too smart and will see 
that you've searched for suspects.
Wouldn't be so daft… Considering some of the suspects I go after this would be 
very dangerous 
Surely this is a breach of data protections standards and MPS 
policy.
Because that is insane
N  as there can be trace which would link my personal account 
to having searched for the suspect and facebook may then use 
that data to link me to the subject and he would then be able to 
find me despite my high security settings. 
Please note, I would not do this in cases involving anyone 
likely to realise what was going on
No however I have frequently seen others do so. It is my understanding that we are prohibited from doing this 
due to security issues.
You have to fill out a form, it's too long lengthy and time 
consuming, you have to wait in the queue as there are things 
more urgent than your enquiry
Easier then having to go through open source unit - Fast time 
intelligence is required and do not have time to submit a 
form
Whilst at court it had been suggested that victim had used 
facebook. Needed to complete search at the time.
easier and time efficient
Quickest and easiest way to conduct fast time enquiry. Because although it is against the policy - its often much 
easier and quicker than using a standalone. if the subjects 
being looked at are not organised criminals etc and would not 
have the ability to see who is looking at them i have research 
them on my personal accounts
Easier, quicker and more effective than tasking OSU.
Q.9 Have you ever used your personal social media account (Facebook etc.) to conduct Internet Investigation & Research (Open Source research) - [Comment]
Efficiency
You're Kidding
Why – Which reasons are provided or constructed?
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Thematic Coding Themes Respondent Answers Respondent Answers
What are the phenomena of concern being mentioned?
To see if there were recent updates by missing persons. Misper enquiry to see if subject is on FB.
To see if a missing person has a facebook page and if any 
messages status updates have been added
I used instagram to help with a missing person investigation. 
I have since been told this is not advisable.
To see if a misper had posted that day I cannot remember specifically but have used my private 
social media accounts to see if mispers have social media 
accounts and if any information is useful
To search for relatives listed on a victim's facebook page who 
was in a coma. Trying to urgently ID NOK details.
Looking at advertised events and known organisers to look for 
Intels which will assist us in planning.  Eg High risk of public 
disorder, community tensions on particular events etc
I created after concerns were identified during an encounter 
between a Mother, her new boyfriend and the Mother's 12 year 
old daughter
As part of my License Inforcement Officer role
To locate high risk Misper As above for high risk mispers. Normally stating they are 
going to commit suicide and I want to see if they are on 
social media, exactly what is being posted. I can also see if 
they are posting anything else which will assist me with 
assessing the risk.
A very high risk missing person I looked at personal account 
which assisted in finding MISPER in quick time
Access to IT
When on borough didn't have access to stand alone and the 
investigation was time critical
WhatsApp - by adding a SUSP's number to phone via number 
provided, we were able to obtain an image of them, as they had 
their photo as their profile photo. They cannot tell that we have 
added them just by our saving their phone number to our mobile 
phone
Facebook searches for suspects' profiles for information and 
intelligence "
Twitter and Facebook to identify local crime. Searching for names of potential suspects to determine if 
they exist. I would NEVER add them or interact (direct 
messaging etc)
Twitter - unintentionally saw a retweet in twitter feed of a gang 
nominal video which resulted in intelligence.
searched people on instagram such as 'Duckfedsdaily' or 
other anti police accounts. Some members or posts are gang 
members
To try to identify a subjects Facebook/Instagram account to 
obtain an up to date photograph of them.
Searched names to see a face or obtain further information. 
(domestics, Mispers ect)
To track down a female involved in tenancy fraud Searched for suspect who was wanted
To search for other users on Instagram, and to view their 
accounts, you yourself need to be logged into an account. 
Running searches for names etc. to see if they have a social 
media account. 
To search for a person / mobile number on facebook etc Read-only to monitor closed social media groups, with 
locations fo dumped stolen vehicles to enable me to recover 
them back to R/K. Can't be viewed from aware/met 
terminals
I use PIPL.com" Only to look at a suspect's photo
To search a person for profile picture I was asked by a supervisor to look for a suspect on Instagram 
- as this is an app that one must have an account to use I 
obliged.
To search a name for a suspect I maintain a simple 'dummy' Facebook account to use for 
research.  I am aware that I cannot interact with others using 
this account
To look for suspects I have used Twitter in an attempt to locate a suspect and also 
to research a victim
To look for stolen bike sales I have a fake account that i use for work just like many other 
investigators have had to do.
To look at the relationships and profiles between family 
members following on from a Merlin
I have a fake account that I use as it is the only way to get the 
job done without filling out 
loads of forms.
To identfiy location of an organised event where no risk to self. For example searching telephone numbers to link to an 
account name
Searching for organised crime suspects and associates I wanted quick research conducted on potential drug dealer. 
Wanted latest pictures of him he may have on facebook, 
whatsapp etc. Want to identify potential drug dealers from Check up on CCTV clips that have been posted on residents 
groups and not submitted to police
Downloaded several Gang Videos from You Tub , as request 
for Met Intel - had not been done some 2 weeks later, 
Carry out research on youth and their trends Confirm identity of an individual.
By joining open groups to be kept informed of information. Conducted searches for profiles of known offenders
I do know people that have because during fast time man hunt 
investigations, it's too time consuming to request it via Open 
Acertian names of Gang Nominals
have used the log in section (forgotten login details) to search 
telephone numbers and names
Just to check a photo or email address of a victim.
Used Facebook account to search for suspect's Facebook account Looked to see if someone had a Facebook account
Searched Facebook Looked on Facebook to confirm identity of subjects and 
connections to their friends
Searched Twitter x 2 I have used colleagues as not on facebook
Through facebook/ instagram apps. I have created an account for just such purposes.
I did not establish contact via my personal device as my own 
personal account should not be used when representing the MPS.
Searching a name on facebook and looking at a profile picture 
of an open account and linked friends (only if the account is 
unrestricted)
Only search facilities
Sent messages on IM to members of the public who have lost 
their property, usually a wallet or purse/handbag.
Look for members of public's friends when their phone ran 
out of battery in order to get in contact with them.
Only to see if they had a facebook account. I then made a request 
through media and com's to contact the subject so they could 
meet with me to collect paperwork from a court which had to be 
signed for (current address was unknown - not a criminal 
matter). request was refused by media and comms.
finding a wallet in public I could use Facebook to track down 
the owner and reunite them with it.
Once, in 2009, when all efforts to contact a key witness had 
failed. Set up a facebook account in my name and found the 
witness and contacted her directly. This resulted in her giving 
evidence via live link from Hungary
By joining open groups to be kept informed of information.
Ask members of the public to contact police as witnesses to 
incidents
Communication 
/Engagement
Q.9 Have you ever used your personal social media account (Facebook etc.) to conduct Internet Investigation & Research (Open Source research) - [Comment]
No Reason Provided
Inteiligence Purposes
Why – Which reasons are provided or constructed?              
(Continued)
Safeguarding
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Question 10. Have you used a false persona (assumed identity to mask your own) to 
conduct Online Investigation (Open Source) searches/research? 
 
Table 10. 
Have you used a false persona Frequency Percentage 
Yes 90 11 
No 695 89 
 
 
n=785. 
 
Table 11. Frequency of False Persona use at each Open Source Level 
Open Source Levels Frequency Using False Personas 
Frequency 
Percentages 
Level 1 685 24 3.5 
Level 2 78 48 61.5 
Level 3 16 13 81.3 
Level 4 1 1 100 
Level 5 5 4 80 
 Total 90  
  
11%
89%
Figure 18. Have you used a false persona to conduct Online Investigation (Open 
Source) searches/reaserch?
Yes No
 191 
Question 10.1. (If yes to Q.10) 
What device(s) have you used when using a false persona? Please tick all that apply. 
 
Table 12. 
Devices Used Frequency 
Personal non-work-related device (your own phone/tablet etc) 14 
AWARE terminal (MPS desktop/tablet device etc) 17 
Covert terminal (Standalone machine not overtly linked to MPS) 69 
 
 
n=90, modal response – Covert Terminal (69). 
 
  
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Personal non-work related device (your own
phone/tablet etc)
AWARE terminal (MPS desktop/tablet device etc)
Covert terminal (Standalone machine not overtly linked
to MPS)
Figure 19. What devices have you used when using a false persona? 
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Demographic Questions 
 
Question 15. What your current rank/grade is? 
Table 13. 
 
 
n=785, modal response – PC/DC (560). 
 
  
5% 1% 1%
71%
16%
3% 2% 1%
Figure 20. What is your current rank/grade?
Band E Band D Band C PC/DC PS/DS Insp/DI Prefer not to say Other
Position Frequency Percentage 
Band E 42 5 
Band D 7 1 
Band C 4 1 
PC/DC 560 71 
PS/DS 123 16 
Insp/DI 27 3 
Prefer not to say 17 2 
Other 5 1 
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Question 16. Please state your length of service. 
 
Table 14. 
Length of service (years) Frequency Percentage 
0-2 years 37 5 
2-5 years 151 19 
5-10 years 129 16 
10-15 years 206 26 
15-20 years 146 19 
20-25 years 45 6 
25-30 years 58 7 
30-35 years 13 2 
 
 
n=785, modal response – 10-15years (206). 
  
5%
19%
16%
26%
19%
6%
7% 2%
Figure 21. State your length of service
(0-2) (2-5) (5-10) (10-15) (15-20) (20-25) (25-30) (30-35)
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Question 17. Please select your age group. 
 
Table 15. 
Age Range Frequency Percentage 
18-24 20 2 
25-34 226 29 
35-44 287 36 
45-54 194 25 
55+ 21 3 
Prefer not to say 37 5 
 
 
n=785, modal response – 35-44 (287).  
2%
29%
36%
25%
3% 5%
Figure 22. State your age range 
(18-24) (25-34) (35-44) (45-54) (55+) Prefer not to say
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Knowledge Based Questions 
 
Question 1. Does the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA 2000) impact the 
way in which police obtain Online Investigation (Open Source) intelligence? 
 
Table 16. 
Does RIPA Impacts obtaining OS Intelligence Frequency Percentage 
Yes 271 43 
No 49 8 
Don’t Know 304 49 
 
 
n=624, modal response – Don’t Know. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
43%
8%
49%
Figure 23. Does the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (2000) impact the 
way in which police obtain Internet Investigation and Research (Open Source) 
intelligence? 
Yes No Don't Know
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Figure 24. Qualitative Comments and Thematic Coding: Question 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thematic Coding Themes Participant Response Participant Response
What are the phenomena of concern being mentioned?
Yes repeated viewing is considered surveillance and clearly we cannot create fake 
profiles or risk being deemed a CHIS/UC. Even where there is no contact between police 
profile and person of interest.
It does because we cannot look at someone's public posts on a regular basis 
without breaching RIPA. If they are posting things online there is an 
expectation that this is public. 
Unless you are an online UC.
Viewing profiles repeatedly - for a specific operation  requires in my opinion a Directed 
Surveillance Authority.
It does affect it if open source is being used constantly (refreshed) hourly or 
daily. It could cause an issue in court with regards if this needs be covered 
under RIPA for directed surveillance. We are following the suspects digital 
footprint. 
it details how we can monitor suspects internet accounts that are password 
protected, emails, etcSome material that can be obtained from the internet (especially social networking 
profiles) can be considered private information and will be directed surveillance if 
repeatedly/frequently viewed.
It can. An example would be repeated access to a subjects facebook account 
which would start to get into the realms of surveillance.
RIPA is for covert and intrusive surveillance. Simply viewing open source material on the 
internet does not require RIPA authority as long as you are not constantly monitoring it.
Information obtained can only be obtained from what is already there ie a 
Facebook profile. A DS authority will required if profiles are actively 
monitored or friend requests/relationships are made.
Ripa is always considered in the work i do with repeat viewings of social media etc. some 
of the work cab be classed as surveillance and again Ripa would apply
If you repeatedly look at Social Media postings to gather intelligence then 
you need to be aware of collateral damage ie finding out stuff about friends 
etc that are not relevant to your investigation.
RIPA - with regards Social media research .......One off research is fine. However, looking 
at an account more than once can be deemed "monitoring" and should be authorised as 
Directed Surveillance
If you are regularly checking someones face book account or other social 
media accounts you're likely to be obtaining private/personal information 
and experiencing collateral with regards to others commenting on the items 
being posted/commented on and therefore potentially breaching RIPA.
Repeated covert viewing requires a DSA I believe it relates to the overt or covert use of the systems and whether you 
are merely checking sites or continually monitoring someones usage of 
something which could amount to surveillance.    
Repeated searches of specific social media profiles requires Directed Surveillance 
Authority
You are restricted by the amount of times you can look into a subjects details 
without impacting on RIPA
Repeated viewing and ongoing monitoring, you are able to access an account once 
however if you are wishing to monitor an account for updates or daily posts this would 
required a DSA
You cannot complete repeated viewing without a DSA in place - which is 
ridiculous as its all in the public domain !!!
Ongoing consistent viewing of a subjects social media profile may breach RIPA You can look on open source for investigation purposes, but if you wish to 
repeatedly look at someone's profile you would need a DSA due to human 
rights and privacy.
RIPA and this includes repetitive viewing of what are deemed to be “open source” sites 
for the purpose of intelligence gathering and data collation.”
Open Source is not subject to RIPA No its not targeted covert surveillance, its accessing historically public 
information.  RIPA would apply if its private information or future Open source = open to the public No as the surveillance is not covert.
Open source doesn't count as surveillance Material found through 'open source' is open to all. There are no covert 
methods being used and the material is available for anyone to access.
Non-contact research, however, is ok without RIPA application. As stated, RIPA was legislated before Social media took off, the current view 
is outdated and public profiles should not be come under RIPA in any form, 
even with repeated viewing they are public and anyone can view them. 
Journalists/MOP/Business can do this repeatedly but because we are police 
we cannot.
Not if the information is readily available on the internet and without interaction. If the 
information is available on a public domain, I do not believe RIPA is in use.
No, because it is not private information.
No, everything online is accessible to anyone. Anything gained has not been gained by 
obtrusive methods.
"No. If its publicly available it has been disseminated for public consumption. 
It is covert 
gathering of information for a policing purpose and it would be directed with 
a risk of collateral intrusion so it does fall within the RIPA definition but the 
fact that is in a public domain, there is a tacit agreement that it can be 
looked at. However, if the information is restricted in some way then RIPA 
would apply. The main issue with open source is not to leave a footprint."
Open source is publicly available and although covert it is not accessing private 
information.
Although information on social media accounts such as private 
communications within platforms is protected by RIPA most public posts are 
not covered
This is information open to the public. The owners of the data can have no expectation 
that the data is 'private'
Anything in the public world, we as police should be able to use it without 
the fear of breaching any act or policy. Suspect has been involved in crime on 
a particular date, people are so flash with the latest phone and take selfies, 
this may prove the clothing worn and the suspects features.
Accessing the account information would likely be subject to restrictions but the purpose 
of Open Source is to complete research on publicly available information 
Obtaining private information about suspects must be justified and proportionate
My understanding is that it would depend on the circumstance. If searching 
for events in your area and names come up, it would not, but if these names 
are then specifically looked into at this point it may and must be 
not too familiar with RIPA act
Online V's Real Life
Online interactions are governed in the same was as real-life interactions and the same 
legislation applies
Of course it does. The same rules apply to establishing and maintaining a 
relationship for a covert purpose as they do to UC and CHIS tasking.
Not sure but would guess at yes as if we are tracking someone online then technically we 
are following them and keeping them under observation.
make that "yes, probably".  Though I find myself wondering if we over-think 
it. Most of our interest is from an Intelligence Only viewpoint and not 
needed for investigations.
Not certain, but I'm guessing that simply viewing overtly visible information doesn't need 
authorisation, or making overt contact through social media from a police acount, while 
establishing contact using any sort of anonymous account would need RIPA authorisation.  
It's a grey area for me - but I would have thought there would be restrictions 
of some kind with certain searches
Many officers are not clear on when or if they need an authority or what the authority 
required actually is.
Again, on the brothel investigation I wanted to do some covert surveillance 
and watch the 
comings and goings but had to take advice from line managers whether a 
RIPA was needed. 
Nobody could really answer the question so I googled it myself .
Policing Purpose
No. If its publicly available it has been disseminated for public consumption. It is covert 
gathering of information for a policing purpose and it would be directed with a risk of 
collateral intrusion so it does fall within the RIPA definition but the fact that is in a public 
domain, there is a tacit agreement that it can be looked at. However, if the information is 
restricted in some way then RIPA would apply. The main issue with open source is not to 
leave a footprint.
Repeat Viewing
Why – Which reasons are provided or constructed?
Q.1 Knowledge Section - Does the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA 2000) impact the way in which police obtain Internet Investigation &amp; Research (Open Source) intelligence- 
[Comment]
Open Source Not Subject to RIPA
Open Source is not Private 
Information
ProportionalityNecessity/Collater
al Intrusion
Not Sure
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Question 2. Does MPS Policy on the covert use of Social Media and Open Source 
Intelligence impact your use of these platforms? 
 
 
Table 17. 
Does MPS Policy obtaining OS Intelligence? Frequency Percentage 
Yes 149 24 
No 70 11 
Don’t Know 405 65 
 
 
n=624, modal response – Don’t Know (405).  
24%
11%
65%
Figure 25.  Does MPS policy on the covert use of social media and Open 
Source Intelligence impact your use of these platforms? 
Yes No Don't Know
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Question 3. Does the College of Policing ‘Code of Ethics’ apply to the use of open source 
engagement and research? 
 
Table 18. 
Does the Code of Ethics apply to the use of Open 
Source? 
Frequency Percentage 
Yes 250 40 
No 6 1 
Don’t Know 368 59 
 
 
n=624 modal response – Don’t Know (368). 
 
  
40%
1%
59%
Figure 26. Does the College of Policing 'Code of Ethics' apply to the use of 
open source engagement and research? 
Yes No Don’t Know
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Question 4. The privacy/security debate is an important one for society and the 
legitimacy of the police. Do you think the police should automatically have the right to 
view open source information regardless of how personal, for a policing purpose? 
 
Table 19. 
Do the police have the right to automatically view open 
source information regardless how personal? 
Frequency Percentage 
Yes 355 57 
No 119 19 
Don’t Know 150 24 
 
 
n=624, modal response – Yes (355). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57%
19%
24%
Figure 27. The privacy/security debate is an important one for society and 
the legitimacy of the police. Do you think the police should automatically 
have the right to view open source information regardless of how personal, 
for policing purpuses? 
Yes No Don’t Know
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Figure 28. Qualitative Comments and Thematic Coding: Question 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thematic Coding Themes Respondent Answers Respondent Answers Respondent Answers
What are the phenomena of concern being 
mentioned?
Yes. It is a shocking idea, but if anyone is uploading information on 
networks which could in theory be accessed by any good hacker, then 
the subject knows that the information should get in anyone's hand 
and the Police should have automatic right to view it to protect 
children and vulnerable people, among other things.
Yes, providing it is auditable and regulated. Like phone 
work; applications would be an appropriate hurdle. I 
don't think a blanket access is necessary except in 
exceptional circumstances - terrorism etc. 
If the same information would be available to any person 
searching the internet (ie; privacy settings, facebook 
accounts etc) then it should be able to be used legitimately 
by the police without restraint... perhaps it is, my knowledge 
on the subject is minimal now, although I am under the 
impression it cannot be?  However, the accessing of 
information which would otherwise be private to any person, 
should require necessary authorities.  
I can't decide on this - the police officer in me would say a big yes -  
as a private person I would have concerns about an unquestionable 
right to delve into people's lives 
If it can be seen on the internet then we should have 
access to use it as evidence, but maybe it needs to be 
treated a bit like hearsay evidence.
If the open source info is viewable by any person in whatever 
format I believe the police should be able to view that 
unhindered for policing purposes. If it requires hacking or by 
passing of security then I believe there needs to be a level of 
authority attached to this.
Yes. In some cases, results of open source research may provide 
specific information that may not have been available on commonly 
used police indices
Yes as long as there is a legitimate reason if that 
reason protects others.
If the Police believe the information would progress any type 
of investigation then it should be permitted to access the 
relevant information
If any member of the public can view it on a personal device why 
should the Police not also use it when available?
I think if anyone makes any information/images/text 
public, police should be able to view it as easily as 
member of the public can.  Furthermore, police should 
be able to record and use this information in the 
evidential chain easier.
If the subject is putting it on social media for the world to 
see, the police have a right to view it.
Yes. If we can view it openly then it cannot be that personal. Yes, if it's in the public domain it seems fair i.e. it has 
been consciously put on the Internet by the individual 
concerned. 
If someone is under investigation for a crime then yes.  We 
need to prove guilt and obtain facts to build a case against a 
suspect.
I'm not sure I understand the question.  If you mean information that's 
in the public domain then it seems a bit odd to suggest police should 
artificially act as though it's not.  If it means social media details 
secured using privacy settings, then the same restrictions should apply 
as for other private data.  
yes if this for policing issues If people put it in the public domain we should be able to use 
it, the media etc can. It would make people think twice 
about posting things online. 
Yes, within the right parameters Whatever it takes to catch criminals. If someone has published persoanl material about 
themselves they have effectively forfeited any right to 
privacy.
I think people would be prepared to accept this. Yes if there is an urgent investigation which could be 
assisted fast time by having the right to view it
IF PEOPLE KNEW THAT WE COULD DO THIS THEN MAYBE 
CRIME WOULD DROP
Yes because if it's "open source" then that means it's 
publicly available. We're not talking about interception 
of communications here. It would be stupid not to be 
able to access information that my son could get on 
his mobile phone.. 
If someone has posted information publicly, they are making 
it available to anyone, including friends, family, strangers, 
police, journalists, politicians, etc. Therefore, one cannot be 
surprised if someone finds that information. However, if 
someone makes efforts to make the information less public 
(ie viewable by friends and family only), then it should be 
expected that police should have to gain authority in order to 
access that information. Equally, police should not trawl the 
internet for potential offences, but if a crime has been 
reported, it would be inappropriate to exclude or neglect 
publicly available open source material. It would certainly be 
of benefit for everyone, especially teenagers, to be better 
educated in the implications of making information public, 
so that they can decide for themselves what they are happy 
to share.
Yes if it mitigates risk to the public and assists with 
prosecutions, further it could undermine and assist 
making it relevant to defence.
If somebody posts it on the internet they should expect it to 
be visable for the world to see.
The vast majority of queries I have for the internet are 
not sensitive. Public information from social media 
sites that have no privacy settings should be 
something police have access to for invetigative 
purposes. The most ridiculous moment I have had 
related to a high risk missing person who had met 
someone online through an online game. I researched 
the game in general terms on my personal device as 
the aware terminal did not let me carry out the 
search. Once I knew what the game was, I contact 
Met Intelligence and told them I needed to speak to 
someone about an online relationship from the game 
platform. I was told that because I'd done a search on 
my device, my phone now needed to be bagged as 
evidence in relation to the search I had carried out. 
Needless to say, I did not do that.
Yes, if its public information that everyone else could view 
on there own devices.  We cant not solve or investigation 
crimes because we wont use information that's common 
knowledge to everyone with an iPhone, It would undermine 
confidence in the police.  If people don't want their 
information to be "open source" they should make their 
information private ie privacy setting on facebook, twitter 
and linkedin 
Yes 100%.  Surely we should at least have the same access as 
member of the publics.  I think we should have dummy accounts that 
could benefit the Police from conducting necessary real time policing.  
Surely not having open access is not letting Police conduct their own 
proactive investigations.
Yes definitely.  Social media is ubiquitous and is used 
in various ways by the criminal fraternity.  It would be 
more than likely that personal information would be 
contained within most peoples social media profiles 
and there would be to some extent collateral 
intrusion.  As with any other powers that police are 
afforded there would obviously need to be 
accountability and real reason for viewing open source 
material.
If people willingly create a social media profile and content 
that the whole world can see they're surely consenting to 
everyone, regardless of who they are, viewing it. 
That information could be the key reason why person is found 
guilty/not guilty. Information obtained that way often assists in 
tracing a suspect and in those occasions after having traced the 
Police should look into anyone committing crime and 
the courts should hand down heavy punishments to 
deter others. However, prisons are full and the burden 
If people put it out there for others to see then they should 
be happy for anyone to see it!
Surely it being open source suggests anyone can access it. Why should 
police be any different?
Why put obstacles in the way If its for policing purposes we should have all the access we 
need; not only would greater access keep people safer and 
bring more offenders to justice it would improve the 
efficiency of the police by removing some of the hoops we 
have to jump through
If there is a policing purpose, police should have the same rights as 
anybody else to look at publicly available data / information. There are 
enough privacy settings on social media so that users can set them to 
prevent unwanted intrusion. I think the same celebrity debate as 
public life vs private life can be applied here. If the user chooses to 
broadcast themselves in whatever manner then it becomes their 
responsibility to manage private data and ensure what they are 
putting up is legal and morale. Public morality is driven by public 
oversight. It does shift but it is gradual. It is a publicly vital concept as 
public morality will drive changes in law such as gender equality and 
sexuality. It is dependent on the individual thought processes that 
drive current thinking facilitated as rights in our society as democratic 
principles of free speech and Humanitarian law (freedon of 
association for etc.). Law enforcement agencies have a crucial part to 
play in the establishment of public morality as they are not just 
punitive, but are the principle challengers to public thinking, ultimately 
by judicial process. if you consider that law arises from public morality 
then police enforce those laws and challenge any action and thereby 
thinking that has been deemed by common law and statute as 
unlawful. There must thus be a tacit understanding and thus 
permission by members of the public that broadcast on public 
platforms that what they put out in the public domain may be tested. 
Online opinion is a major factor in public campaigns and just because 
public morality has effectively "gone online" which permits the far 
wider dissemination of individual information and views. It is a 
fundamental requirement in society that this information / view point 
is tested where appropriate.   Just because there is a certain 
remoteness to online activities does not change the fact that an 
individual is not remote from public morality and due process. The 
fundamental paper principle of "caveat subscriptor" (let the signor 
beware) must equally apply to online activities. if an individual does 
not privatise his or her information then there must be an 
understanding that it is in the public domain and subject to use by 
whoever views it, including law enforcement agencies. 
Q.4 Knowledge Section - The privacy/security debate is an important one for society and the legitimacy of the police. Do you think the police should automatically have the right to view open source 
information regardless of how personal, for policing purposes- [Comment]
Yes - Access should be autom
atic
W
hy – W
hich reasons provided or constructed?
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Thematic Coding Themes Respondent Answers Respondent Answers Respondent Answers
What are the phenomena of concern being 
mentioned?
information placed freely online can be viewed by anyone around the 
world. There would be no reason to exclude police from this 
community - indeed we could face criticism is we chose to not view 
that which his free for everyone else to see.  Society and legislation 
requires us to protect the vulnerable as well as prevent crime - we 
should vigorously contest any efforts to curb our capabilities in these 
areas. If the communities we serve have an online presence, then we 
should also be capable of protecting them in that space and be able to 
act against anyone who commits crime in this space or whose use of 
this space gives us an window to act against their 'real world' 
offending.
We need to react quickly to events. The police don't 
care about what you find embarrassing, we don't 
come into work thinking 'I cant wait to view 
someone's personal info'. The culture of today is quick 
to restrict officers in doing their job effectively, but 
even quicker to condemn or criticise if we don't get 
certain information quickly. The nature of the world 
has changed, data is an important revenue stream so 
peoples data will be online or stored securely on 
websites. If we need to access it, it should be given 
quickly. Again, we don't come into work thinking how 
can i snoop on someone for the sake of it.
I believe that the internet can be used for more sinister 
purposes, if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to 
worry about, this is another reason why I don't have social 
media other than one application on my personal phone as I 
have nothing to hide , however I do not understand social 
media enough and I do not want to. I am happy for the 
source unit to look at and develop information for the 
purposes of covert policing, this way errors can be avoided in 
how we obtain this information.
Yes - If you want privacy you shouldn't be using social media, the idea 
that you can "connect" with the world but retain absolute privacy is 
childish. Criminals are becomming aware of our restrictions and are 
openly exploiting the fact we need such high levels of authority.
We have to be able to safely view everything that's 
out there
If it's public - the person has decided it's permissible for 
anyone (including the police) to view. We can look for people 
in public (and legally take their photo / film them) with no 
legal concerns (at least in terms of copyright / permission). 
Applying surveillance on social media accounts and recording 
all posted I suppose would be much the same as a real-
world investigation and duly require RIPA authority in the 
same way.
To be honest, we have a lot more freedom in the UK than al lot of 
places around the world, i think the price of having freedom to be 
online and indeed living as a citizen here in the UK, the people should 
be subject to the authorities, and people should be open to scrutiny 
just as the Police and the authorities are. This is the cost of national 
safety. Sadly in this day and age, we forget that sometimes we have 
to forgo the rights and privileges we all enjoy and take for granted for 
the greater good, to keep everyone safe. 
We are the Police at the end of the day.  We should be 
able to access whatever we want whenever we want 
as long as its for a work purpose, there should be zero 
restrictions.  People and human rights acitivists wont 
like that but its tough, if you want your country to be 
I believe that if something is in the public arena it is fair to 
access, record and utilise it. If the public have chosen privacy 
controls then these should be respected however the 
confidence and ability of the police to access and gather 
information should not be impeaded beyond what would 
apply to a normal member of the public. An example would 
be where an investigation has failed due to these 
limitations. We are then professionally embarrassed by a 
journalist who doesn't have to conform to the same 
standards. 
There are rights - 'public' info is fair game but things that are set 
private or only to friends/family, etc. is just the same as 'private' 
conversations in your home - as such that should need 'powers' to look 
at
Policing purposes would mean that there should be a 
legitimate reason.  Often not having automatic rights 
can be a hindrance and slow down investigations and 
crime reports.  For example in a case of harassment, 
malicious communications an automatic access to 
facebook would be helpful and a more efficient way to 
proceed with some investigations.
GDPR I would say is one of the bigger concerns in this 
(applying from early-mid 2018). RIPA perhaps less so, as 
looking at someone's public persona is completely fine. 
Recording it is the difference, so if the MPS are not recording 
what they see on the individual's personal social media, then 
there is no issue (although this risks the integrity of the 
investigation being harmed, as the user may just delete the 
information and it will be lost, undermining potential 
evidence)."
By its nature open source information is public.  This could help identify and link priority outstanding 
offenders
If it's publicly available then we should - it would just be 
ridiculous if we had to jump through hoops to get 
information that any private individual could get hold of in 5 
minutes - potentially make us look daft at court!
Open-source is freely available data; if someone sticks personal 
information about themselves on the side of their house it is equally 
freely available. 
Policing purposes are there to save life and limb, 
investigate crime and protect vulnerable individuals. 
These purposes should not be impeded by people 
views on privacy. 
If it's out there then anyone or any organisation can see it. 
MoP's have implicitly consented so we should be able to fill 
our boots as long as there is a legitimate policing purpose.
Open source, which is available to all, should be available to police 
and public alike.  If it is not open source, eg private Facebook account 
etc, then strict guidelines under RIPA should be adhered to and 
Open source = Public. We are duty bound to 
investigate without fear or favour, if it's out there and 
viewable to anyone why should we ignore it?
If it's open source then by its very nature it's available for all 
to view
open source yes; If public can access it then so should Police. Ultimately the data any of us post on social media is 
published voluntarily. 
If it's open source then it is in the public domain and I don't 
understand why we need further authorities.
open source should be used for policing purposes. It's on the internet 
anyway, why not use it?
Of course. The public know everyone can see what 
they are doing.
If it's open and freely available then why shouldn't the Police 
access it.
Open source means just that. Material posted onto a public forum In order to further help and deal with investigations 
but only through a covert office as it is being currently 
done. 
I believe the individual is responsible for protecting their own 
privacy on social media, assuming that they are given the 
opportunity to easily do so.
Open source material is there to use otherwise the police have less 
powers than members of the public .
Of course we should, if everyone else can why not the 
police?
I believe that if someone has posted something on an open 
format on the internet such as facebook or other social 
media site then police should be able to access this.
Open source is, by definition, available to all. It is ridiculous to suggest 
the police would not be able to look at information that the victim of a 
crime could legally and legitimately find in seconds.
This can be used to find missing people, family of 
deceased people, people wanted for offences (serious 
or otherwise), intelligence for vehicles used by subject 
in crime, connections with other criminals, 
I believe that the duty we have to preserve and protect life 
outweighs all other rights
Open source is available to all... Police are not using any powers to 
access it so I see no reason why not?
It could have a very detrimental effect on the outcome 
of a case if the information is not made redily 
available
I am a firm believer that we should have access to any/all 
systems and that this should all start from a National 
Identity Card which should be introduced.
open source is available for all so therefore should be available for 
police to use.
Information is placed on a public domain for any 
person to view
I feel this would speed up investigation time to find 
outstanding suspects
Open source information is published for all to see, including the 
police, it is similar to walking down the street waving a banner. There 
are privacy options that people may use if they wish to keep 
information to a relative level of privacy.
This could assist the investigation so if it’s for policing 
purposes we should be able to view it. 
I do think they should have the right because if it is to 
apprehend offenders then it can only be a positive. I think it 
should be specifically legislated so it is not misused.
I feel that this right would be very beneficial to police personnel, to 
investigations and to the public's perception/confidence in the police. I 
believe this right would create opportunities to improve 
investigations, gather further evidence and intelligence and 
information sharing (and internationally) and could assist in obtaining 
more successful prosecutions for suspects. I feel having this right 
could also create opportunities to create further/new strategies and 
processes in keeping the public safe as it could open further avenues 
to police types of crime more effectively, that are currently difficult to 
do so due to not having this right so accessible. also, personally, I feel 
that having this right could create a greater sense of responsibility as 
a police officer, to the public, in  positive way, to show that they are 
capable and worthy of having such a right. 
100%. I think that private information is obtained by us 
whenever we enter someones house, search their 
pockets or investigate them. We could potentially and 
at any stage see or hear something totally private (and 
completely defaming or controversial) and we would 
be expected to handle this information sensitively and 
according to legislation. The PACE powers and Misuse 
of Drugs act powers (among others) which allow us to 
justify these kinds of searches are based on suspicion 
of criminality only. If we suspect someone of 
criminality - why are their private online and open 
source places much more difficult or impossible for us 
to investigate. It is beyond me. If we find evidence of 
criminality then we will investigate it. 
Too bad if people committing offences don't like it. We are 
the police. If we find private info then we are expected to 
deal with it legally. If we fail to do that we should be 
prosecuted in turn. Who is it down to to lobby for and correct 
this? Just like a private company could not deny us access to 
their physical buildings if we could justify it - if these 
software giants want to operate in the UK and access the UK 
customers then they must have a method whereby their UK 
customer's law enforcement representation can safeguard 
and protect their population. If they don't want to allow us 
that - then ban them from the UK. Why does the government 
care? It's not like half of them pay the UK our due of tax is it. 
People aren't going to move overseas or not visit here 
because Snapchat gets banned. They just might if the use of 
social media and totally private, impenetrable 
communication systems gives terrorists and criminals an 
effective way to operate here.
Open source information - yes. Data that people place on social media 
which is public carries little or no expectation of privacy. Such data 
that carries with it restrictions placed by the user, e.g. restricted posts 
on social media, should require the usual RIPA justifications and 
powers in order to access.
Criminals are using the internet more and we as, a 
service, need to be able to freely use this in the fight 
and investigation of crime
if its for police work then it should be freely available, there 
should be no restrictions on what police can look at if its 
open source 
W
hy – Reasons provided or constructed?
Q.4 Knowledge Section - The privacy/security debate is an important one for society and the legitimacy of the police. Do you think the police should automatically have the right to view open source 
information regardless of how personal, for policing purposes- [Comment]
Yes - Access should be autom
atic
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What are the phenomena of concern being 
mentioned?
Open source info is just that open to all.  
The Police are an essential pert of the fabric of society and should not 
be excluded from collecting this info. 
If its a policing purpose then yes It's open source.  There's no expectation of privacy.
It's not a matter of there being a right, if you make personal 
information available to any person online you are allowing yourself to 
be viewed by any person.  Any person with any grumbles can seek to 
improve their own online security.
Anything that is posted or stored in a public forum 
should be able to be viewed for policing purposes.
I feel that information that is posted into an online forum 
should be accessible by police, particulalrly if it would assist 
in the execution of their duty, whether this is to find a 
Misper or outstanding suspect. 
Open source but protected by privacy settings should be protected by 
DSA and Undercover policing authorities.  Other than that post online 
for all to see and open profiles are visible to everyone including the 
public and so therefore police should be able to work on it.
Access to what is in the public domain is game on. 
Anything that is private is not. Threshold tests apply 
before accessing private data. From my limited 
knowledge balance appears to be correct as it stands. 
If it is open for the public at large to view because of 
mimimal security settings it should be fine for us. 
If someone does not have restrictive security on their account and 
anyone can view it then why not allow the police to use that. If the 
information is protected then that is a different matter. 
We know about the recent success Terrorist 
organisations have had by using internet to spread 
their propaganda and recruit terrorist to carry out acts 
of terror. Why shouldn't police be allowed to use 
internet as a tool to fight back and combat the issues 
that are faced by the communities and nations?"
If it has been shared in the public domain and is available for 
all persons to see then I feel we should have a right to view 
it. The digital world is just as real now as the physical one. 
We just view it in a different way. We would not ignore 
information obtained in the physical world or stop seeking 
out evidence at the scene of a crime. So why should we act 
any differently online?
In the world that I work we are constantly looking at the welfare of 
that person and trying to ensure safeguarding of them.  Often, we 
have a feeling about something, which if we had access to one 
specific area of information it may either confirm or negate a risk to 
that person.  We rarely have powers to demand information when 
someone is missing which is a challenge when trying to identify risk 
and negate it.      
By definition open-source is publically available 
information. Police need to have the tools and the 
powers in order to conduct effective investigations and 
prosecutions. Many offences are now taking place in 
"cyber-space" so Police need to have the powers and 
ability to pursue those leads. As with most 
investigative tools, open source should be subject to 
uses for the purpose of prevention and detection of 
crime. 
For serious crime I believe the protection of the public from 
crime over-rides the right to privacy on the internet 
particularly in terrorist and child protection cases. I know 
with enough evidence we can get a Courts permission to 
access personal sites but we need to monitor the level of risk 
taking place prior to obtaining the right level of evidence. I 
am not suggesting any officer can look where they like just 
that those investigating the most serious crimes can be 
authorised by a senior officer. 
If you have nothing to hide then you wont get in trouble Any information which can be obtained through the 
same levels of access as a normal member of the 
public should be 'open'. 
If it is in the open domain we should have the same right to 
access the information provided we are using overt methods 
to obtain it.  To be blunt, if people are stupid enough to post 
information in an open forum that they don't want anyone to 
see, well what can you say !
Privacy and private information are, by definition not open and 
therefore not public. RIPA governs this area.
Criminals should have no hiding places. if it is freely available on the internet then everyone has the 
right to view it. the police should be no different, i think the 
public would expect that as a minimum 
In a threat to life incident, this should be the case. Definitely ... a honest member of the public should 
have nothing to hide or be worried about...
If it is in open source then it is in public domain. The 
individual could easily protect accounts - as is commonly 
done - but if they chose not to, then anyone can see and 
access this public information. 
To assist locating and apprehending offenders and venerable 
members of public.
Criminals are hiding as know this to be the case If it is open source is seems counter-intuitive not to be able 
to view it. If the information is willingly posted publicly be 
the subject then anyone should be able to view it. 
If the information is on an open source it is incumbent upon the data 
source themselves to manage their exposure online. Would a person 
stand in the street and shout the information that they share online? 
Unlikely. However, if they put it in an open forum online then I see no 
reason why the police should not be able to view that and act on it, no 
matter how personal the information is, provided that it is properly 
captured, assessed with all other intelligence or evidence and 
consistent in its provenance.
Due to current restrictions we are not able to view 
personal or direct messages only those available to 
the general public, by the time we have instructed 
users to capture this themselves the evidence can be 
deleted by the other party. If we were able to do this 
then more evidence could be secured, however 
measures would need to be in place to govern when 
this would be appropriate 
If it is open source then the person in question has already 
permitted at some point for that information to be made 
public. If we could view something as a member of the 
public then why should that ever be inadmissible as evidence 
if viewing it from a policing point.
This would save time, money and police resources. Crime no matter how serious or not is crime.  Clearly 
we need to use what we can.
If it is open source and available to any given member of the 
public then it would be very strange if the police couldn't use 
it. We need to be more careful when people are putting 
information out in a more restricted manner.
The material is in the public and should be available  for police 
purposes 
Cut the red tape and let us crack on and lock up 
criminals. If I want to investigate my wife I can do that 
without MPS tools in my own tmie!
IF it is open source then the information is already available , 
you are not intrusively entering 'private' informaition.
some many cases could have been won, Corruption is evident in all realms of society. All we 
need is easy access to information which any other 
member of the public can get anyway without any 
issues, passwords or authority. 
If open source is left open and freely available (i.e not 
requiring a friend request, no privacy settings) then the 
police should be able to view it as any other member of the 
public or organisation in the world can. 
The information is in the public domain and available to anyone who 
searches for it. In the majority of cases the individual has posted 
information online freely knowing it will be accessible by anyone 
including law enforcement agencies. 
By definition, open source information is accessible by 
anyone through the use of a computer. 
If it's available to the public, why shouldn't the police be able 
to view it
It is posted for all to see. Up to MoP to makeit private if wish to 
protect from police, press etc
If it's information that an individual has made freely 
available to the wider public I see no issue in police 
accessing and using it for investigative purposes. 
Anything which is beyond that should be accessed only 
once the proper authority has been granted and it's 
proportionate and justified etc
If it is on an open forum, then it should be allowed for 
officers to view too.
It is a choice to use Social Media Platforms and it is clear that the 
more information you put onto digital accounts the more you leave a 
footprint. If you have no Facebook account it cannot be accessed.     
Privacy is an ethical issue. Law enforcement agencies 
are required to investigate all lines of enquiry to either 
prove or  disprove., by law
for the purposes of national security / solving crime, if you're 
a law abiding individual you will not be of interest to law 
enforcement
it is open source. people have chosen to have their information open 
and freely available (be it through choice or poor practice) - it is in the 
public domain and therefore fair game. 
We are safeguarding persons primarily intrusive 
checks help the intel process. 
If it is open source, then it is no different to witnessing 
something in a public place. 
If you create an open, public profile, then we have as much right as 
anyone to view that profile (as long as it is for a policing purpose and 
is within RIPA guidelines around right to privacy, collateral intrusion, 
etc).
It has always been my view (and one upheld by a 
number of court judgements) that material made 
available on the internet that can be viewed publically 
has been published by the author. 
Everyone has the option to choose their privacy settings on 
social media, so if someone has allowed their profile to be 
public, then this should not be viewed as a breach of privacy. 
its the same as walking down the street if its online there can be no 
expectation of privacy. Its public forum so owner has agreed for othes 
to see it
At the point, the information ceases to be 'private' and 
anyone, including the police, can access it.
For a suitably serious policing purpose then  I think that any 
online information should be in play.
Its in the public domain so why not, if people what to hide this 
information then security and information security should be a 
personal responsibility
if you put information in the public domain then and 
you dont set your security settings to prevent anyone 
viewing info then its in the public domain   
People post information voluntarily, police should have 
access to it
Much of the information is open and not protected its not private you 
need a policing purpose to justify what you are doing
Privacy in a liberal democracy is important. It depends 
what you mean by open source ?  If you mean 
something that anyone can see by a quick internet 
search then yes, its open source. 
If you have nothing to hide what is there to worry about! If 
we had this access it may make people think twice about 
what they share on social media.
We are accessing information that is already in the public domain.  
The public will be exasperated if we cannot access information that 
they themselves can because it's already in the public sphere. 
If we are expected to 'police' and investigate, then we 
need proper access to any and all information. The 
level and depth of that info should then depend on the 
type of investigation, along the lines of standard 
applications e.g. proportionately, collateral intrusion 
etc.
People are made aware of whatever they put on social 
media or the internet is available to anybody including law 
enforcement agencies.
W
hy – Reasons provided or constructed?
Yes - Access should be autom
atic
Q.4 Knowledge Section - The privacy/security debate is an important one for society and the legitimacy of the police. Do you think the police should automatically have the right to view open source 
information regardless of how personal, for policing purposes- [Comment]
 203 
Figure 28. Qualitative Comments and Thematic Coding: Question 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thematic Coding Themes Respondent Answers Respondent Answers Respondent Answers
What are the phenomena of concern being 
mentioned?
Open source info is just that open to all.  
The Police are an essential pert of the fabric of society and should not 
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It's not a matter of there being a right, if you make personal 
information available to any person online you are allowing yourself to 
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public and so therefore police should be able to work on it.
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their propaganda and recruit terrorist to carry out acts 
of terror. Why shouldn't police be allowed to use 
internet as a tool to fight back and combat the issues 
that are faced by the communities and nations?"
If it has been shared in the public domain and is available for 
all persons to see then I feel we should have a right to view 
it. The digital world is just as real now as the physical one. 
We just view it in a different way. We would not ignore 
information obtained in the physical world or stop seeking 
out evidence at the scene of a crime. So why should we act 
any differently online?
In the world that I work we are constantly looking at the welfare of 
that person and trying to ensure safeguarding of them.  Often, we 
have a feeling about something, which if we had access to one 
specific area of information it may either confirm or negate a risk to 
that person.  We rarely have powers to demand information when 
someone is missing which is a challenge when trying to identify risk 
and negate it.      
By definition open-source is publically available 
information. Police need to have the tools and the 
powers in order to conduct effective investigations and 
prosecutions. Many offences are now taking place in 
"cyber-space" so Police need to have the powers and 
ability to pursue those leads. As with most 
investigative tools, open source should be subject to 
uses for the purpose of prevention and detection of 
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particularly in terrorist and child protection cases. I know 
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access personal sites but we need to monitor the level of risk 
taking place prior to obtaining the right level of evidence. I 
am not suggesting any officer can look where they like just 
that those investigating the most serious crimes can be 
authorised by a senior officer. 
If you have nothing to hide then you wont get in trouble Any information which can be obtained through the 
same levels of access as a normal member of the 
public should be 'open'. 
If it is in the open domain we should have the same right to 
access the information provided we are using overt methods 
to obtain it.  To be blunt, if people are stupid enough to post 
information in an open forum that they don't want anyone to 
see, well what can you say !
Privacy and private information are, by definition not open and 
therefore not public. RIPA governs this area.
Criminals should have no hiding places. if it is freely available on the internet then everyone has the 
right to view it. the police should be no different, i think the 
public would expect that as a minimum 
In a threat to life incident, this should be the case. Definitely ... a honest member of the public should 
have nothing to hide or be worried about...
If it is in open source then it is in public domain. The 
individual could easily protect accounts - as is commonly 
done - but if they chose not to, then anyone can see and 
access this public information. 
To assist locating and apprehending offenders and venerable 
members of public.
Criminals are hiding as know this to be the case If it is open source is seems counter-intuitive not to be able 
to view it. If the information is willingly posted publicly be 
the subject then anyone should be able to view it. 
If the information is on an open source it is incumbent upon the data 
source themselves to manage their exposure online. Would a person 
stand in the street and shout the information that they share online? 
Unlikely. However, if they put it in an open forum online then I see no 
reason why the police should not be able to view that and act on it, no 
matter how personal the information is, provided that it is properly 
captured, assessed with all other intelligence or evidence and 
consistent in its provenance.
Due to current restrictions we are not able to view 
personal or direct messages only those available to 
the general public, by the time we have instructed 
users to capture this themselves the evidence can be 
deleted by the other party. If we were able to do this 
then more evidence could be secured, however 
measures would need to be in place to govern when 
this would be appropriate 
If it is open source then the person in question has already 
permitted at some point for that information to be made 
public. If we could view something as a member of the 
public then why should that ever be inadmissible as evidence 
if viewing it from a policing point.
This would save time, money and police resources. Crime no matter how serious or not is crime.  Clearly 
we need to use what we can.
If it is open source and available to any given member of the 
public then it would be very strange if the police couldn't use 
it. We need to be more careful when people are putting 
information out in a more restricted manner.
The material is in the public and should be available  for police 
purposes 
Cut the red tape and let us crack on and lock up 
criminals. If I want to investigate my wife I can do that 
without MPS tools in my own tmie!
IF it is open source then the information is already available , 
you are not intrusively entering 'private' informaition.
some many cases could have been won, Corruption is evident in all realms of society. All we 
need is easy access to information which any other 
member of the public can get anyway without any 
issues, passwords or authority. 
If open source is left open and freely available (i.e not 
requiring a friend request, no privacy settings) then the 
police should be able to view it as any other member of the 
public or organisation in the world can. 
The information is in the public domain and available to anyone who 
searches for it. In the majority of cases the individual has posted 
information online freely knowing it will be accessible by anyone 
including law enforcement agencies. 
By definition, open source information is accessible by 
anyone through the use of a computer. 
If it's available to the public, why shouldn't the police be able 
to view it
It is posted for all to see. Up to MoP to makeit private if wish to 
protect from police, press etc
If it's information that an individual has made freely 
available to the wider public I see no issue in police 
accessing and using it for investigative purposes. 
Anything which is beyond that should be accessed only 
once the proper authority has been granted and it's 
proportionate and justified etc
If it is on an open forum, then it should be allowed for 
officers to view too.
It is a choice to use Social Media Platforms and it is clear that the 
more information you put onto digital accounts the more you leave a 
footprint. If you have no Facebook account it cannot be accessed.     
Privacy is an ethical issue. Law enforcement agencies 
are required to investigate all lines of enquiry to either 
prove or  disprove., by law
for the purposes of national security / solving crime, if you're 
a law abiding individual you will not be of interest to law 
enforcement
it is open source. people have chosen to have their information open 
and freely available (be it through choice or poor practice) - it is in the 
public domain and therefore fair game. 
We are safeguarding persons primarily intrusive 
checks help the intel process. 
If it is open source, then it is no different to witnessing 
something in a public place. 
If you create an open, public profile, then we have as much right as 
anyone to view that profile (as long as it is for a policing purpose and 
is within RIPA guidelines around right to privacy, collateral intrusion, 
etc).
It has always been my view (and one upheld by a 
number of court judgements) that material made 
available on the internet that can be viewed publically 
has been published by the author. 
Everyone has the option to choose their privacy settings on 
social media, so if someone has allowed their profile to be 
public, then this should not be viewed as a breach of privacy. 
its the same as walking down the street if its online there can be no 
expectation of privacy. Its public forum so owner has agreed for othes 
to see it
At the point, the information ceases to be 'private' and 
anyone, including the police, can access it.
For a suitably serious policing purpose then  I think that any 
online information should be in play.
Its in the public domain so why not, if people what to hide this 
information then security and information security should be a 
personal responsibility
if you put information in the public domain then and 
you dont set your security settings to prevent anyone 
viewing info then its in the public domain   
People post information voluntarily, police should have 
access to it
Much of the information is open and not protected its not private you 
need a policing purpose to justify what you are doing
Privacy in a liberal democracy is important. It depends 
what you mean by open source ?  If you mean 
something that anyone can see by a quick internet 
search then yes, its open source. 
If you have nothing to hide what is there to worry about! If 
we had this access it may make people think twice about 
what they share on social media.
We are accessing information that is already in the public domain.  
The public will be exasperated if we cannot access information that 
they themselves can because it's already in the public sphere. 
If we are expected to 'police' and investigate, then we 
need proper access to any and all information. The 
level and depth of that info should then depend on the 
type of investigation, along the lines of standard 
applications e.g. proportionately, collateral intrusion 
etc.
People are made aware of whatever they put on social 
media or the internet is available to anybody including law 
enforcement agencies.
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be excluded from collecting this info. 
If its a policing purpose then yes It's open source.  There's no expectation of privacy.
It's not a matter of there being a right, if you make personal 
information available to any person online you are allowing yourself to 
be viewed by any person.  Any person with any grumbles can seek to 
improve their own online security.
Anything that is posted or stored in a public forum 
should be able to be viewed for policing purposes.
I feel that information that is posted into an online forum 
should be accessible by police, particulalrly if it would assist 
in the execution of their duty, whether this is to find a 
Misper or outstanding suspect. 
Open source but protected by privacy settings should be protected by 
DSA and Undercover policing authorities.  Other than that post online 
for all to see and open profiles are visible to everyone including the 
public and so therefore police should be able to work on it.
Access to what is in the public domain is game on. 
Anything that is private is not. Threshold tests apply 
before accessing private data. From my limited 
knowledge balance appears to be correct as it stands. 
If it is open for the public at large to view because of 
mimimal security settings it should be fine for us. 
If someone does not have restrictive security on their account and 
anyone can view it then why not allow the police to use that. If the 
information is protected then that is a different matter. 
We know about the recent success Terrorist 
organisations have had by using internet to spread 
their propaganda and recruit terrorist to carry out acts 
of terror. Why shouldn't police be allowed to use 
internet as a tool to fight back and combat the issues 
that are faced by the communities and nations?"
If it has been shared in the public domain and is available for 
all persons to see then I feel we should have a right to view 
it. The digital world is just as real now as the physical one. 
We just view it in a different way. We would not ignore 
information obtained in the physical world or stop seeking 
out evidence at the scene of a crime. So why should we act 
any differently online?
In the world that I work we are constantly looking at the welfare of 
that person and trying to ensure safeguarding of them.  Often, we 
have a feeling about something, which if we had access to one 
specific area of information it may either confirm or negate a risk to 
that person.  We rarely have powers to demand information when 
someone is missing which is a challenge when trying to identify risk 
and negate it.      
By definition open-source is publically available 
information. Police need to have the tools and the 
powers in order to conduct effective investigations and 
prosecutions. Many offences are now taking place in 
"cyber-space" so Police need to have the powers and 
ability to pursue those leads. As with most 
investigative tools, open source should be subject to 
uses for the purpose of prevention and detection of 
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For serious crime I believe the protection of the public from 
crime over-rides the right to privacy on the internet 
particularly in terrorist and child protection cases. I know 
with enough evidence we can get a Courts permission to 
access personal sites but we need to monitor the level of risk 
taking place prior to obtaining the right level of evidence. I 
am not suggesting any officer can look where they like just 
that those investigating the most serious crimes can be 
authorised by a senior officer. 
If you have nothing to hide then you wont get in trouble Any information which can be obtained through the 
same levels of access as a normal member of the 
public should be 'open'. 
If it is in the open domain we should have the same right to 
access the information provided we are using overt methods 
to obtain it.  To be blunt, if people are stupid enough to post 
information in an open forum that they don't want anyone to 
see, well what can you say !
Privacy and private information are, by definition not open and 
therefore not public. RIPA governs this area.
Criminals should have no hiding places. if it is freely available on the internet then everyone has the 
right to view it. the police should be no different, i think the 
public would expect that as a minimum 
In a threat to life incident, this should be the case. Definitely ... a honest member of the public should 
have nothing to hide or be worried about...
If it is in open source then it is in public domain. The 
individual could easily protect accounts - as is commonly 
done - but if they chose not to, then anyone can see and 
access this public information. 
To assist locating and apprehending offenders and venerable 
members of public.
Criminals are hiding as know this to be the case If it is open source is seems counter-intuitive not to be able 
to view it. If the information is willingly posted publicly be 
the subject then anyone should be able to view it. 
If the information is on an open source it is incumbent upon the data 
source themselves to manage their exposure online. Would a person 
stand in the street and shout the information that they share online? 
Unlikely. However, if they put it in an open forum online then I see no 
reason why the police should not be able to view that and act on it, no 
matter how personal the information is, provided that it is properly 
captured, assessed with all other intelligence or evidence and 
consistent in its provenance.
Due to current restrictions we are not able to view 
personal or direct messages only those available to 
the general public, by the time we have instructed 
users to capture this themselves the evidence can be 
deleted by the other party. If we were able to do this 
then more evidence could be secured, however 
measures would need to be in place to govern when 
this would be appropriate 
If it is open source then the person in question has already 
permitted at some point for that information to be made 
public. If we could view something as a member of the 
public then why should that ever be inadmissible as evidence 
if viewing it from a policing point.
This would save time, money and police resources. Crime no matter how serious or not is crime.  Clearly 
we need to use what we can.
If it is open source and available to any given member of the 
public then it would be very strange if the police couldn't use 
it. We need to be more careful when people are putting 
information out in a more restricted manner.
The material is in the public and should be available  for police 
purposes 
Cut the red tape and let us crack on and lock up 
criminals. If I want to investigate my wife I can do that 
without MPS tools in my own tmie!
IF it is open source then the information is already available , 
you are not intrusively entering 'private' informaition.
some many cases could have been won, Corruption is evident in all realms of society. All we 
need is easy access to information which any other 
member of the public can get anyway without any 
issues, passwords or authority. 
If open source is left open and freely available (i.e not 
requiring a friend request, no privacy settings) then the 
police should be able to view it as any other member of the 
public or organisation in the world can. 
The information is in the public domain and available to anyone who 
searches for it. In the majority of cases the individual has posted 
information online freely knowing it will be accessible by anyone 
including law enforcement agencies. 
By definition, open source information is accessible by 
anyone through the use of a computer. 
If it's available to the public, why shouldn't the police be able 
to view it
It is posted for all to see. Up to MoP to makeit private if wish to 
protect from police, press etc
If it's information that an individual has made freely 
available to the wider public I see no issue in police 
accessing and using it for investigative purposes. 
Anything which is beyond that should be accessed only 
once the proper authority has been granted and it's 
proportionate and justified etc
If it is on an open forum, then it should be allowed for 
officers to view too.
It is a choice to use Social Media Platforms and it is clear that the 
more information you put onto digital accounts the more you leave a 
footprint. If you have no Facebook account it cannot be accessed.     
Privacy is an ethical issue. Law enforcement agencies 
are required to investigate all lines of enquiry to either 
prove or  disprove., by law
for the purposes of national security / solving crime, if you're 
a law abiding individual you will not be of interest to law 
enforcement
it is open source. people have chosen to have their information open 
and freely available (be it through choice or poor practice) - it is in the 
public domain and therefore fair game. 
We are safeguarding persons primarily intrusive 
checks help the intel process. 
If it is open source, then it is no different to witnessing 
something in a public place. 
If you create an open, public profile, then we have as much right as 
anyone to view that profile (as long as it is for a policing purpose and 
is within RIPA guidelines around right to privacy, collateral intrusion, 
etc).
It has always been my view (and one upheld by a 
number of court judgements) that material made 
available on the internet that can be viewed publically 
has been published by the author. 
Everyone has the option to choose their privacy settings on 
social media, so if someone has allowed their profile to be 
public, then this should not be viewed as a breach of privacy. 
its the same as walking down the street if its online there can be no 
expectation of privacy. Its public forum so owner has agreed for othes 
to see it
At the point, the information ceases to be 'private' and 
anyone, including the police, can access it.
For a suitably serious policing purpose then  I think that any 
online information should be in play.
Its in the public domain so why not, if people what to hide this 
information then security and information security should be a 
personal responsibility
if you put information in the public domain then and 
you dont set your security settings to prevent anyone 
viewing info then its in the public domain   
People post information voluntarily, police should have 
access to it
Much of the information is open and not protected its not private you 
need a policing purpose to justify what you are doing
Privacy in a liberal democracy is important. It depends 
what you mean by open source ?  If you mean 
something that anyone can see by a quick internet 
search then yes, its open source. 
If you have nothing to hide what is there to worry about! If 
we had this access it may make people think twice about 
what they share on social media.
We are accessing information that is already in the public domain.  
The public will be exasperated if we cannot access information that 
they themselves can because it's already in the public sphere. 
If we are expected to 'police' and investigate, then we 
need proper access to any and all information. The 
level and depth of that info should then depend on the 
type of investigation, along the lines of standard 
applications e.g. proportionately, collateral intrusion 
etc.
People are made aware of whatever they put on social 
media or the internet is available to anybody including law 
enforcement agencies.
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Yes - Access should be autom
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Also if information is not protected/secure it is available for the public 
or anyone else to view.
It is the choice the poster has made to publish this into 
an open forum, no different, for example, from leaving 
a poster on a lamp-post.
If you make an application to join a social media group, your 
contract states " we will share information with law 
enforcement agencies", its clear an unambiguous from the 
start, if you access social media, put items there,. DONT 
MOAN about the police finding it. 
Its in the public domain.  each person has the freedom to choose what 
is and is not placed in the public domain by them.  
It's in the public domain Pubilc Domain. Prevention and detection of crime?!
If its placed in any sort of open forum, I.E. online, Facebook, Twitter 
then the Police should be able to use this  
If the individual has declined to set their profile to 
private it is the equivalent of painting the message in 
6 foot letters on a billboard, anyone can and will see 
it.
If journalists and the public can look at it/use it (for example 
an open Facebook account), we look incompetent as an 
organisation if we don't at least try and exploit it for 
legitimate policing purposes.  We are YEARS out of date.  
If it is something that is in the public domain which the Police have 
not had to uncover through engaging with the person then I do not 
think it is unethical or unlawful if it is publically available then it is fair 
game. Transposing this argument to traditional policing, officers 
would have to wear blinkers in the street, were this the case!
If the information is available to the public, police are 
entitled to see it. I am not aware of it being used for 
another reason so I can't provide a circumstance other 
than the ones in which I use it which as you can see is 
very basic.
If members of the public are leaving their social media 
accounts open then yes - just as if they were putting posters 
up in their winsows at home or commenting verbally in 
public. However if the profiles are closed then just as when 
your front door to your house is closed only when a warrant 
is obtained  can police enter, I think the police should have to 
go before a court and then onto the companies who run 
these sites prior to having access. 
If information is shared by a 3rd party, whether it be a social media 
profile, or by using google... the information is out there and can be 
accessed. The only important factor needs to be the grading of its 
reliability
If information is freely available it should be useable.  
It can get embarrassing if we are unable to access 
information which members of the public can
If information is posted online on unrestricted accounts then 
Polcie are in their rights to view and makes use of this 
information, however if a person protects their account and 
the information isn't readily available to the general public 
authority should be gained before accessing and using this 
information
If information is available in an open forum then of course police 
should be allowed to have access to it. If there is a valid policing 
reason then all information should be made available, especially if it 
may hinder an investigation.
If information is in the public domain, the user must 
accept that any agency could look at it in the same 
way any member of the public could. There are plenty 
of ways to secure information if desired.
If it could assist in finding a missing person for instance then 
this would be very useful
If it is available open source without the use of passwords and hacking 
then it is fair game for police. The issues in NOT doing it is that 
victims will do it on our behalf which when trying to clear up and 
present as evidence is always a trying process. If police do it 
themselves the product will be cleaner and readily convertible into 
evidence (Statement or exhibit).
If it available on the wider internet it seems obvious 
that the police should also have access to it. 
If it falls within your given definition of 'Open Source' 
(namely that it's visible to us as it is to any member of the 
public) then yes, it's available to be seen and should be 
utilised.  If someone's 'however personal' information has 
been put in the public domain by them, then I fail to see how 
they could complain if we made use of it.
Yes, to assist with investigations where there is a risk to a person's 
safety and the information could assist in finding them/helping them
W
hy – Reasons provided or constructed?
Yes - Access should be autom
atic
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I disagree that Police should be able to routinely access everyone's 
information without a crime even being suspected of being 
committed."
No, because an individual still has the basic human 
right to privacy, so it should only be used where it can 
be fully justified
I don't think this is the case to look for information at hoc 
basis but always good to be justifiable.
whilst i don't agree that we should have automatic access, the 
process is too far the other way, and if it is relevant can be made 
quicker with a reduction in the number of people each application 
needs to go through to be agreed.
Not all police officers are trustworthy, so a higher rank 
such as a Superintendent should have the final say - 
needs control for the purpose of protecting police
basic human and social rights should be protected and 
respected to save the fabric of the society
Without some control over what we view, we are likely to loose any 
ability to do so in the future.
HRA I don't think that it should be automatic, I think there needs 
to be regulated access to a persons private information, but 
there shouldn't be any claus to inhibit police research due to 
the sensitivity of the information.
Unless it is for criminal matter then they should not be allowed as 
some might abuse this power 
It would be misused We should have to justify the use but Iit should be a case of 
adding a report reference and the officer conducting the 
research just checks the CRIS. Its time consuming having to 
do a form for each application
There has to be a respect for privacy and a legitimacy for the 
application for the information.
everybody has a right to data protection. That kind of 
information should be requested separately if access 
is need 
It should not be a given that Police have access to persons 
information. HOWEVER, should the investigation be of a 
certain significance or could minimise the risk to another 
person, then (with the correct authority) we should have at 
least the opportunity to look at such information. 
there are some that would use it in the wrong way and abuse the fact 
that it is automatically our right to view open source information 
therefore ruining it for everyone else 
I think it needs to be carefully regulated. it is an 
endless resource unlike other systems like PNC and 
CRIMINT so it needs to be properly monitored and 
restricted where necessary.
Its a good argument for both sides.  I tend to lean towards 
that we should not automatically have rights as our policing 
is already under scrutiny by the public and they believe a 
certain amount of privacy is important to keep.  It's a bit like 
"Big Brother is watching you". 
The police need to be mindful of privacy and freedom of expression in 
all aspects of policing.
It would be open to abuse but if someone has put their 
details on social media for all to see..........
People still have a right to privacy therefore it is correct that 
police access to personal information is resrticted
There are rules and SOPs in place to prevent the misuse of material, 
but there is very much a need for access to this material.  Disclosure 
rules MUST be followed but access to all material is needed, given the 
reliance society has now on the internet / social media and not having 
access may harm an investigation that will either assist prove an 
allegation or identify evidence that disproves the allegation.
We all have a right to a private life, unrestricted 
access may open ethical dilemmas. As a police officer 
i already resent the amount of control "the Job" has 
over my life, i really do not want "the state" to be able 
to freely fish around in my personal matters. If you 
look hard enough in anyones life you will find 
something the person will not want to be judged by 
others on. 
No not an automatic right (this would be massively open to 
allegations of abuse) but should be much easier than it is. 
Public assume we have vastly easier and greater access than 
we do, which can make managing their expectations a 
challenge.
Being able to view public accounts for certain policing purposes could 
be beneficial - eg.  To help trace a high risk missing person or to help 
trace wanted offenders. Police should NOT be accessing public 
profiles to just monitor previous offenders for developing intelligence 
otherwise this could be viewed as intrusive - just because somebody 
has committed a crime once, does not mean they will commit 
another.
When it comes to more serious offences, I think the 
question is less whether we should have the 
automatic right to view private, online information but 
whether the public would expect us to be able to if it 
was necessary, proportionate and for a policing 
purpose. I think they would, and I think if we want to 
be effective in combating crime we need to have a 
more effective online presence. Programming and 
coding issues aside, it seems ridiculous to me - for 
example - that we can't read anything on an iPhone 6 
without a pin. I know this is not a policing debate per-
se, but it is illustrative of our impotence in the face of 
crime conducted on smart phones and online. We lose 
countless PWITS cases every single week because no-
one can look at the phone so we give up and charge 
for possession. Perhaps it is an issue of education (or 
rather ignorance on borough), but I have very little 
faith in our abilities to exploit technology where it is 
important to an investigation. 
We should follow the same rules for the real world - IE use 
of RIPA.  The public should have some expectation of privacy 
when security settings are applied. If social media is being 
used as a tool to find out information relating to individuals 
policing should adhere to the principles of proportionality 
and collateral intrusion. That said we should not be tied 
down with bureaucracy when conducting initial fact finding 
enquires. However when directed at individuals RIPA should 
be followed to protect the public and MPS staff by having 
accountability with external oversight. (OSC inspections)      
The same we cannot obtain a persons medical history, banking 
details, their personal information online should be allowed a degree 
of privacy. As with the other areas of privacy, it can be overriden when 
it is proportionante, necessary, legal and accountable.  
However, If you mean something that requires a 
password or security setting to be bypassed then no. 
To have such access, without oversight,  would be no 
different from police opening someone's post. I 
believe it would undermine the trust in police."
Collateral intrusion can only happen for the right reasons. 
There always be an idiot that wants to check up on his or her 
ex partner's social media account.
Some people are innocent parties in criminal activity, and sometimes 
are unaware as to what is going on. Their private lives should not be 
intruded upon because of someone else's indiscretion. Privacy should 
remain private.
Users of social media have an expectation of privacy, 
covert intrusion into this can cause reputational 
damage. The legal framework is however somewhat 
sketchy and requires updating to take into account 
expectations and necessity of intrusion. 
Automatically is the word that I disagree with, there must be 
a specific reason, not fishing.
Risk to obtaining too much private information from collateral 
contacts - Breaches Article 8 
Police should not have access to anyone's personal 
information unless there is a legitimate reason for 
them to have access to it.
Police officer if you cannot be trusted.
Its our job to protect the public, the civi liberty groups need to stop 
obstructing us upholding the law.
Some level of protection needs to be in place to 
ensure that the information is requested in a 
I believe there is an argument that if it is openly accessible 
then an individual is exposing themselves to the risk that 
others may use this information or at least monitor it. if a 
profile is set to private and you have to request access and 
you do so under a false name (not police related) then i think 
this needs more stringent guidance and supervision. 
People are entitled to an expectation of privacy online just as they are 
on the street. We cannot just go and search someone on the street so 
we should not be able to search online without reasonable grounds.
It depends. I don't think it should be readily available 
accessible to police as there may be abuse of the 
system. Any breach of privacy must be justified.
W
hy – Reasons provided or constructed?
No - Access should not be autom
atic
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IF IT IS JUSTIFIED FOR POLICING PURPOSES FOR INDICTABLE 
OFFENCE
If it is for the purpose of policing, I agree. I think if they can justify why it was viewed then I see no 
problem
Policed properly and kept safe then there is no reason why we cannot 
access it for a Policing Purpose.  
I agree with online UC investigators having authority 
for communcations etc, but at my level repeated 
viewing should for things in the public domain should 
not be under RIPA. expectation that anything online is 
public.
as long as its on a social media account for all to see then 
yes
yes, though depends on the nature of the offence. If it is one of 
national security, life endangement etc then yes as the seriousness of 
the investigation should take precedence over criminal 
activity/privacy. 
Grey area, requires maturity by OIC and oversight. Yes 
when dealing with credible to an individual, more grey 
when dealing with monitoring of live feed from a 
public protest. 
As long as it is dealt with and disposed of correctly if not 
required. There is no point being a 
Yes but with conditions - must be for a legitimate and legal reason If its in relation to helping solve a crime or finding a 
missing or vulnerable person or child then yes, Police 
should have access to a plethora of information
As long as it's for policing purposes I do not see any issues. If 
a person is innocent they would have nothing they need to 
hide and would have nothing to worry about. If the person is 
guilty... well law shouldn't protect the guilty...
Only if its related to the job in question If it's open source -it's open (if that is proportionate to 
the investigation)
As long as it is for a policing purpose and it is reasonable, 
then I think it should be lawful.
We should always justify and account for viewing/obtaining personal 
information but in general if it is relevant to a Police investigation 
then the Police should have the right to view it. 
If should still be governed by the seriousness of 
offence and reasons why this cannot be obtained 
through less intrusive means to maintain public 
confidence whilst I am a believer in nothing to hide 
why would you bother a lot of people see the right to 
privacy as a more serious matter and that I believe is 
the general consensus so safeguards must be kept in 
place.  
AS LONG AS IT'S DONE FOR OFFICIAL REASONS I DON'T SEE 
A PROBLEM
It's about being proportionate and how the service is perceived. If the material is there for anyone to view without 
having to engage with the individual then they are fair 
game. In relation to private/closed accounts, then 
rightly, RIPA needs to be adhered to re, 
proportionality/necessity.
As long as it is for a valid policing purpose and can be shown 
to be PLAN and does not infringe any current legislation, i.e.  
legal privilege, etc.
We should always have to provide a sound reason: just 'cause a large 
section of society now chose to effectively undress by an open window 
(to use a faintly off-beat metaphor)  doesn't mean we should all stand 
by window and stare on the off chance of catching a glimpse of 
someone's underwear.  However, that does not mean that everything 
should go down the RIPA route as, to continue with the earlier 
metaphor, if you're daft enough not to close your curtains then you 
should be aware that there's a chance someone will see you in a state 
of undress.
Intrusion should always be necessary and proportional 
to the objectives and within the law.
As long as it is not abused. If it is to locate an offender or 
find someone at risk then we should have the right to do so.
Yes, certainly if the case is 'serious' or the investigation involves 
'saving life or limb'.
In certain very specific circumstances there should be 
a justification but this should be limited to only the 
most serious investigations in which an ongoing threat 
to life exists i.e. terrorism investigations. 
As with all things we should be held accountable.
There must be a justifiable level of intrusion. Yes, bu to a degree and within reason for specific 
crimes. Otherwise this would leave officers open to 
criticism..
As with anything, if it can be justified & is reasonable & 
proportionate
We are only looking at this information as part of an investigation. As 
long as the officer can justify looking at the information in this day of 
age we should be able to look at it without loads of paperwork. This is 
all information which is available to the public anyway.
Clearly, any material that is only open to a closed 
group or section of the public is placed there in the 
expectation that it can only be viewed by those people.  
Any police access to that is, and should be, carefully 
controlled to ensure that it is proportionate, legal, 
necessary and whomever accesses it can be held 
accountable for that access.  That doesn't mean it 
should be difficult, just that there needs to be a 
process to consider these"
As long as there is a necessity and a legitimate policing 
purpose for it. Eg: Investigating indecent images, 
investigating sexual predators to establish their offending 
patterns and gather evidence against them, to intercept the 
communications especially when investigating 
If police can justify (ie threat to life/prevent crime) then fine" Yes, as long as sufficiently justified and with the 
relevant authorities.
But I think the whole process needs to be simplified and 
made more accessible to all investigators who can justify 
accessing the open source information to assist them with 
their enquiries including lower level crimes.   
This is incredibly intrusive and shouldn't be used without justification There should be a legitimate reason to use this, 
however if there is a genuine need then we should not 
have barriers which prevent us from thoroughly 
investigating an incident.
But it would have to be strictly monitored, to make sure that 
it was being viewed for a policing purpose and that it was 
relevant to the reason for looking at it in the first place but  
it must be justified and handled with discretion. 
There always has to be a legitimate reason for looking at 
personal/private information - there has to be safeguards in place, I 
do not think we should just have blanket authority to look at anyone's 
private information.
Yes, as long as it is accessible without overcoming or 
breaching user privacy settings.  As long as we are 
seeing what has been made available for anyone to 
see.  
But I think if you can prove the information is needed and 
can justify it, and have a log of who has authorised it for 
proper use , so that the system is not misused then I think 
access to that personnel information should be granted 
This is an argument around the world, people do have a right to 
privacy, why should it be any different to social media access?  It 
would help to have access to it to assist investigations.  there should 
be an access form for Social media where people consent (there is 
one for phones).
It has to be justified. All viewing should be in accordance with PLAN not carte 
blanche.
some accountability and rationale for accessing private information 
should remain
Where appropriate, using an approved framework, the 
use of open source information for modern police 
work is essential. However the way open source is 
used must must be qualified / managed in line with 
intelligence/evidence guidelines. 
Any research for potentially private information should 
address the proportionality and necessity. Failure may 
undermine the trust from the members of public and lead to 
an abuse. 
Not automatically. Depends on the seriousness of circumstances. It is through processing, evaluation and proper 
assessment through an approved framework and 
guidelines best outcomes will result."
Absolutely, for a legitimate purpose
Society is one that is now media based and will only become more 
prevalent within crime.  If it is for policing purposes, then yes we 
should have access.  Otherwise how can we do our job to its 
maximum capacity. 
Yes with regards to Terrorism and cyber criminal 
investigation, but general use to spy on people I would 
say No.  It all depends on the situation and what 
damage could be caused.
All and any access should be documented and a rational 
(brief) provided. 
PLAN method. The internet, particularly social media and other 
sources of 'news' information, are vital for free 
speech/debate. The fact that the police can view this 
Apply code of ethics and no problem, up to person posting 
information what level of security they apply
Should have a policing purpose, any realse to help an investigation or 
locate a wanted/missing person
Justification is key A long as this can be justified
Police should have the right to view all information as long as the 
person can fully justify the reasons.  Too many rules tie officers hands.  
If you are innocent then nothing to fear.
Subject to the proportionality of the enquiry - open 
source material is in the public domain - as a member 
of the public there would be no restriction on my 
ability to make open source enquiries - why should 
there be restrictions imposed when as a professional I 
would be making the enquiries to prevent / detect 
crimes of a serious nature.
If the data is being viewed for a policing purpose and is in 
relation to an investigation then it should be able to be used 
to protect/prevent harm or offences being caused to other 
members of public. If information obtained through open 
source research is considered private/personal, then the 
responsibility of the information not being widely accessible 
should lie with the individual who has made the information 
available through open source media.
No, but they should have access with appropriate justification. It would depend on the reason and explaining the 
reasons. Also how people's accounts are set up and 
what privacy settings they have in place and therefore 
what access they allow the general public to have to 
their life. 
But only if it is proportionate (seriousness of the offence and 
risks to the victim) 
Police need to justify their actions with regards to the privacy of what 
we should do. We have found previously that police take advantage of 
their powers and so to make officers justify what they do is important. 
In line with the justifications for a RIPA authority i.e. 
prevention/dection of crime, national security, 
economic loss etc
As long as there is a legitimate purpose and not a fishing 
exercise to gather Intel.
W
hy – Reasons provided or constructed?
Balance betw
een privacy and Security
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It would depend on the case Subject to the proportionality of the enquiry - open 
source material is in the public domain - as a member 
of the public there would be no restriction on my 
ability to make open source enquiries - why should 
there be restrictions imposed when as a professional I 
would be making the enquiries to prevent / detect 
crimes of a serious nature.
This is because not all open source information is accurate.  
It is often inaccurate,  subjective and can be  malicious. 
Police need to adhere to legislation. You would not be able to watch 
somebodies house and see who is going in and out without directed 
surveillance authority - so you shouldn't be able to do repeated 
monitoring without correct permissions. If its P, L, A and N then 
should be no problem getting authority.
The extent of how much material is viewed should be 
tested as to how proportionate the 
research/investigation when taking into consideration 
the seriousness of the crime being committed. 
As long as the individual can justify why they need the search 
of information I don't see a problem with it
Organised crime and Counter Terrorism purposes or high risk misper 
yes otherwise no.
No only for investigative purposes investigating crime, 
dealing missing persons, high risk incidents and in 
some cases intelligence gathering.
If it assists a Police investigation than yes.
must be reasonable and comply with the Human Rights Act  As with other covert tactics, the use of the covert 
internet research/engagement must be appropriately 
authorised and any work must be shown to be 
proportionate, lawful, accountable, necessary and 
ethical.
As long as submissions are accountable and proportionate 
then yes.
Must be proportionate to offending / criminality No, has to be justified in each case Provided their is a legitimate reason for doing so, and not 
just researching for the sake of it.
PLAN should always be at the forefront of an officers mind, even 
taking PLAN out of the equation the shear quantity of information 
available means the police have to be targeted around how they use / 
access information.
When justified yes, definately It must be justified in order maintain balance of security 
with freedom and right to privacy
only view if necessary for a policing purpose- why would you need to 
view for personal use?
Yes, if it is justifiable, relevant, proportionate and for a 
policing purpose we should be able to access it.
provided it can be justified. Is part of a genuine investigation 
and doesn't become a 'fishing' tool. 
It must form part of an investigation and grounds must exist for 
requesting it.
Providing that it is for legitimate purpose and with 
correct authority, I feel that it is an essential tool to 
locate  Missing Persons and conduct research for 
investigative purposes
Providing the Necessity/Collateral Intrusion/Proportionality 
and Timeliness requirements are adhered to
Only to the extent of targeted specific investigations, not simply to 
"police" social media. In the current circumstances it is far too easy 
for criminals to hide behind the internet. 
Yes, for policing purposes but not as a fishing exercise - 
legitimate need must exist.
it it is proportionate to the investigation and assists, then def 
necessary
But we would need to justify the use for legitimate purposes only such 
as Risk individuals being W/M or missing
In the prevention and detection of crime it should not 
be a hindrance.
Whilst there are those with false /corrupt intent as a Police 
Officer I am only ever looking at information with a 
legitimate Policing Purpose and we are doing it with one 
hand tied behind our backs standing on our heads using 
antiquated systems / techniques / processes"
But only where there is a legitimate risk to the wellbeing of the 
country as a whole or significant identifiable risk to an individual or 
group of individuals.
Like everything this will need to be justified. There are 
different levels of intrusion which will need to be 
taken into account. EG if someone does not have any 
restrictions on their account and we are looking at 
what any member of the public would have access to I 
do not see any issues with this.
If it is justifiable, like call data etc then yes. At what level of 
justification / authorisation would depend on the 
information. The current system is very good, however more 
officers need to be trained and more covert terminals need 
to be made available without the awful hoop jumping to get 
them.
If it will assist in an investigation and help bring suspects to justice. 
But should me monitored to make sure officers are not abusing the 
use of it though.  
If for legitimate policing purposes yes.  If done for a policing purpose, it is necessary for the 
prevention/detection of crime and apprehension of 
offenders. 
If it's for policing purposes there is a legitimate reason behind it. It 
could lead to the prevention of a crime or the apprehension of a 
suspect. The safety of the public, which depending on the 
circumstances could mean one person or hundreds, should always be 
the priority.
I think there should still be a higher ranking officer to 
authorise such a search. I do think that the procedure 
for doing so should be simplified and made easier to 
use rather that what it is at present which is designed 
to discourage the search in the first place. If the 
search is very important the only achievement of the 
procedure is to delay and hinder.
The balance between respecting personal/private/sensitive 
data and the need to investigate crime, prevent damage to 
property, and preserve life will always need to be weighed 
up and considered. I imagine each case/investigation is 
judged on it's own merits, and what is to be gained from the 
information versus the intrusive nature of the 
investigation/research.
If it relates to a serious offence then yes i think having immdeiate 
access would help. Again not to be abused by police forces. 
I think the police should justify to an extent why they 
need that information. It should be generally given to 
us, but people should not be able to abuse it. 
Whilst it should be more widely available to officers, police 
should be able to view / conduct internet research, but only 
if there is a legitimate policing purpose
I believe there should be a ranking system in relation to the severity of 
the crime in terms of gaining access to open source info. However, in 
saying that, if that information is already freely available to the public, 
then it is free game.
I think that as long as HRA principles are followed there 
should be no problem with this. I'm not happy with the work 
'automatically' in the question, as this implies no 
checks/balances should be followed, but following and 
considering HRA principles should alleviate this.
I believe we should have to have grounds to view the material if it is 
of a personal nature and on non-public accounts - e.g. we are 
conducting an investigation into something and suspect that social 
media/open source material can with assist us in that investigation or 
assist in apprehending an offender.  We should not be able to view 
private facebook accounts etc without any grounds or reason to do so.  
However material which is openly placed on the internet in a public 
way should be viewable by us as it would be by any other member of 
the public.
I hvae a mixed opinion on this but personally conclude that if 
you put sopmething online publicly, even with the intention 
of it only being seen by friend etc, it is still in the public 
domain and should be able to be viewed as part of an open 
source investigaton. The privacy argument is a valid one but 
as police officers, if there is evidence or other useful 
information pertanent to an investigation sitting on the 
internet for public view without barriers, we would be doing 
a dis-service to pass over it.
I suggest there are already in place procedures to gain any 
information required with obviously valid and justified reasoning.
I like the idea of what we are investigating being 
proportionate to what we can access. If I was the gate 
keeper that would probably not be the case.
I think it is right that the balance should be on the side of 
police having to make justifications for the right to view 
open source information if it is of a very personal nature.
If it is for police work/investigation then it should not be made hard to 
get authority by someone not around. It would be helpful if it was a 
tool that any investigator could use
If information is in the public domain and it assists 
with a policing purpose then the public should 
reasonably expect it to be accesssed.
I think police should automatically have the facility to view 
this data, but any police search it needs justification. 
However this does not and should not necessarily include 
prohibitive administration. Imagine how few crimes would 
be progressed if an Optica application had to be completed 
for every PNC check!
If it is for investigation purposes we should be able to conduct this 
research in order to speed up the investigation process and rule 
out/identify suspects faster.
This is a sensitive legal issue, which has to be carefully 
considered and decided upon by the legislator. A 
consultation process might be required to reach a 
decision on this matter. 
Among many other factors, it will presumably be necessary 
to strike a balance between the rights of an individual 
including the individual's human rights on the one hand and 
the necessity to investigate into the commission or 
preparation of the commission of a serious crime, which 
might endanger the wider public or put national security at 
risk.
There must be set guidelines which are kept to If there is a level of intrusion which goes beyond this 
then a level of authorisation should be required."
There should be more of a debate about young people be 
able to comit crime and view porn on mobile smart phones
W
hy – Reasons provided or constructed?
Balance betw
een privacy and Security
I think that whilst RIPA is not fit for the current 
purpose, I believe our interpretation of it in the OS 
context is actually not a bad system. I believe that 
most people are well aware of how their public facing 
data is handled. If you put something in the public 
domain, the majority understand that it can be seen by 
anyone, including the authorities. Its much the same 
as if you sat on a bus with a relative discussing the 
details of what you did last night in the presence and 
hearing of others, you'd expect that they can probably 
hear you and should tailor what you say appropriately. 
Equally, if you sat on that bus and was saying 
inappropriate things and an officer heard you, the 
public would expect the officer to act, much the same 
as if an officer online finds videos of violence or 
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